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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My central claim is that philosophers of mind have failed to take adequate account 
of empirical evidence regarding human consciousness and vision. Experiments on 
split-brain patients over the past fifty years reveal consciousness in both cerebral 
hemispheres. I claim specifically that (a) consciousness in the right hemisphere is 
inherited from our animal ancestors; (b) consciousness in the left hemisphere arose 
during human evolution in association with language; and (c) the existence of both 
forms of consciousness provides the best explanation for many aspects of normal 
human experience. 
 
Evidence for two cortical visual pathways in the human brain has been 
expanding for twenty years. The ventral pathway is specialised for object 
identification, and the dorsal pathway for the control of actions in respect of those 
objects. The evidence has been challenged by those who have failed (a) to 
distinguish between the visual pathways themselves and processes served by the 
pathways, and (b) to recognise the specific circumstances in which actions draw on 
one pathway. I claim that in the left hemisphere only the ventral pathway reaches 
consciousness. 
 
The combination of two visual pathways with two centres of consciousness 
challenges traditional views about perception. I claim that (a) perception is distinct 
from seeing; (b) perception is limited to the left hemisphere; and (c) the parallel 
process in the right hemisphere is associated with the emotions. The presence of two 
centres of consciousness challenges traditional views on the unity of consciousness 
and on personhood; but it also offers an explanation for conflicting views on the 
emotions and the existence of self-deception. 
 
I distinguish my claims about human consciousness from the Dual Systems 
(or Two Minds) Theory. Although there are superficial parallels, the latter theory 
denies that both systems/minds are conscious, and takes no account of the 
specialisation of the cerebral hemispheres revealed by experiments on split-brain 
patients. I conclude that philosophy must incorporate empirical evidence if it is to 
avoid claims of irrelevance.Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding and explaining consciousness is one of the central, and most complex, 
issues in the philosophy of mind. In this thesis I review some empirical data relating (i) 
to consciousness in humans and (ii) to the human visual system; and, in the light of that 
data, I claim that philosophers have mostly ignored a crucial distinction regarding 
human consciousness. The failure to make this distinction has implications for other 
areas of interest to the philosophy of mind, such as perception and emotion. 
 
Before I set out my detailed claims, it will be helpful to provide some 
background information on my approach to this issue. After discussing the relationship 
between philosophy and science, I outline my general approach to philosophy. I then 
review the concepts of “mind” and “mental states” before defining two distinct forms of 
creature consciousness and outlining how they can be identified. After a brief review of 
other concepts of consciousness and their relationship to creature consciousness, I set 
out my specific claims and some initial implications. I end the chapter with a summary. 
 
1.1 Philosophy and science 
In this part of the chapter, I explain how I see the relationship between philosophy and 
science, particularly neuroscience, and how I will approach and set out the empirical 
data on which I will build my case. I list the academic disciplines from which I will 
draw information, and my reasons for so doing. 
 
The relationship between philosophy and science is two-way. Philosophers can, 
and should, ask the difficult questions that provoke scientists into particular lines of 
research. But it is also essential that philosophers develop theories that are consistent 
with empirical data provided by scientists. As Heil (2004, p 3) puts it, “the philosophy 
of mind and empirical work on the mind can and should push ahead together”. Indeed, it 
has been said that “philosophical methods are most powerful when used with empirical 
data” (Prinz 2004, p 30).  
 
However, Heil also admits that “philosophy is largely unconstrained by 
empirical findings” (Heil 2004, p 13), and in this thesis I will show that this lack of 
constraint has resulted in philosophers failing to take account of important empirical 
data relating to consciousness. In order to make my case, and to provide the information 
needed both to criticise existing theories and to propose alternatives, I must necessarily 
set out the empirical grounds on which I do so.  
 
This means that the thesis contains a certain amount of data from neuroscience. 
However, since I am not writing for neuroscientists, I have sought to couch that data in 
terms that are comprehensible, and to avoid technical jargon wherever possible. When 
the use of technical neurological terms is unavoidable, I mark their first occurrence in Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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each chapter with bold italic, indicating that the term is included in the glossary at 
Appendix A. 
 
The brain is a most complex organ and is amazingly adaptable. People regularly 
recover from damage to the brain, such as from a stroke, and eventually other areas take 
the place of some, if not all, of those that have been damaged. Furthermore, just as there 
are rare examples of individuals born with physical abnormalities, such as missing 
limbs or the heart located on the right hand side of the body, so there can be unusual 
variations in the brain (such as only one hemisphere developing, or the brain matter 
being pressed into abnormal configurations through conditions such as hydrocephalus).  
 
All statements that I make about the brain, and particular areas within the brain, 
should be understood as referring to the normal human brain, unless otherwise 
specified. In the same way, when I talk about the abilities of humans, I am speaking of 
persons who are not suffering from any mental or physical disabilities. If I say humans 
are able to report their mental states, this statement is not disproved because some 
humans are aphasic, or because they may on some occasions be unconscious through a 
general anaesthetic. 
 
Few present day philosophers will deny that mind and brain are intricately 
related. Writing in 1994, one leading neurologist says “I wish I could say that we know 
with certainty how the brain goes about the business of making mind, but I cannot – 
and, I am afraid, no one can” (Damasio 2006, p 258). A philosopher has made the same 
point in the following terms: 
 
How is it possible for conscious states to depend upon brain states? 
How can technicolor phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter? 
What makes the bodily organ we call the brain so radically different 
from other bodily organs, say the kidneys – the body parts without a 
trace of consciousness? How could the aggregation of millions of 
individually insentient neurons generate subjective awareness? We 
know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we 
have, it seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be so. 
(McGinn 1997, p 529) 
 
Although McGinn comes to the conclusion that we may never be able to under-
stand consciousness, I take the view that the problems involved can be overcome. 
Whilst I approach the subject of consciousness in this thesis from the viewpoint of the 
philosophy of mind, I do so on the basis that in this field, at least, philosophy and 
science are inextricably related. I draw on material not only from neurology and medical 
neuroscience, but also from psychology and the philosophy of psychology, and from 
cognitive neuroscience. My aim in using these diverse sources is twofold: to identify 
empirical data that are relevant to a philosophical theory of consciousness, and to find 
ideas and concepts arising from that data that might assist in the development of such a 
theory. 
 
Having set out how I will approach the empirical data that will form the 
foundation for my thesis, I now turn to some underlying philosophical issues, beginning 
with my general approach to philosophy. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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.SUMMARY: Philosophy must pay regard to empirical data. I will draw 
on neurological science, but avoid technical terms as far as possible. 
Any statements I make about the human brain should be understood as 
referring to the normal undamaged brain, unless specifically stated 
otherwise. 
 
 
1.2 My philosophical approach 
In this part of the chapter I set out those aspects of my approach to philosophy that have 
influenced my research into human consciousness and vision.  In particular, I stress that 
I do not subscribe to any traditional “position”, but rather draw on a range of ideas to 
find an answer to each separate question with which I am faced. 
 
Even within the single field of philosophy of mind there are numerous distinct 
approaches to the issue of consciousness, and of the mind in general. Whilst labels such 
as “realist”, or “representationalist”, or “functionalist” may serve as useful ways of 
defining an approach to the philosophy of mind as a whole, they can lead to confusion if 
it is assumed that taking a particular stance on one issue requires taking the same stance 
on all other issues. My general approach is pragmatic: I take a particular view on each 
issue with which I am confronted, without thereby accepting “the whole package” that 
some may associate with that view.  My position is that of Searle when he says that his 
“views do not fit any of the traditional labels” (Searle 1994, p 15), although I recognize 
the truth of what he adds by saying that “to many philosophers the idea that one might 
hold a view that does not fit [traditional] categories seems incomprehensible” (ibid). 
 
At various times I will discuss consciousness in terms of a number of functions 
that play a role in processing sensory inputs. It may be that some of the functions I 
propose could be understood purely as illustrative. For example, the behaviour of birds 
foraging for food can be viewed functionally as a process of Cost Benefit Analysis in 
order to help us understand what is going on, without committing to the view that the 
birds are actually performing such a function (Bermúdez 2003, pp 114-5). In general, 
however, the combinations of mental states that I propose are intended to be understood 
as functions. I can therefore be classed as a functionalist, although I reject the more 
extreme functionalist view that mental states can be defined by the function that they 
perform, without regard to the physical material involved. 
 
The philosophical school of thought termed ‘eliminative materialism’ takes the 
view that the concepts that lie at the centre of folk psychology (such as desire, hope, 
belief) will in due course be eliminated by a scientific understanding of the mind. I do 
not subscribe to this view, but this does not for me rule out the possibility that there may 
be some aspects of folk psychology that turn out to be eliminable. For example, I will 
question below whether it is appropriate to speak at all about “the mind”, and wonder 
whether we have “a mind”. 
 
I am a naturalist in the sense that I view human mental activities as arising 
through the normal operation of laws within the brain (whether expressed in the 
language of biology, chemistry, or physics), and I take consciousness to be a natural Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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feature of the brain (see Searle 1994, p 1).  I assume that consciousness in humans arose 
through the process of evolution by natural selection. Although my focus is on human 
consciousness, I will therefore also consider evidence of consciousness and sensory 
processes in animals for the light they might throw on human consciousness. 
 
I assume that mind evolved as brains became more complex, and that a certain 
level of complexity is needed before mind can exist.  Not all activity in the brain is 
mental activity – much of it is purely physical and outside the interests of philosophy of 
mind. I believe that it is not necessary to understand, for example, how ion flows in 
neurons contribute to their operation, in order to comprehend perception, nor the exact 
manner in which memories are stored to comprehend learning, although future research 
may prove me wrong on these specific points. Different theorists will predict that 
different features of the brain are relevant as regards a philosophical theory of the mind. 
The claims that I am making in this thesis do not depend on the nature of the 
relationship between mind and brain, and so I take no definite position on issues such as 
supervenience or emergence.   
 
It might be claimed that by focusing on human consciousness rather than on 
consciousness in general what I am undertaking is more cognitive science than 
philosophy of mind. Cognitive science is concerned with how the brain performs those 
activities that can be classed as ‘mental’ or ‘conscious’, whereas philosophy of mind is 
concerned with mental phenomena independently of their realisation. In defending 
myself against this challenge I make two points. 
 
The first is to take the same line as Carruthers, who states that his theory of 
consciousness falls somewhere between philosophy and cognitive science. He adds that 
he is “inclined, in any case, to deny the existence of any sharp distinction” between the 
two (Carruthers 2000, p xvii). The second is to point out that our philosophical theories 
concerning mental phenomena must stand the scrutiny of empirical science. That is why 
we now reject the previously held philosophical views that located emotions in bodily 
organs other than the brain, or that assigned a pivotal role in mind to the pineal gland. It 
is my contention that most current philosophical views about human consciousness fail 
to accord with empirical findings; they must therefore be either amended or abandoned. 
 
Having set out this broad brush picture of my approach to philosophy, I now 
turn my attention to two specific philosophical topics that are crucial to any discussion 
of consciousness. These are the ontology of mind, and the related issue of mental states. 
 
SUMMARY: I do not claim for myself any of the traditional positions 
within the philosophy of mind, although I might be classed as a 
moderate functionalist. I take consciousness to be a natural feature of 
brain, arising as brains became more complex. I take no position on the 
nature of the relationship between mind and brain. 
 
 
 
 Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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1.3 What is mind? 
The term ‘mind’ has already been used quite a few times in this thesis, but different 
readers will have brought different assumptions about its meaning. If we assume that 
what we today mean by ‘mind’ is in essence what the ancient Greeks meant by ‘ψυχη’ 
(‘psyche’), then disagreements about the nature of mind have lasted around 2,500 years, 
that we know of. In this part of the chapter I outline three different concepts of mind, 
and state which I will adopt for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
One view, and probably the most widely-held outside of philosophy, is that 
‘mind’ refers to some discrete denumerable entity, such that humans are formed by a 
combination of body and mind. On this view, the mind can be separated from the body 
– for example, when people close to death report that they left their body and viewed it 
from a distance. Such a view underpins the Christian concept of resurrection and the 
Buddhist concept of reincarnation. This is the view adopted by Descartes who, in his 
sixth Meditation, describes the mind as a substance, distinct from body, in that it lacks 
extension, but linked to the body. 
 
Some two and a half millennia ago, Plato proposed that mind might be 
understood in this way (Heil 2004, p 14), although he also put forward an alternative 
view – that mind is to body as the tuning of the strings is to a lyre. On this 
understanding, mind describes how the body is organised, and there is no implication of 
the existence of anything other than the physical. This concept of mind was also used by 
Aristotle (ibid, p 15). 
 
The view of the mind as something distinct from the body reflects our everyday 
awareness of ourselves as being “inside” and distinct from the body. We see our body 
grow old, but we sense that the real “us” is still the age we were in our prime. However, 
despite the appeal of this concept of mind, it poses apparently insuperable problems. 
How can we fit such a mind into the physical universe? How can something non-
physical cause the physical behaviour of our bodies? This forces us to look for a 
concept of mind that locates it in a physical context, and there are two ways in which 
this might be done. I will illustrate these with an analogy. 
 
A school is an institution that exists physically. It does not need a 
specific location: schools in the Australian outback, for example, can 
be spread over vast distances as pupils link with their teacher by radio. 
Where there is a location, that location does not constitute the school: 
the school is formed through the organisation of teachers and pupils for 
the purpose of education. Thus a school is not in itself a physical object 
but rather an arrangement of physical objects designed for a specific 
purpose. There can be many such arrangements, and it is therefore both 
possible and reasonable to individuate schools. This village may have 
one school, another may have two, and so on. 
However, we have a concept of education – the common 
feature of all schools. If an institution that claims to be a school is not 
organised so as to educate its pupils, then it is not a school. Further-
more, education can take place outside of school; for example, home 
schooling by parents, or self-education. Education – in this sense – is 
not denumerable. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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If the term ‘mind’ is understood in the same way as the term ‘school’ – as a 
description of a particular form of organisation with a particular purpose – then it makes 
sense to discuss how we individuate minds. Does each person have one mind, or more 
than one? But if mind is like education, then it is inappropriate and meaningless to 
individuate ‘minds’ – there is simply mind.  
 
Whether we regard “school” or “education” as the appropriate simile for mind, 
the same question arises.  What sort of materials can be organised so as to constitute 
mind: can only animal brain matter constitute mind, or can aliens, robots or computers, 
for example, be minded? Answering this question is outside the scope of this thesis, 
which is concerned solely with mind in relation to animals and humans. 
 
It may be helpful at this point to sum up the three ways of understanding what is 
meant by ‘mind’ in the following table: 
 
  Mind as Cartesian 
substance 
Mind as 
organisation 
Mind as abstraction 
Independent Existence  YES  NO  NO 
Countable  YES  YES  NO 
Compatible with 
physicalism 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Table 1.1 Ways of understanding the meaning of ‘mind’ 
I take the problems of explaining how mind as a separate substance can interact 
with the physical universe to be so overwhelming, that this concept of mind must be 
ruled out.  This leaves the question of whether we should conceive of mind as an 
organisation, such that I could have one or more minds, or as an abstraction; in which 
case it makes no sense to talk about having “a mind”. (I realise that we do speak about 
having “an education”, so the analogy I have been using falls down at this point. 
Consider instead the concept of “finance”: I can point to a financial institution, but not 
to “a finance”.) 
 
I am strongly attracted to the view that in time it will become evident that mind 
is an abstraction, and that references to “the mind” should be eliminated from folk 
psychology. However, I take the view in this thesis that ‘mind’ when applied to animals 
and humans should be understood as the organisation formed by certain brain states – 
what are referred to as “mental states” – for a common purpose. The issue that I will not 
address is how we are to understand the relationship between brain states and mental 
states: issues such as type identity versus token identity, supervenience, and emergence. 
I will simply assume that there exists a consistent relationship between certain brain 
states and mental states. 
 
SUMMARY: I reject the concept of mind as distinct from, and separable 
from, the body. I view the term ‘mind’ as describing the way in which 
certain brain activities are organised in order to create consciousness, 
in the way that a school is organised to provide education. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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I take the common purpose of those mental states that constitute mind to be 
consciousness, but before I consider the meaning of that term, I must consider further 
the issue of mental states. 
 
 
 
1.4 Mental states 
I take the view that certain brain states can be viewed as mental states because they 
form a part of the organisation that we call “mind”. There are a number of different 
ways of categorising mental states and I will consider these in turn. Although I do not 
refer directly to the function of individual mental states in establishing these categories,  
I will describe combinations of mental states as functions at various points in the thesis. 
 
1.4.1 Occurrent and non-occurrent states 
 
One distinction that philosophers make is between occurrent mental states and non-
occurrent mental states. In this section I explain the distinction, and outline how it will 
be reflected in my terminology. I begin with the process of learning and its creation of 
non-occurrent states.  
 
The process of learning involves the formation of pathways between different 
neurons or groups of neurons, such that when one neuron or group of neurons is 
activated the other neurons are also activated. This process has been described as “cells 
that fire together, wire together” (Robertson 1999, p 13). The pathways that are formed 
in this way exist whether or not they are currently active; indeed, they continue to exist 
even when the mind is inactive, such as during anaesthesia. My belief that “Paris is the 
capital of France” does not have to be activated in order to be a belief, but only when it 
is activated can it contribute to my mental processes. 
 
I will use the term ‘state’ in the sense of ‘occurrent mental state’, and will use 
the term ‘disposition’ for non-occurrent mental states. By using this term I am not 
adopting the behaviourist position, I am simply making the point that when a pathway 
has been formed in the brain, there will be a disposition to activate all the elements in 
the pathway whenever one element is activated.  It may be that a certain level of 
activation is needed before the rest of the pathway becomes active, so that being 
disposed to believe ‘p’ (that Paris is the capital of France) may not result in a mental 
state of believing ‘p’ every time that neurons representing France or Paris are activated. 
 
Although I have made a clear distinction between dispositions and states, 
dispositions share many features with propositional states. What I say about the latter in 
the following section should be understood as applying equally to dispositions. 
 
SUMMARY: I reserve the term ‘state’ for occurrent mental states, i.e. 
states that are playing a part in mental activity. I use the term 
‘disposition’ for non-occurrent states. 
 Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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1,4,2 Types of state 
Mental states can be grouped into types based on certain common features. The four 
main types of state that are commonly identified are as follows: 
 
·  Propositional states: these are states that represent different attitudes to 
propositions. There are a number of distinct attitudes, including belief, hope, 
desire and intention (in its everyday sense). Propositions comprise the 
statements of what is believed, hoped, desired or intended: I believe “that it will 
rain today”; I hope “that it will rain today”; I desire “that I drink a cup of tea”; or 
I intend “that I drink a cup of tea”. 
 
·  Sensational states: these are states that represent sensations that I am 
undergoing. Examples are the sensation of being tickled; the sensation of 
nausea; the sensation of pain. I may have a sensation of some background noise, 
before I realise that it is someone speaking, and I can then perceive what they 
are saying. 
 
·  Perceptual states: these are states that interpret the information that reaches me 
through the senses. Although I will challenge this way of understanding 
perception in a later chapter, it is common practice to describe verbs such as 
‘see’ and ‘hear’ as perceptual verbs. Thus, seeing a tree, or hearing a bird, or 
feeling the computer keys that I am pressing, are all examples of paradigmatic 
perceptual states. 
 
·  Emotional states: we are all familiar with states such as fear, or excitement, or 
pleasure, where our mental state is matched to a greater or lesser extent with 
changes to our body: butterflies in the stomach, tenseness in our muscles, or a 
more rapid heart beat. 
 
Although it is relatively easy to categorise states in general in this way, it is 
much more difficult to decide which category individual states fall into. If I say “I am 
afraid that it is going to rain today”, is this a propositional state expressing an attitude, 
or an emotional state, reporting a feeling? If I am aware of a feeling of nausea, is this a 
sensational state, or one aspect of an emotional state? The answer in both cases is that it 
could be either. This categorisation of states should be seen as a useful aid to under-
standing the mind, not an inflexible strait jacket into which all mental states must be 
forced. 
 
Many of these states share one important feature: that they are about something. 
Such states are termed intentional states, and they are the subject of the next section. 
 
SUMMARY: Although categories such as propositional, sensational, 
perceptual and emotional are useful ways of describing mental states, 
many states can be viewed as falling into more than one category. 
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1.4.3 Intentional states 
Intentional states are states that represent something. If a see a tree, then my perceptual 
state represents the visual appearance of a tree. If I hear the wind rustling the leaves of 
the tree, then my perceptual state represents the sound that is created by the wind 
moving the tree’s leaves. (I am not primarily concerned in this thesis with the question 
of whether in such a case there are two separate states – one visual and one auditory – or 
a single state that is both visual and auditory. I will however make brief reference to the 
unity of consciousness in chapter 5.) 
 
Intentional states come in two forms: first order states and higher order states. A 
first order intentional state represents something at first hand: a tree, my hand, an idea. 
We can speak of the tree, or hand, or idea as being the object of the intentional state. A 
higher order intentional state has as its object a first order (or another higher order) 
intentional state. Thus if I look out of my window I see a tree: I have a first order 
representation of the tree. But if I think to myself “I seem to see a tree”, I have a higher 
order state representing my experience whose object is the first-order state representing 
the tree. (I could be having the thought “I seem to see a tree” when there is in fact no 
tree to be seen, so the object of my mental state representing my experience cannot be a 
tree, but only an intentional state representing a tree.) 
 
The distinction between first order and higher order intentional states will 
become important in what follows, when I distinguish two different forms of 
consciousness.   
 
SUMMARY: Intentional states are states that represent something: if 
they represent another representation then they are higher order states, 
otherwise they are first order states. 
 
 
 
1.5 Creature Consciousness 
Trying to explain what we mean by ‘consciousness’ has been likened by Güzeldere 
(1997, p 1) to the problem of explaining time as reported by Augustine: “when no one 
asked him, he knew what it was; being asked, however, he no longer did”. There are 
countless quotes in the philosophy literature about the mysterious, problematical, 
inexplicable nature of consciousness, and the problem is compounded by the very 
different senses in which the term is used. 
 
My concern in this thesis is with one particular sense of the term – with what has 
been termed “creature consciousness”. My concern is with the folk psychological 
understanding that certain creatures (including humans) are conscious, and that other 
creatures are not, and that consciousness is related to the complexity of the nervous 
system, more specifically to the brain. In the following sections I define two distinct 
forms of creature consciousness. 
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1.5.1 Basic consciousness 
I suggest that there are two features common to all conscious creatures: they are sentient 
and sapient. By ‘sentient’ I mean that such creatures sense their environment: that is, 
certain internal states vary in ways that reflect changes in their surroundings. These are 
“sensational states” as described above. In this context, I take the environment to 
include the creature’s own body other than the brain, so that sentience includes 
sensations such as pains. I take sentience to be necessary for consciousness, but not 
sufficient for it, unlike philosophers such as Rosenthal (1997, p 729) who claims that 
“to be conscious a person or other creature must be awake and sentient”. 
 
The view of creature consciousness that I am using in this thesis is that sentience 
must be accompanied by sapience for consciousness to exist. By sapience I mean the 
ability, however limited, to reason about the content of sensational states and to will 
behaviour. In taking this view I am also assuming that reasoning is possible in the 
absence of an external language, so that animals, for example, are capable of “thinking 
without words” (Bermúdez 2003). (By requiring both sentience and sapience, I am 
limiting creature consciousness to birds and mammals: others may adopt a wider 
definition.) 
 
When I speak of a sentient creature, I refer to a creature that is currently capable 
of sensing its environment, not a creature that is currently sensing its environment. And 
similarly, a sapient creature is one currently capable of reasoning, not one that is 
currently reasoning. This means that a conscious creature is one that is currently capable 
of sensing its environment and of reasoning, although – at least in theory – it may not be 
doing so at this particular time. An analogy may help clarify this point. 
 
There are two identical houses, equipped with the same electrical 
facilities and the switches to control them. In both cases all the lights 
are off, and all the electrical equipment is off. I enter one house and 
switch on a light, but nothing happens. I enter the other house and 
switch on the light, and the light comes on. The first house was not 
connected, the second was. 
 
I will adopt the term “basic consciousness” – or more briefly “B-consciousness” 
– for creature consciousness as I have described it (the combination of sentience and 
sapience). What I have described as sentience is not dissimilar to what Armstrong 
(2004) calls “minimal consciousness”. And what I have termed B-consciousness is 
close to, if not the same as, what Armstrong terms “perceptual consciousness”. 
However, Armstrong goes on to identify another sense of consciousness which he terms 
“introspective consciousness” (ibid, pp 610ff), and in the following section I will 
consider the relationship between this and basic consciousness. 
 
SUMMARY: Basic consciousness is a combination of sentience and 
sapience. In consists in the active ability to sense and to think, even 
when not currently sensing or thinking. 
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1.5.2 Compound consciousness 
The ability to introspect is the ability to be aware of and to reason using both the content 
of our mental states and the states themselves. It is, as Edelman (2006, pp 14-15) 
expresses it, the consciousness of being conscious. This requires the capacity for higher 
order representations (ibid, p 15; Lowe 2000, p 190), which makes possible more 
complex reasoning than can be achieved with only first order representations. These two 
factors – higher order intentional states and the capacity for more complex reasoning – 
may form the foundation for the development of (external) language. I do not know 
whether I could be introspectively aware of what I am thinking if I did not have the 
ability to express my thoughts in words, but I do know that I could never know that 
other people were introspectively conscious if they could not report their thoughts to me 
using a common language. 
 
Clearly “introspective consciousness” cannot exist in the absence of basic 
consciousness. I adopt the term “compound consciousness” (or C-consciousness) to 
refer to that form of creature consciousness that incorporates both the sentience and 
sapience that go to make up B-consciousness and the additional ability to introspect and 
verbally report that introspection. Whether this compound form of creature 
consciousness can be fragmented into its separate parts must await empirical evidence. 
 
SUMMARY: Compound creature consciousness combines sentience 
and sapience with the ability to introspect one’s mental states, to use 
language to report their presence and their content, and to engage in 
complex reasoning. 
 
 
 
 
1.5.3 Definitions 
I have identified two forms of creature consciousness, and I will claim later that they 
exist separately and independently in humans. For now, the following definitions may 
be helpful. 
 
DEFINITION 1: B-CONSCIOUSNESS is that form of creature 
consciousness that comprises the capacity to sense the environment 
and to respond with simple reasoning using the content of first order 
intentional states that may result in observable behaviour.  
 
DEFINITION 2: C-CONSCIOUSNESS is that form of creature 
consciousness that comprises the capacity to sense the environment, to 
respond with complex reasoning – using both first order and higher 
order intentional states – that may result in outward behaviour, and to 
introspect and verbally report those states. 
 
Having defined these two forms of creature consciousness, I now consider how 
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1.6 Identifying the two forms of creature consciousness 
My purpose in this part of the chapter is to establish the means by which we can identify 
the presence of creature consciousness, and discriminate between its two forms. I begin 
with the brain and then consider behaviour, and the mental states that give rise to it. 
 
 
1.6.1 Similar brains 
There can be little doubt that consciousness arises from and in the brain. As Searle puts 
it: “studying the brain without studying consciousness would be like studying the 
stomach without studying digestion” (Searle 2002, p 36).  I take it that Searle is 
referring to philosophical study of the brain, and is not denying that other specialists 
might well study the brain without reference to consciousness. He might well have 
added that it would also be pointless for philosophers to study consciousness without 
reference to the brain.  
 
Although, as will be discussed in a moment, behaviour is the practical means of 
identifying the presence of consciousness, it is the similarity of brain that is equally 
important (Edelman 2006, pp 14-15). I am not claiming that only brains can support 
consciousness; it may well be that the time will come when we encounter conscious 
aliens who lack brains like ours, or when we succeed in creating conscious artifacts. 
What I am claiming is that at the present we are not aware of consciousness in any 
creature lacking a brain like ours, and it is the presence of such a brain that – at least in 
part – justifies our interpretation of animal and human behaviour as evidence of 
consciousness. 
 
Searle stresses the importance of both factors in recognizing the presence of 
consciousness. He expresses it in the following terms: 
 
It isn’t just because a dog behaves in a way that is appropriate to having 
conscious mental states, but also because I can see that the causal basis 
of the behavior in the dog’s physiology is relevantly like my own. . . . It 
is the combination of these two facts . . .(Searle 1994, p 73) 
 
Given that we are aware of basic similarities between the brains of mature 
humans, and the similarities between the brains of some animals and the brains of 
humans, then we judge the presence of creature consciousness by observing behaviour. 
In the next section I will consider what forms of behaviour provide evidence of 
consciousness. 
 
SUMMARY: Our judgment that a creature is conscious depends in part 
on our recognition of similarities between their brain and ours. 
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1.6.2 Reasoned behaviour 
In identifying the causes of their behaviour, we assume that dogs, and other conscious 
animals, are responding to sensory inputs in the way that they do because they have 
desires and beliefs that lead them to act in that way. This process of ascribing 
‘reasoning’ or ‘practical rationality’ has been described by Davidson as follows:  
 
If someone acts with an intention then he must have attitudes and 
beliefs from which, had he been aware of them and had the time, he 
could have reasoned that his act was desirable . . . If we can 
characterize the reasoning that would serve we will, in effect, have 
described the logical relations between descriptions of beliefs and 
desires and the description of the action, when the former gives the 
reasons with which the latter was performed. 
(Davidson 1978, pp 85-86) 
 
I make a distinction between what I will term “reasoned behaviour” and “rational 
behaviour”. It is not sufficient evidence for consciousness that I, as the observer, can 
rationalise a creature’s behaviour. Evolution by natural selection can produce instinctive 
behaviour that can be termed “rational” in creatures that lack consciousness as I have 
defined it. One example would be the way that a frog shoots out its tongue to catch any 
small black object that comes into sight: since it is likely that such an object will be a fly 
and therefore food, the frog’s action can be termed rational, but does not provide 
evidence of reasoning. 
 
There are, I suggest, two factors that provide evidence for reasoning, and thereby 
for consciousness. They are choice and learning. 
 
SUMMARY: We judge creatures to be conscious when their behaviour 
gives evidence that it is the result of reasoning. 
 
 
1.6.3 Choice and learning 
In many situations there will be several distinct objects that are sensed within the 
environment, and several different beliefs and desires that are relevant to those objects. 
This means that there is not a single reaction to the sensory input that can be understood 
as reasoned, and an observer can deduce from the observed behaviour that a choice has 
been made. Picture the family dog faced with Mum putting food in its bowl, just as Dad 
comes in the door. Does the dog choose to eat the food or greet the newcomer?  
 
It should be stressed at this point that I am reviewing folk psychological views 
about consciousness, rather than philosophical views, and that I am claiming that in folk 
psychology choice is seen as evidence for reasoning and therefore for consciousness. I 
am not claiming that choice is a feature of consciousness. It may be that philosophers 
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competing beliefs or desires: that does not negate my claim that we consider animals to 
be conscious, in part because we see them as making choices.  
 
Philosophers can also conceive of zombies – creatures who appear to be 
physically identical to humans in every respect but who lack consciousness. If such 
creatures existed, it might be claimed that they could be seen to be making choices, 
even though they are not conscious. A detailed discussion of the idea of zombies is 
outside the scope of this thesis; I will simply note that in practice we assume that other 
humans and some animals are conscious, in part because we see them make choices; 
and I take the view that we are justified in making that assumption. 
 
It must also be acknowledged that there are philosophical problems with the 
concept of free will, and whether any creature has the capacity to choose. Determinists 
will claim that there could be an unbroken causal chain from the moment of the Big 
Bang until now that determines which chocolate I select from the box in front of me. 
This is a significant question for philosophers to debate, but it does not change folk 
psychological ideas about choice. When we see an animal appear to make a choice, we 
assume that it is reasoning and thus that it is conscious. 
 
The initiation of behaviour in conscious creatures is, as I have shown, a result of 
choice; and the behaviour can be termed “willed behaviour”. I will use this term as 
another way of expressing the same thing as “reasoned behaviour”, where it is the act of 
willing, rather than the reasoning that precedes it, that is the focus of attention. 
 
The other feature in the behaviour of creatures, closely related to choice and 
will, that provides evidence of consciousness is the ability to learn, or to be trained. A 
rat can be trained to find its way through a maze to get food: a dog can be trained to 
assist a shepherd in the management of sheep: people can be trained to become 
philosophers. But other animals, such as crocodiles, snails or coral, cannot be trained.  
We conclude that if they cannot be trained, then they cannot be learning, and if they are 
not learning they cannot be reasoning, and thus they cannot be conscious. 
 
SUMMARY: Evidence that a creature makes choices and that it is 
capable of learning is evidence of reasoning. 
 
 
 
1.6.4 Two caveats 
So far in this part of the chapter, I have stated that – based on Folk Psychology – 
we identify consciousness when we see a creature behave in a way that is best explained 
by it having sensory states representing its environment and reasoning about the content 
of those states; and that we identify reasoning by evidence for choice and the ability to 
learn. We may be wrong in individual instances of behaviour (the man who seems to 
duck to avoid a bullet might have an involuntary tic that happily coincided with the 
arrival of the bullet); but expect to be right when we observe a creature’s behaviour over 
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Whilst reasoned behaviour is useful evidence for consciousness, its absence is 
not proof of the absence of consciousness. When it comes to human behaviour, the most 
common evidence for creature consciousness is the use of language, and that may reveal 
consciousness at an earlier point in time when there was no behavioural evidence. 
Although we can recognize C-consciousness from behaviour that gives evidence of 
complex thought and higher order intentional states, the usual evidence is quite simply 
the use of language. I turn now, therefore, to the relationship between language and 
consciousness. 
 
SUMMARY: Single instances of behaviour are insufficient evidence of 
consciousness. Absence of behaviour is not evidence of absence of 
consciousness. 
 
 
 
1.6.5 Language and consciousness 
Folk psychology recognises that sensory inputs and reasoning do not necessarily 
result in observable outward behaviour. There have, for example, been numerous 
examples of people totally paralysed, either through general anaesthesia or some form 
of trauma, who have reported after their recovery that they were conscious throughout 
the entire time. They could see, and hear, and feel pain, and they could think, even 
though they could provide no outward evidence of consciousness. A less dramatic 
example is the professor of philosophy who is found by her student apparently fast 
asleep with her eyes shut, but who then speaks up and says “I am not asleep; I am 
thinking”. It is subsequent behaviour, in the form of language, that provides evidence of 
the previous presence of consciousness. 
 
In the absence of language we have no evidence that animals can introspect their 
mental states, nor that they have higher order mental states. It might be possible to 
conceive of a creature that possesses language but lacks the ability to introspect and 
report their mental states. It might also be possible to conceive of a creature that can 
introspect and has higher order states, but that lacks a language to report them. 
However, neither of these cases should obscure the fact that humans can introspect and 
report their mental states, so that when they do so we have evidence for  
C-consciousness. 
 
However, two further caveats are necessary. Firstly, the inability of particular 
individuals to use language because of developmental or neurological deficits does not 
constitute proof of the absence of C-consciousness. The loss of language after a stroke, 
for example, does not, in and of itself, demonstrate the loss of  C-consciousness. But 
secondly, the inability to report one’s mental states when there is no language deficit is 
evidence of the absence of C-consciousness. Thus if an individual’s behaviour is such 
that it meets the criteria for B-consciousness, but that individual (with full use of their 
linguistic abilities) is unable to report the mental states that resulted in that behaviour, 
then we can conclude that they were B-conscious but not C-conscious. 
 Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
20 
SUMMARY: The use of language is evidence of C-consciousness. The 
lack of language through developmental or neurological deficits is not 
evidence for the absence of C-consciousness. When there are no such 
deficits, the inability to report mental states is evidence of  
B-consciousness. 
 
 
1.6.6 Two tests 
In this part of the chapter I have focused on the folk psychological basis for identifying 
the presence of creature consciousness in humans and some animals, where we 
recognise underlying physiological similarities. Although the absence of behaviour is 
not proof of the absence of consciousness, we can apply certain tests to behaviour in 
order to identify the presence of creature consciousness and to discriminate between  
B-consciousness and C-consciousness. 
 
EVIDENCE FOR B-CONSCIOUSNESS: Behaviour that provides 
evidence of simple reasoning, using the content of mental states to 
learn and make choices, where the creature either (i) is of a type that 
lacks language, or (ii) is of a type that possesses language but, with no 
developmental or neurological deficits preventing its use, is unable to 
use language to report those mental states. 
 
EVIDENCE FOR C-CONSCIOUSNESS: Either (i) the use of language 
to report mental states and their contents or (ii) behaviour that 
demonstrates complex reasoning and higher order representations 
when there are developmental or neurological reasons for the absence 
of language. 
 
In part 1.8, I will set out my claims about creature conscious in both its forms, 
but before I do so there is one other issue to be addressed. The term ‘consciousness’ is 
used within the philosophy literature in senses other than “creature consciousness”, and 
I should consider some of those senses of the term and their relationship to creature 
consciousness, at least briefly, before I focus on the latter. I turn now, therefore, to 
review the concepts of access, phenomenal and state consciousness, and their relation to 
creature consciousness. 
 
 
1.7 Other types of consciousness  
In this part of the chapter I review three other types of consciousness that are frequently 
discussed in the philosophical literature: phenomenal consciousness, access 
consciousness and state consciousness. My aim is to determine how, if at all, they relate 
to the two forms of creature consciousness that I have defined. I begin with phenomenal 
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1.7.1 Phenomenal consciousness 
Much has been written about the form of consciousness termed “phenomenal 
consciousness”, and this is usually described by variations on a claim originally made 
by Nagel. In a widely quoted paper entitled What is it like to be a bat? Nagel makes the 
following claims that appear at first sight to relate to what I have termed  
B-consciousness: 
 
 
Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many 
levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the 
simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what 
provides evidence of it . . . [T]he fact that an organism has conscious 
experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to 
be that organism. . . . [A]n organism has conscious mental states if and 
only if there is something it is like to be that organism – something it is 
like for the organism. (Nagel 1997, p 519 – italics in original) 
 
I will return to the difference between conscious organisms and conscious 
mental states below, but for the moment I want to focus on the much quoted phrase 
“what it is like” and in particular what it is “like for the organism”. Unless philosophers 
have imbued the term “like” with some esoteric sense, we should be able to understand 
what Nagel means by applying common sense. We know that he is talking about 
experience, so we can imagine being asked by someone “what was that experience like 
for you?” There are three different ways in which we might respond.  
 
·  The first is to provide a comparison. If I know that you have had a particular 
experience, I can compare my experience to that. If I have had experience A, and 
I know that you have had experience B, then I can say “my experience was like 
experience B but . . .” and list some of the differences. Lewis (1997, pp 581) 
says that this approach is missing the point. Whilst we may well be able to 
compare different experiences that we have had, or to compare our experience 
with someone else’s, I must agree with Lewis that this does not seem to be 
Nagel’s sense. 
 
·  The second way to answer the question “what was it like?” is to describe. If I 
arrive home and tell me wife that there was an accident on the motorway, she 
might ask me what it was like. I could answer by describing the accident. “A 
motorcyclist was weaving in and out of the traffic. A car driver failed to notice 
him and began to change lanes. The motor cycle collided with the car and the 
rider was thrown across into the other carriageway.” It seems unlikely that this is 
what Nagel meant. 
 
·  The third possibility is to say that the experience cannot be described: it is 
personal and ineffable. The only way for you to know what the experience that I 
had is like is to have the experience yourself. This is certainly the view taken by 
some philosophers, who claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot be 
explained in physical terms. Some, like Nagel (1997) and Chalmers (2004), 
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others, such as McGinn (1997) claim that it is a problem that can never be 
solved. 
 
I suggest that there is one factor underlying all three answers to the question 
“what was it like for you?” This is that you must have been aware of the experience in 
order to answer. There is a difference between being aware of an experience, and being 
aware of the content of a mental state. If I am driving “on automatic pilot” (a subject I 
will return to in a later chapter) and pull up at the traffic lights which are red, I was 
clearly aware of the content of my visual input (the red lights). But if my passenger asks 
me a little later – when I am driving normally again – what it was it like to see the red 
traffic lights back there, then I cannot answer, because it was not like anything, in any 
of the three senses. 
 
I take it therefore – along with philosophers such as Carruthers (2000) – that 
phenomenal consciousness is a higher order feature of human experience. This would 
equate phenomenal consciousness with what I have termed C-consciousness. But is 
phenomenal consciousness a form of creature consciousness? Many, if not most, 
references by philosophers to phenomenal consciousness describe it as a form of state 
consciousness (Carruthers 2000, p 13; Block 1997, p 380). This is what Carruthers says: 
 
The most obvious and striking (and the most famous) form of state-
consciousness is phenomenal consciousness. This is the property which 
mental states possess when it is like something to have them (Nagel’s 
famous phrase, 1974). Put differently, phenomenally conscious states 
have distinctive subjective feels. . . So we might be asked to reflect on 
the unique quality of the experience we enjoy when we hear the timbre 
of a trumpet-blast, or drink-in the pink and orange hues of a sunset, or 
sniff the sweet heady smell of a rose. In all these cases there is 
something distinctive which it is like to undergo the experience . . . 
(Carruthers 2000, p 13 – italics in original) 
 
Twice in this passage Carruthers uses the phrase “it is like” and I take it that 
what he means is “what it is like for us”. He is talking about the “experience we enjoy”. 
Clearly we are conscious when we enjoy our experiences, but Carruthers’ explanation 
of that conscious experience is that it involves a phenomenally conscious state. That is, 
creature consciousness is to be explained by state consciousness. In section 1.7.3 I 
consider the implications of this claim, but before doing so I consider the issue of 
access consciousness. 
 
SUMMARY: The phrase that is commonly used to explain what is 
meant by “phenomenal consciousness” is “what it is like”. I claim that 
this means being aware of experience, which it turn means being in a 
higher order state. Phenomenal consciousness is usually viewed as a 
form of state consciousness. 
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1.7.2 Access consciousness 
Whereas Carruthers assigns phenomenal consciousness a role in reasoning, Block 
distinguishes phenomenal consciousness from access consciousness, and claims that it 
is the latter that contributes to reasoning and the control of behaviour (Block 1997, p 
382). He also claims that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness can exist 
independently: that is, that you can be phenomenally conscious without being access 
conscious – and vice versa. 
 
Block gives the following example of phenomenal consciousness in the absence 
of access consciousness. 
 
Suppose that you are engaged in intense conversation when suddenly at 
noon you realise that right outside your window, there is – and has been 
for some time – a pneumatic drill digging up the street. You were aware 
of the noise all along, one might say, but only at noon are you 
consciously aware of it, That is, you were P-conscious of the noise all 
along, but at noon you are both P-conscious and A-conscious of it. 
(Block 1997, pp 386-387 – italics in original) 
 
What changes in this scenario is surely attention, not the form of consciousness. 
If I can realise that I was hearing the sound of the drill before noon, then I must have 
stored a memory of that experience, and if I was able to store a memory then it seems 
that I had access to the sound: I was simply not paying attention to it.  This example 
fails, as I see it, to prove that phenomenal consciousness can exist in the absence of 
access consciousness. 
 
However, there is a sense in which Block’s distinction may have some 
justification. In the previous section I suggested that phenomenal consciousness might be 
equated with C-consciousness. What distinguishes C-consciousness from  
B-consciousness is the ability associated with the former to introspect and to report one’s 
mental states. Clearly, to be B-conscious involves, among other things, the use of the 
content of perceptual states in reasoning. If I am B-consciously reasoning using the 
content of a perceptual state, then it might be said that I have access to the content of that 
state – even though I cannot introspect it or report it. If at a particular time I am  
B-conscious but not C-conscious, then I might be said to be access conscious but not 
phenomenally conscious. 
 
However, when Block speaks of access and phenomenal consciousness, and 
when Carruthers speaks of the latter, they are both speaking about conscious mental 
states, not about forms of creature consciousness. In the following section therefore I 
turn my attention to what is meant by talk of “state consciousness”. 
 
SUMMARY: Block differentiates access and phenomenal consciousness, 
with only the former resulting in reasoning. I suggest that  
B-consciousness may be viewed as access consciousness in the absence 
of phenomenal consciousness 
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1.7.3 State consciousness 
Talk of “conscious states” raises three questions: (1) what does the word 
‘conscious’ mean in this context? (2) what makes “conscious” states “conscious”? and  
(3) how do “conscious” states bring about creature consciousness? Because these three 
issues are interrelated, they cannot be answered independently, and the answers must 
emerge from a general discussion. 
 
Mental states are clearly not conscious in the same sense that I am conscious. 
Mental states are not sentient or sapient, although they undoubtedly play a role in my 
sentience and sapience. So why use the term ‘conscious’ to describe such states? One 
philosopher has made this point in the following terms: 
 
Given the reality of the distinction between states we are aware of being 
in and states we are not aware of being in, the only remaining question is 
that of why the word “conscious” is thus dragged in as an adjective to 
mark it. . . I cannot myself hear a natural sense of the phrase “conscious 
state” other than as meaning “state one is conscious of being in”.   
(Lycan 1997, p 759) 
 
But this is not the meaning of “conscious” when used by Carruthers of 
“phenomenally conscious states”, since it implies that state consciousness arises from 
creature consciousness, and not the other way round. It is not the distinction between 
states that Lycan challenges, but only the use of the term “conscious” to mark that 
distinction. It is clear that philosophers writing about “state consciousness” are 
intending to distinguish those states of which we can become conscious from those that 
by their nature will remain below the level of consciousness. They use terms such as 
“poised” and “available” to describe the role of such states. 
 
Carruthers speaks of “a certain sort of intentional content” being “held in a 
special-purpose short-term memory store in such a way as to be available to higher-
order thoughts” (Carruthers 2000, p xiii). Block speaks about states that are “poised for 
free use in reasoning and . . . control of action and speech” (Block 1997, p 382), and 
Tye speaks of states whose content is “Poised, Abstract, Nonconceptual [and] 
Intentional” (Tye 2004, p 658). All three passages are concerned with the availability of 
states, not their actual use. 
 
The claim common to all three philosophers is that the states to which they give 
the name “conscious” are necessary for, but not sufficient for, creature consciousness. 
What is not made clear is how these “conscious” states are related to creature 
consciousness. The problem of this approach is highlighted by Searle. 
 
In his (2007) Searle cites examples of experiments that seek to identify the point 
at which a visual input becomes conscious, in order to explain how we become 
conscious. Two of his examples are binocular vision and gestalt switching.  The first of 
these involves showing one eye a row of vertical lines and one eye a row of horizontal 
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seeing vertical lines and seeing horizontal lines. The aim of this research is to find what 
it is that causes the mind to be conscious of one rather than the other. 
 
Gestalt switching involves objects such as a Necker cube (see figure 1.1 below).  
The surface ABCD can be viewed either as the side of the cube facing the viewer, or as 
the base of the cube, and experimenters seek to explain how we switch between these 
views. 
Figure 1.1: A Necker Cube 
 
Searle says of such experiments that “I am very enthusiastic about all these lines 
of research but I fear that they may be making a fundamental mistake: In all of these 
cases, the subject is already conscious” (ibid).  
 
SUMMARY: I concede a distinction between states of which, or in 
which, I can be conscious and those of which, or in which, I cannot be 
conscious. I reject, however, both the use of the term “conscious” to 
describe the former and the idea that such states can explain creature 
consciousness. 
 
 
 
1.7.4 Conclusions 
I have claimed that in order to make sense of “what it is like” to have a particular 
experience, I must be aware not only of the content of the relevant sensory input but 
also of the experience of perceiving that input. This is only possible with higher order 
representation. If the term “phenomenal consciousness” is used in the sense of creature 
consciousness, then I see no distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what I 
have termed C-consciousness: they are different terms for the same thing. 
 
However, if “phenomenal consciousness” is used to describe a form of state 
consciousness, then I have questioned the use of the term “consciousness”.  Conscious 
states are described as being “available” or “poised” for reasoning and control of 
behaviour, but insofar as they are not used for reasoning or control of behaviour they are 
not states of which, or in which, I am conscious. Whilst there may be considerable value 
in understanding the difference between states that can reach consciousness and those 
that cannot, it is misleading to use the term ‘conscious’ of the former.  Such states 
cannot, in and of themselves, explain how a creature is conscious. 
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I have also challenged Block’s claim that some conscious states can be 
phenomenally conscious without being access conscious. If one takes a higher order 
view of phenomenal creature consciousness, and accepts that access consciousness can 
be viewed as a form of creature consciousness, then it could be said that B-conscious 
creatures are access conscious but not phenomenally conscious. Accepting such a view 
would deny phenomenal consciousness to animals, and limit it to humans. 
 
SUMMARY: If the term ‘phenomenal’ is applied to creature 
consciousness, then C-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness 
are the same. I question the use of ‘consciousness’ to describe mental 
states. In terms of creature consciousness, humans can be access 
conscious without being phenomenally conscious, but not vice versa. 
 
It is not my intention in this thesis to explore this viewpoint, but to focus my 
attention solely on creature consciousness, in its two distinct forms. Whether mental 
states can be said to be “conscious”, and what form that “consciousness” might take, 
has no direct relevance to the claims that I make. Those claims can now be spelled out 
in detail, and some of their implications outlined. 
 
 
1.8 My claims 
In this part of the chapter I set out the specific claims that I am making in this thesis, 
and some of their implications. The justification for these claims will appear in the 
course of the following chapters and will take two forms: empirical evidence from 
neurology, psychology and cognitive science, and inference to the best explanation. The 
impact of the evidence is cumulative, so what may appear very weak at first will 
become stronger as further supporting evidence comes into play. 
 
1.8.1 Claims about consciousness 
In previous sections I have made clear the approach that I am taking to the issue of 
consciousness, and have defined two forms of creature consciousness. I am now in a 
position to set out three specific claims about human creature consciousness. It is my 
contention that existing philosophical views about human consciousness fail to take 
these facts into account. 
 
CLAIM 1: Humans have two separate centres of creature 
consciousness, one in each cerebral hemisphere. 
 
CLAIM 2: The form of creature consciousness located in the right 
hemisphere, which I term B-consciousness, is the capacity to sense the 
environment and to respond with simple reasoning using the content of 
first order intentional states.  
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CLAIM 3: The form of creature consciousness located in the left 
hemisphere, which I term C-consciousness,  is the capacity to sense the 
environment, to respond with complex reasoning using both first order 
and higher order intentional states, and to introspect and verbally 
report those states. 
 
I will justify these claims in chapter 2 with evidence from split brain patients and 
human evolution, and inference to the best explanation for various forms of human 
behaviour. Further evidence will arise in chapter 3, where I review recent work relating 
to the processing of visual input. In section 1.8.3 I make claims about vision in humans 
that arise from the duality of human consciousness, but before that I must consider some 
implications of my first three claims. 
 
 
1.8.2 Some relevant definitions 
One of the results of failing to make a distinction between B-consciousness and  
C-consciousness has been to over-emphasise the role of introspection and reporting. 
Behaviour that in animals would be taken as clear evidence of consciousness is 
dismissed in the case of humans as “unconscious” or “subconscious”, solely on the 
basis that it cannot be reported verbally. Throughout chapters 2 and 3 I will draw 
attention to behaviour that, whilst unreported and unreportable, is nevertheless 
conscious. To avoid confusion I define the terms “non-conscious”, “subconscious” and 
“unconscious” as follows: 
 
DEFINITION 3: NON-CONSCIOUS describes behaviour that arises 
neither B-consciously nor C-consciously.  
 
Examples of non-conscious behaviour include blinking, instinctive reactions, and 
actions such as tics and trembles caused by neurological damage. 
 
When we see ourselves or another person acting in a way that (a) we cannot 
classify as non-conscious but (b) the sensory inputs and reasoning resulting in that 
behaviour cannot be introspected, then we refer to such behaviour as subconscious. In 
chapter 2 I will defend the view that much, if not all, of such behaviour is in fact  
B-conscious behaviour.  
 
However, there are also circumstances in which we become aware of the results 
of reasoning without being aware of the steps involved. For example, I am doing a 
cryptic crossword and become stuck on a clue. Unable to solve it, I move on to other 
clues and then suddenly the answer to the previous cue “comes into my head”. The 
definition of C-consciousness involved three factors that distinguish it from  
B-consciousness: higher order representations, complex reasoning, and introspect-
ability/reportability. Since the process of solving clues in this way involves both higher 
order representations and complex reasoning, it cannot be considered a B-conscious 
process. For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the term ‘subconscious’ to describe 
thoughts and behaviour that fit into this pattern. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
28 
DEFINITION 4: SUBCONSCIOUS describes reasoning, whether or 
not resulting in behaviour, that gives evidence of higher order 
representations and complex reasoning, but which cannot be 
introspected or verbally reported. 
 
In chapter 2 I will provide examples of human behaviour that is B-conscious but 
not C-conscious, but does not justify being classed as subconscious. I will also explore in 
that chapter the difference between different senses of the term ‘unconscious’. 
 
DEFINITION 5: UNCONSCIOUS describes creatures who are either 
not C-conscious (but still B-conscious), or not B-conscious (and 
therefore also not C-conscious). 
 
When necessary to distinguish between these two senses of ‘unconscious’ I will 
use Un-C-conscious or Un-B-conscious as appropriate. Examples of unconsciousness 
will be discussed in chapter 2: for the moment it should be noted that I take it that it is 
necessary to be B-conscious in order to be C-conscious, but that one can be  
B-conscious without being C-conscious. 
 
SUMMARY: I have defined how I will use the terms non-conscious, 
subconscious and unconscious. 
 
 
1.8.3 Claims about vision 
The fact that human reasoning and human behaviour can arise from two separate centres 
of consciousness raises issues affecting several topics within the philosophy of mind. It 
is not possible within the confines of one thesis to explore all the relevant issues, so I 
will focus on the implication for how we are to understand visual processing. In chapter 
3 I review the evidence accumulated over the past twenty years for two separate visual 
pathways, and the relationship of each pathway to the separate forms of creature 
consciousness.  
 
The facts of two centres of consciousness and of two separate visual pathways 
combine to question traditional views about human visual processes. I make three further 
claims, the justification for which will be made in chapter 4. 
 
 CLAIM 4: Humans see both B-consciously and C-consciously. 
 
CLAIM 5: Seeing and perceiving are distinct stages in the processing 
of visual inputs (bottom-up and top-down respectively), and perceiving 
is limited to the left hemisphere. 
 
CLAIM 6: Top-down visual processing in the right hemisphere is 
linked to emotion. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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1.8.4 Some wider implications 
Within the limitations of this thesis it is only possible to consider in any depth this one 
area in which the fact of two centres of consciousness has an impact on philosophical 
theories. In the final chapter of the thesis I suggest other areas that are affected. In some 
cases the impact will be negative: current theories are shown to be inadequate and 
require either abandonment or substantial revision. In other cases the claims made in this 
thesis offer a possible solution to problems where there continue to be controversy and 
uncertainty. 
 
That chapter will also analyse the relationship between my claims about creature 
consciousness and the Dual System (or Two Minds) Theory (Evans & Frankish 2009). 
This theory, or rather collection of theories, about the mind – that have duality as their 
common theme – holds that all the operations of the human mind can be divided between 
two distinct systems. There are indeed some significant parallels with the claims that I 
am making, but there are also very significant differences, not the least of which is that 
Dual System Theory views one system as unconscious.  
 
 
1.9 Summary 
In this opening chapter I have provided the background to the issues to be investigated, 
including the relationship between philosophy and other disciplines, and my personal 
approach to philosophy. I have outlined how I understand the terms ‘mind’ and ‘mental 
state’. I have defined two forms of creature consciousness, which I have termed basic or 
B-consciousness and compound or C-consciousness. I have reviewed three other ways in 
which the term ‘consciousness’ is used within the philosophy of mind (access 
consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, and state consciousness), and have concluded 
that although all three raise many questions, I can make and defend my claims without 
needing to resolve them. 
 
I have set out three claims about human consciousness, which will be defended in 
chapter 2, and have referred briefly to the evidence for two distinct visual pathways in 
the human brain, which will be examined in chapter 3. I have set out three claims about 
human vision, that arise from the duality of human consciousness and dual visual 
pathways, and which will be defended in chapter 4. I have ended this chapter by 
outlining the issues that will be covered in the final chapter of the thesis. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DUALITY OF CREATURE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUMANS 
 
In the opening chapter I defined two forms of creature consciousness that I termed  
B-consciousness and C-consciousness. I then described two tests by which their 
presence could be identified, and made three claims. These are: 
 
1.  Humans have two separate centres of creature consciousness, one in each 
cerebral hemisphere. 
 
2.  The form of creature consciousness located in the right hemisphere is  
B-consciousness. 
 
3.  The form of creature consciousness located in the left hemisphere is  
C-consciousness. 
 
As will become clear in the course of this chapter, by “separate centres of 
creature consciousness” I mean separate systems for processing sensory inputs; forming 
and storing beliefs, desires, and memories; reasoning; and initiating behaviour. Some 
have chosen to use the term “mind” for what I have called “B-consciousness” and  
“C-consciousness” (see, for example, the quotation in 2.2.4 below). I will return to this 
issue in chapter 5. In this chapter I set out the initial evidence for my claims, drawing on 
three sources. Further evidence will appear in chapter 3, where I examine the 
implications of two distinct cortical visual pathways in the human brain. 
 
The first source discussed in this chapter is the experimental evidence from split-
brain patients. These are patients whose corpus callosum – the link between the two 
cerebral hemispheres – was severed in order to overcome severe epilepsy. The second 
source is evidence about the evolution of the brain and of consciousness. The third 
source is human behaviour, and instances where the co-existence of both forms of 
consciousness, or the absence of one form of consciousness, provides the best 
explanation for that behaviour. 
 
NOTE:  
In this and the following chapter I make frequent use of the term 
‘perception’. This should be understood in a general sense as referring 
to the conscious recognition of what we see. In chapter 4 I will claim 
that the term should have a more limited use. 
 
 
2.1 The evidence from split-brain patients 
In this part of the chapter I review the evidence that has accumulated over the past fifty 
years concerning the consciousness that split-brain patients demonstrate, whether they 
are using their right or their left hemisphere. I begin with a brief historical survey, Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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before reviewing some of the empirical findings and their implications. I conclude this 
part by showing that the differences between the two hemispheres can be explained by 
the presence of B-consciousness in the right hemisphere, and C-consciousness in the left 
hemisphere. 
  
2.1.1 The historical background 
In the 1960s several patients suffering from a severe form of epilepsy underwent 
commissurotomy, a medical procedure that severs the corpus callosum. This separated 
the two cerebral hemispheres, so that information could no longer pass between them, 
and the surprising fact is that for the patients concerned life went on – after recuperation 
and minus the epilepsy – without significant change. They could navigate the world 
around them, read and write, and generally behave like those of us with the link between 
the hemispheres intact.  
 
However, when these patients were studied more closely, a very different picture 
emerged. These studies were undertaken initially by Roger Sperry and his colleagues, 
and resulted in him being awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1981. 
In his acceptance speech, Sperry reminded his audience of the classical view of a 
“leading, more highly evolved and intellectual left hemisphere and a relatively retarded 
right hemisphere . . . lacking generally in higher cognitive function” (Sperry 1981, p 1). 
However, after reviewing the evidence from split-brain patients he presented a different 
picture. 
 
Each brain half . . . appeared to have its own, largely separate, 
cognitive domain with its own private perceptual, learning and memory 
experiences, all of which were seemingly oblivious of corresponding 
events in the other hemisphere . . . Each hemisphere  
. . . appeared to be using its own percepts, mental images, associations 
and ideas . . . each could be shown to have its own learning processes 
and its own separate chain of memories, all of course, essentially 
inaccessible to conscious experience of the other hemisphere.   
(Sperry 1981, pp 2 & 3). 
 
In his brief biography of Sperry, published on the Nobel Prize web site, Horowitz 
(1997, p 3) quotes Sperry as saying of the right hemisphere that it is “a conscious system 
in its own right, perceiving, thinking, remembering, reasoning, willing and emoting, all 
at a characteristically human level”. Horowitz ends his biography by claiming that “the 
discovery of the duality of consciousness . . . opened up whole new fields of brain 
research, and these are now being worked by a new generation of biologists, and, of 
course, philosophers” (ibid). 
 
Despite Horowitz’s claim, if you were to look through introductions to the 
philosophy of mind, or philosophy of psychology, published since 1981, or survey the 
philosophical literature of the past forty years, you would find remarkably little reference 
to Sperry’s findings. I have found two papers on the philosophical implications of 
discoveries about split-brain patients dating from the seventies: by Nagel (1971) and Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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Puccetti (1973). Either most philosophers have remained in ignorance of the evidence 
from split-brain patients, or they have concluded that it is irrelevant.  
 
SUMMARY: Experimental data from split-brain patients reveal 
consciousness and cognition in both hemispheres. These data have 
been mostly ignored in the philosophical literature. 
 
Before I review the detailed experimental evidence from split-brain patients, I 
will consider one possible explanation for such a conclusion. 
 
 
2.1.2 The relevance of split-brain evidence 
It might be claimed that creature consciousness in the intact brain is a single function 
with its neural correlates shared between the hemispheres. The fact that the neural 
correlates of some functions are limited to one hemisphere – Wernicke’s area correlating 
with understanding language, for example – does not mean that all such functions must 
be limited to one hemisphere. Perhaps, it might be said, a unitary consciousness shared 
between the hemispheres is severed when the corpus callosum is severed, but the 
separate parts retain sufficient functionality to continue to operate, albeit at a reduced 
level. 
 
If this were the case, then evidence from split-brain patients would be irrelevant 
to our understanding of consciousness in the majority of humans with intact brains. 
However, the evidence from evolution and from everyday human behaviour, which will 
reviewed in the rest of this chapter, both point to the fact that consciousness was separate 
in split-brain patients before their hemispheres were separated.  
 
The evidence from split-brain patients should therefore be assessed with an open 
mind, assuming that the case for dual consciousness in the undivided mind will be made. 
What commissurotomy provides is the opportunity to examine each centre of 
consciousness independently. I begin my review of the evidence with some features of 
the mind that are divided between the hemispheres in the intact brain. 
 
SUMMARY: Whilst it might be claimed that a single unified 
consciousness shared between the hemispheres is divided by 
commissurotomy, the evidence from evolution and from everyday 
human behaviour denies this possibility. 
 
 
2.1.3  Visual input and motor control 
In this section I consider two areas of mental processing – visual input and the control of 
bodily movements – that are divided between the two hemispheres in the intact brain. 
When the hemispheres are divided, therefore, we have the opportunity to assess their 
operation independently. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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The right cerebral hemisphere receives visual data from the left visual field (the 
left hand side of each eye), and the left hemisphere receives visual input from the right 
visual field (Gazzaniga et al 2002, p 152). The right hemisphere maps somatosensory 
inputs from, and motor commands to, the left side of the body; the left hemisphere does 
the same for the right side of the body (ibid, pp 64-65). In the intact brain the output 
from the visual processing in each hemisphere is transmitted to the other hemisphere via 
the corpus callosum, and commands controlling the movement of the body can be 
passed between hemispheres in the same way (see figure 2.3 on page 52). 
 
One result of this arrangement is that objects can be presented in the visual field 
in such a way that the initial processing of the visual information takes place in one 
specific hemisphere. If an object is displayed to a split-brain patient in such a way that it 
is located in the left visual field, the visual input is received by the right hemisphere. In 
tests, the patient is unable to name the object (even though they have understood the 
verbal instructions they received – see 2.1.4 below), but if a list of words is displayed, 
including the name of the object, then the patient is able with their left hand to indicate 
that name. 
 
By contrast, if an object is displayed in the right visual field and is thus perceived 
by the left hemisphere, a split-brain patient has no difficulty in naming the object in 
speech. I will return to the issue of language and the two hemispheres in the next section, 
but at this point I focus on the evidence for consciousness. In both of these cases there is 
evidence of perception (they see the object) and reasoned behaviour (they are able to 
communicate their identification of the object), and the combination of perception and 
reasoning is proof of creature consciousness. In later sections I will discuss the 
relationship between language and consciousness, and will review further experimental 
data from split-brain patients. For the moment, however, I return to the subject of motor 
control. 
 
Motor control is organised hierarchically (Gazzaniga et al 2002, pp 451ff), and 
in general terms we can break it down into three steps: strategic planning, tactical 
planning and implementation. The first stage can take place in either hemisphere, but 
implementation (and probable tactical planning) utilises the contralateral hemisphere. 
(That is why the patient described above used their left hand to point out the name of 
the object visible to their right hemisphere.) Evidence will arise in chapter 3 for a 
specialised Action Command Module (ACM) in the left hemisphere, but as the above 
experiment demonstrates, actions can be planned in the right hemisphere as well. 
 
The control of actions in either hemisphere is not completely independent, 
however. In one experiment, individuals were asked to draw two simple images 
displayed separately in each visual field, using both hands simultaneously. Brain-intact 
participants could only complete the task if the images were either identical or mirror 
reversed, but split-brain patients were not limited in this way (Gazzaniga 2000, p 1299).  
 
There could be a number of explanations for the limitation revealed in brain-
intact participants, and further work is needed to choose between them. One possible 
factor is a reduction in the resources available in the left hemisphere for visual 
processing, perhaps created by the development of language (see 2.1.5 below). 
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SUMMARY: In the undivided brain, the two hemispheres process visual 
input from the contralateral side of the visual field, and control 
movement in the contralateral side of the body. This fact allows 
experimenters to isolate how each hemisphere in split-brain patients 
responds to visual input. In the undivided brain the control of bodily 
action exercised by each hemisphere is limited when two different 
courses of action are involved. 
 
 
 
2.1.4 Language and the two hemispheres 
As has been shown in the previous section, split-brain patients can understand 
commands using their right hemisphere, and can use their left hand to select the name of 
the object being presented to that hemisphere. This could be taken to show that the right 
hemisphere has linguistic abilities, and that consequently split-brain patients using their 
right hemisphere are C-conscious, but this would – I suggest – be to misinterpret the 
evidence. 
 
Language comprises very much more than the ability to attach labels to objects, 
or to properties of objects, such as colour. Many animals use sound to communicate but 
few, if any, possess language. Recognising that a pattern of marks on a piece of paper 
correlates with a particular object does not constitute reading: especially when that 
correlation was learned when both hemispheres were still linked. Language involves the 
ability to combine words, or to recognise combinations of words, in order to convey 
meaning. 
 
There is no evidence that split-brain patients using their right hemisphere can do 
anything like this: their abilities are not much more advanced than a dog that learns to 
obey spoken commands. In one test of split-brain patients, the right hemisphere was 
shown two words in succession, and the patient was asked to point to a picture 
illustrating what they had read. Shown the words “pan” and “water”, for example, the 
patient was unable to select a picture of a pan filled with water (Gazzaniga et al 2002,  
p 414). In a similar test, the patient was asked to select one word from a list of six that 
linked two words previously displayed. Shown the two words “pin” and “finger”, the 
patient was unable to select the term “bleed” from the list of options (ibid, p 680).  
 
I conclude, therefore, that the right hemisphere in split-brain patients lacks 
language. Sperry (1981, p 2) reports this hemisphere to be “mute and agraphic” 
although “able to comprehend, at a moderately high level, words spoken aloud by the 
examiner”. This is a clear contrast to the left hemisphere, which shows no problems in 
both using and understanding language. This difference between the hemispheres has a 
number of implications, and one of these will be the topic of the following section. 
 
SUMMARY: Although using their right hemisphere split-brain patients 
can understand simple verbal instructions, and match objects with the 
written form of the name of the object, this falls short of genuine 
linguistic ability. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
35 
2.1.5 Dissociations in visual processing in the two hemispheres 
It appears that one of the results of developing language in the left hemisphere was the 
loss of some of the resources originally devoted in that hemisphere to visual processing. 
The result is that there are some visual discriminations that can be made by the right 
hemisphere but not by the left (Gazzaniga 2000, p 1304-5). When only part of a shape is 
visible, the brain can complete the whole shape in a process called “amodal 
completion”.  Given the picture shown in figure 2.1 below, both the left and right 
hemispheres in split-brain patients can identify whether the centre white block is thick 
or thin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, if the picture is modified by completing the outline of the white 
triangles (see figure 2.2 below), then the left hemisphere in split-brain patients cannot 
differentiate between the fat and thin shapes, whilst the right hemisphere can do so. 
Since experiments with mice suggest that they see shapes by amodal completion (ibid,  
p 1305), this ability appears to have evolved before the specialisation of the 
hemispheres in homo sapiens, which resulted in its loss from the left hemisphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another test with split-brain patients (Gazzaniga 2000, p 136) also shows a clear 
difference between visual processing in the two hemispheres. In this test two square 
Fat central white shape  Thin central white shape 
Figure 2.2: Recognising underlying shape: case 2 
Fat central white shape  Thin central white shape 
Figure 2.1: Recognising underlying shape: case 1 Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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frames are presented in a single visual field with a small icon in one of the corners in 
each frame. In one version of the test, the participants had to decide whether the two 
icons were in the same location (the “spatial” test); in the other version, they had to 
determine whether both icons were the same (the “identity” test). The left hemisphere 
appeared slightly better than the right at the identity test, but the right hemisphere 
performed significantly better at the spatial test. (I will return to this issue in chapter 3.) 
The experimenters interpret this result as being consistent with the idea that the 
evolution of language in the left hemisphere has resulted in the loss of some 
visuospatial abilities it once possessed (ibid).  
 
SUMMARY: The right hemisphere is significantly better than the left in 
several types of visual discrimination, perhaps because the develop-
ment of language took over left hemisphere resources previously used 
for vision. 
 
 
2.1.6 Dissociations in reasoning in the two hemispheres 
There is also a difference in how each hemisphere performs in tests involving 
recognising whether a stimulus had been previously presented. The left hemisphere is 
prone to more errors, falsely identifying similar items as being the same (ibid,  
p 1313). This appears to be related to a significant difference in how stimuli are 
processed. It appears that the left hemisphere categorises stimuli and theorises about 
them. Thus if a spoon is presented to the left hemisphere, this may be stored not simply 
as “spoon” but also as “cutlery”. If a fork appears later this is also categorised as 
“cutlery” (as well as “fork”) and may then be wrongly identified as a previously seen 
item. One of the results of this difference in how the two hemispheres process visual 
information is that information about inputs in the left visual field reaches  
B-consciousness more quickly than information about inputs in the right visual field 
reaches C-consciousness. 
 
The theorising and problem-solving abilities of the left hemisphere may be 
associated with a specialised module named the “Interpreter Module” (ibid, p 1316), 
which was originally identified as a result of tests on split-brain patients. In one test, a 
picture of a chicken claw was displayed in the right visual field (processed by the left 
hemisphere) and a snow scene was displayed in the left visual field (processed by the 
right hemisphere). An array of pictures was then placed in front of the patient (ie, 
accessible to both hemispheres). Asked to choose two pictures associated with those 
previously displayed, the patient chose a chicken with his right hand (controlled by the 
left hemisphere) and a shovel with his left hand (controlled by the right hemisphere).  
 
Although the link between snow and shovel may have been obvious to the 
patient’s right hemisphere, the left hemisphere did not have access to the original snow 
scene, nor to the logic that had led to the selection of the shovel. When asked why he 
chose the chicken and the shovel, the patient’s immediate response was that “the 
chicken claw goes with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken 
shed” (ibid, p 1316). It should be noted that this was not presented as a tentative 
explanation of what had happened, but as an immediate and accurate statement. In part 
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The existence of the Interpreter Module and the consequent difference in how 
perceptual inputs are processed in the two hemispheres has other implications. It has 
been shown that after commissurotomy the disconnected left hemisphere retains the 
problem-solving abilities of the intact brain, whereas the right hemisphere shows a very 
marked deterioration (ibid, p 1315).  This is consistent with the left hemisphere having 
the complex reasoning skills associated with the development of language, and the right 
hemisphere having more limited reasoning abilities.  
 
SUMMARY: The left hemisphere includes a specialised module – the 
Interpreter Module – that seeks to form theories about sensory inputs. 
This can lead to errors when asked to decide whether an object has 
been previously seen. When unaware of right hemisphere reasoning, it 
can lead to confabulation. The left hemisphere of a split-brain patient 
retains the intelligence of the intact brain, but the right hemisphere 
shows a significantly lower intelligence. 
 
Having reviewed the evidence for a number of clear differences between the 
abilities associated with each of the hemispheres, I am now in a position to determine 
the form of consciousness located in each hemisphere. This is the topic of the following 
section. 
 
 
2.1.7 The duality of human consciousness 
The differences in the roles of the two hemispheres which have been identified in split-
brain patients appear to bear out not only the claim that humans have a centre of 
consciousness in each hemisphere, but also the claim that the two hemispheres have 
distinct forms of consciousness.  Whilst consciousness in the right hemisphere is 
superior in “some perceptual and attentional skills, and perhaps also emotions, it is poor 
at problem-solving and many other mental activities” (ibid): it is a basic form of 
consciousness that humans share with other animals, ie B-consciousness. 
 
The form of consciousness found in the left hemisphere of humans is associated 
with the ability to categorise and theorise about their perceptual experiences, and to 
excel in problem-solving tasks. These skills are accompanied by, perhaps in some way 
depend on, the ability to introspect and to report verbally on the results of that 
introspection. These factors provide the evidence for the presence of C-consciousness. 
 
SUMMARY: B-consciousness resides in the right hemisphere and 
C-consciousness in the left (see Claims 1, 2 and 3 on pages 26 & 27). 
 
If both forms of consciousness exist in modern humans whose brains remain 
intact, (an issue to be discussed more fully in part 2.3), then there should be evidence of 
their separate evolution. That is the topic of the next part of the chapter. 
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2.2 The evolution of human consciousness 
In this part of the chapter I draw on evidence from tool making to demonstrate the 
presence of reasoning, and thus of consciousness, in primates and early hominids.  I 
then summarise the evidence for a major evolutionary change in homo sapiens that 
resulted in the specialisation of the cerebral hemispheres and the development of a new 
form of consciousness. I start with a very brief survey of the evolution of the brain. 
 
 
2.2.1 The evolution of the brain 
It took some four and a half billion years of evolution to get from the first unicellular 
organisms to the beginnings of a brain in multicellular organisms (Joseph 1996, pp 1ff).  
This primitive brain continued to develop until, with the coming of the reptiles, we find 
some clearly defined areas that are familiar today to students of human neurology. 
These include the brainstem, the cerebellum, and those areas that form the major part 
of the limbic system – the amygdala, the hippocampus and the thalamus.  
 
Thereafter the evolution of birds and mammals sees the continuing enlargement 
of the neocortex, until it reaches its maximum size in humans. At some point during this 
process consciousness began. Although there are some cases of parallel development in 
different evolutionary lines, there is no reason to doubt that consciousness in humans 
evolved from more primitive forms of consciousness in our primate and early hominid 
ancestors. 
 
 
2.2.2 Consciousness in wild chimpanzees 
Chimpanzees in the wild use simple tools constructed from plants to gain access to ants 
and termites as a source of food (Bermúdez 2003, p 55 – citing Byrne 1995). For ants, 
they select a stick that is several feet long and then strip off the leaves and leafy stem. 
For termites they select a much shorter and more flexible wand, from either vines or 
twigs, and chew the end.  The tools are selected and prepared at some distance, both 
spatially and temporally, from the location where they will be used.  
 
It has been suggested that this behaviour is innate, and that no genuine thought is 
involved (ibid, p 126), since chimpanzees born in captivity are seen to poke long thin 
things into holes. But, points out Bermúdez, this ignores the fact that chimpanzees 
construct the appropriate tool for the type of food that they are seeking, and that they do 
so well in advance, ruling out claims of trial and error. 
 
This chimpanzee behaviour provides evidence of perception of both the presence 
and the properties of the sticks that are chosen, of belief that the treatment they give the 
selected stick will create the appropriate tool, of a desire to obtain food, and of choice 
between ants and termites as the target food source. The combination of these 
perceptions, desires and beliefs is evidence of reasoning, and therefore of conscious-
ness. Since chimpanzees lack language, we have no evidence to support a claim of  
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SUMMARY: Wild chimpanzees choose whether to search for ants or 
termites, and construct the appropriate tool. This is clear evidence of 
creature consciousness, and suggests that humans inherited this form of 
creature consciousness from their animal ancestors. 
 
 
2.2.3 Consciousness in early hominids 
A similar case for reasoning (and therefore consciousness) can be made for tool-making 
homo habilis, the forerunners of homo sapiens. Bermúdez describes the process as 
follows: 
 
 
Considerable technical skill is required to make a hand-axe. Since the 
hand-axe is symmetrical, the flakes need to be removed from alternate 
sides. Each nodule is different. With different stresses and fracture 
lines, and the toolmaker needs to keep in mind a specific goal and 
adjust his blows accordingly. The force of the blows needs to be 
precisely calculated. The entire process is highly complicated and 
dependent on constant feed-back. A highly developed form of 
instrumental rationality is at work here, feeding into action.  
(Bermúdez 2003, p 127) 
 
Here again we have clear evidence of perception, beliefs and desires being 
integrated by reasoning to produce reasoned behaviour, and thus providing evidence for 
consciousness.  As with the chimpanzees, the evidence points to B-consciousness. 
 
SUMMARY: Evidence of tool-making by early hominids is evidence of 
creature consciousness. This confirms that humans inherited creature 
consciousness from their ancestors. 
 
With evidence for B-consciousness in primates and in homo habilis, we are 
justified in assuming that homo sapiens inherited B-consciousness. But a major change 
occurred during the evolution of homo sapiens, and this will be the subject of the 
following section. 
 
 
2.2.4 Evolution of consciousness in homo sapiens 
This evolutionary change in human consciousness has been described by Joseph 
(2008a) in the following terms: 
 
 
With the appearance of language, profound artistic expression, self-
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schism had formed in the psyche of man. Whereas before there had 
been a more or less unified mind, now there was a new and additional 
form of mental processing which also gave birth to . . . the capacity to 
reason and form complex thoughts. By at least 100,000 years ago . . . a 
fragile and minimally developed linguistic consciousness probably 
emerged from what had been the original mind . . . This original mind 
has not been discarded, however. Rather, as the left brain became 
increasingly associated with language and linguistic consciousness, this 
original mind appears to have also evolved and to have become more 
intimately associated with the right cerebral hemisphere. It is probably 
for these reasons that among modern human beings, the right 
hemisphere is associated with the presumably more primitive 
unconscious whereas the left brain maintains . . . the more recently 
evolved, language-dependent, conscious mind. (Joseph 2008a, p 3) 
 
I will raise objections (see below) to some details in this description of human 
evolution, but I take the general picture to be accurate. Joseph is saying that the mind 
(and I take it that mind includes consciousness) that homo sapiens inherited from its 
ancestors, became restricted to the right hemisphere. Alongside it there developed a 
faculty in the left hemisphere associated with language, which Joseph terms “the 
conscious mind”.  
 
Joseph’s terminology is in line with that used by proponents of the Dual System 
(or Two Minds) Theory, mentioned in chapter 1, which identifies two separate systems 
in the human brain – one conscious and one unconscious. This use of the term 
‘unconscious’ appears to relate to the sense of ‘un-C-conscious’, and means simply that 
the “unconscious” mind cannot introspect its states and cannot report their presence or 
their contents verbally. If Joseph were right in claiming that the “mind” now limited to 
the right hemisphere is not conscious, then either animals are not conscious (despite the 
evidence quoted above for chimpanzee consciousness) or humans lost consciousness in 
the right hemisphere when they gained a new form of consciousness in the left hemi-
sphere. The evidence from split-brain patients clearly shows that this is not the case. 
 
I therefore reject the claim by both Joseph and Two Minds theorists that the 
mind associated with the right hemisphere is unconscious. I also reject Joseph’s claim 
that the capacity for reasoning per se is associated with this evolutionary change. I have 
already provided evidence for reasoning both by chimpanzees and early hominids. The 
parallel developments in the left hemisphere that took place as part of the specialisation 
of the two hemispheres, including language and logic, resulted in the ability in indulge 
in far more complex forms of reasoning than had previously been possible, but did not 
introduce the ability to reason. 
 
The fact that animals and early hominids were conscious, and that this 
consciousness pre-dates the evolutionary change in man that resulted in the 
development of language, means that this original form of consciousness is what I have 
termed B-consciousness. Joseph’s claim that B-consciousness became restricted to the 
right hemisphere is borne out by the evidence from split-brain patients. The 
development of a new and more sophisticated form of consciousness in the left 
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SUMMARY: In the course of human evolution, alongside the 
development of language, there developed a form of creature 
consciousness associated with language and located in the left 
hemisphere. The form of creature consciousness inherited from our 
animal and early hominid ancestors became restricted to the right 
hemisphere. 
 
I turn now to the third source of evidence for two distinct forms of 
consciousness: instances of human behaviour. Some of this behaviour arises in 
experimental conditions, but much of it arises in everyday life. 
 
 
 
2.3 Evidence from intact-brain human behaviour 
In this part of the chapter I examine various instances of human behaviour where the 
fact of two distinct forms of consciousness provides the best explanation. I start with the 
experience referred to as “driving on automatic pilot”, before reviewing some 
experimental data which reveals B-conscious behaviour resulting from reasoning that is 
unavailable to C-consciousness. After a case of “repressed memory”, I end this part 
with issues relating to sleeping and dreaming. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Driving on automatic pilot 
In this section I compare the experience of “driving on automatic pilot” with the actions 
of people in the throes of a petit mal seizure. I conclude that the former case is 
illustrative of the presence of both B-consciousness and C-consciousness, but not the 
latter. 
 
SCENARIO 2.1 
Imagine the situation. You are on your way home after a riveting 
philosophy seminar and considering an important and exciting train of 
thought. You suddenly become aware that you have been driving for 
several miles without any awareness of the road and the traffic on it. 
Since your passenger has not screamed in fear, and since you have not 
had an accident, it has to be assumed that you have successfully 
negotiated your way around other vehicles, responded to traffic lights, 
taken the correct route at several junctions, and generally behaved as if 
you were aware of your surroundings. 
 
The fact that you were aware of your philosophical ruminations and can both 
recall and report them is clear evidence of C-consciousness. But your inability to recall 
or report on your actions in driving the car shows that these actions, and the reasoning 
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In chapter 1, I drew a distinction between subconscious and B-conscious 
behaviour. For behaviour to be subconscious it needed to show evidence of thought 
involving higher order representations and complex reasoning, and neither of these is 
necessary to explain the thought processes controlling driving. There is therefore no 
basis on which to view it as subconscious behaviour. There are, however, grounds for 
regarding driving in this situation as being B-conscious. This becomes clear when 
driving on automatic pilot is compared with driving during an epileptic seizure. 
 
Searle (1990, p 635 cited in Block 1997, p 399) makes a different claim. He 
distinguishes between “unconsciousness” and “peripheral consciousness”, and claims 
that the driver in this situation is peripherally conscious of the road conditions but is not 
paying attention to them. “It is simply not true,” he says, “that I am totally unconscious 
of these phenomena. If I were, there would be a car crash (ibid).” However, as Block 
(1997, p 397) points out, this is in conflict with Searle’s later claim that a person who 
suffers a petit mal seizure but continues to drive home without crashing is totally 
unconscious (Searle, 1992, pp 108-109). 
 
Both Block and Searle are citing Penfield (1975) who reports a number of case 
studies of patients suffering petit mal seizures who continue with activities such as 
playing the piano, walking home or driving their car. Van Gulik (1989, p 220) cites 
Penfield’s work before summarising what happens in such cases by saying that “the 
patient suffers a loss of conscious experience in the phenomenal sense although he can 
continue to react selectively to environmental stimuli”.  Block (1997, p397) takes the 
opposite view, claiming that the petit mal sufferer remains phenomenally conscious but 
loses access consciousness. For Block, the fact that the driver in the throes of a seizure 
does not crash, and that the pedestrian “threads his way” through the crowds, is proof 
that they are conscious. 
 
In chapter 4 (section 4.1.2), I will propose an explanation for how someone can 
continue to drive along a well-known route, and avoid other traffic in the process, whilst 
in the throes of an epileptic seizure (and both un-B-conscious and un-C-conscious). 
What the driver in these circumstances cannot respond to are red traffic lights (Penfield 
1975, p 39). A red traffic light is not a physical obstruction: it is a conventional signal 
that requires reasoning to interpret. Since our driver on automatic pilot correctly 
responds to that signal, he clearly is reasoning and is therefore conscious. This must be 
a case of B-consciousness, since both C-consciousness and subconscious behaviour 
have already been ruled out. 
 
At this point I will claim that in the case of driving on automatic pilot the best 
explanation is that the person concerned is thinking about something other than their 
driving C-consciously, and is driving B-consciously. This explanation is consistent both 
with the facts of the particular situation, and with the broader picture of two forms of 
consciousness existing side by side in the human brain.  
 
SUMMARY: Driving on automatic pilot can be understood as driving 
B-consciously whilst thinking about something else C-consciously. It is 
to be distinguished from continuing to drive during a petit mal seizure, 
since in the former case the driver obeys traffic lights, but in the latter 
does not. 
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2.3.2 Consciousness and visual perception 
The evidence from split-brain patients cited in part 2.1 above makes clear that each 
hemisphere can have perceptual experiences; and to have a perceptual experience that 
results in reasoned behaviour is to demonstrate consciousness. In this section I make the 
case that independent visual perception and consciousness can be identified in everyday 
human behaviour. 
 
One of the findings from studies of split-brain patients is that the right 
hemisphere processes visual inputs more quickly than the left, so that they reach  
B-consciousness before they reach C-consciousness. Keep that in mind as you read the 
following scenario. 
 
SCENARIO 2.2 
A soldier is on patrol in a city in one of the world’s trouble spots. 
As he makes his way down the street he suddenly halts, and he 
brings his gun to bear on a rooftop across the street. “What’s up?” 
asks one of his comrades. “I must have seen something on that 
roof over there,” the soldier responds. “I’m not sure what. It might 
have been the sun catching something metallic. Why else would I 
have raised my gun?”  
 
In this scenario the soldier responds to something he sees, but he cannot think 
about or verbally report the content of his perceptual experience. He can report that he 
was on patrol, he can describe the street down which he was walking, and he can report 
that he was carrying a gun. All of these are C-conscious experiences. He can also report 
that he brought his gun to bear on a target, but he cannot report what he saw on the 
rooftop or the reasoning that led him to bring his gun into readiness: he can only 
speculate on these experiences.  So either it was a case of subconscious reasoning or of 
B-conscious reasoning. 
 
There is no justification for assuming that his actions were subconscious. The 
thought process that led to him raising his gun does not demand higher order 
representations or complex reasoning, which are the defining features of subconscious 
behaviour. The fact that he reacted in a reasoned manner to a visual input is consistent 
with B-consciousness. I take this to be another case where the coexistence of both  
B- and C-consciousness provides the best explanation. 
 
SUMMARY: There are circumstances in which we respond  
B-consciously to stimuli of which we are not C-conscious. 
 
From a case that illustrates independent visual perception and reasoning, I turn 
now to a case of independent memory and an actual case of B-conscious reasoning 
causing behaviour that could not be explained C-consciously. 
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2.3.3 Consciousness and memory 
Sperry (1981, p 2) reached the following conclusion from his study of split-brain 
patients. “Each brain half,” he says, “appeared to have its own, largely separate, 
cognitive domain with its own private perceptual, learning and memory experiences.” In 
this section I review a case of a B-conscious private memory experience. 
 
Memory can be divided into two broad categories: declarative and non-
declarative. The latter term describes memories that we cannot consciously retrieve, 
such a how to ride a bike. My concern in this section is with declarative memories: 
those that we can access consciously. Declarative memories are divided into two kinds: 
semantic and episodic. The former are those that are stored using language: not just 
words and their meanings, but any information that is stored verbally. Episodic 
memories are those that are stored without the use of words: memories of what it felt 
like to kiss your first girlfriend, or your memory of a piece of music. 
 
Many memories are interwoven: you hear a piece of music and recognise it, and 
you are able to identify its name and the composer. Something triggers a memory of 
your first girlfriend’s name and that leads to a memory of your first kiss. Often, 
however, we fail to join the links. We hear a piece of music and recognise it, but we 
cannot remember its name, or the name of the composer. We can clearly recall our first 
kiss, but cannot remember our first girlfriend’s name. There are also some memories 
that are only stored episodically, because the experience occurred before we acquired 
the language skills to store it semantically. Such memories are sometimes termed 
“repressed memories”, but the problem may not be unwillingness to retrieve them, but 
rather inability.  
 
Since language is related to C-consciousness and linguistic processes are located 
in the left hemisphere, semantic memories are formed and retrieved C-consciously. 
Lacking the need for language, episodic memories can be stored and retrieved  
B-consciously. As Joseph (2008b, p 1) puts it, the two halves of the brain “may not only 
perceive things differently, but have different memories triggered in response to those 
perceptions”. The following case study is concerned with behaviour brought about by 
B-conscious episodic memory, in the absence of C-conscious semantic memory. 
 
SCENARIO 2.3 
When Carol was a little girl she was molested on several occasions 
by her uncle. The first time she was nearly 4 years old and had been 
sitting next to her uncle on the couch when he began to stroke and run 
his fingers through her hair. He continued this action while he cajoled 
and intimidated her into performing fellatio. He did this to her on ten or 
more occasions over a one year time period until he moved away. 
Somehow she managed to forget all about this until many years later 
while in college. 
She was in bed with her boyfriend and they had just finished 
making love when he began to stroke and run his fingers through her 
hair. All at once she began to panic, became quite hysterical, and 
started crying and trying to strike her boyfriend. Then grabbing up her 
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For the next several weeks she refused to talk to him, hung up 
when he called her, and began to feel an overwhelming aversion 
towards men. She sought counselling, but to no avail.  
It was only a year later while watching a movie that the entire 
memory of what had happened to her, so many years before, 
unravelled. In the movie a man walked into a crying girl’s bedroom 
and while trying to soothe her began to brush and run his fingers 
through her hair. Immediately Carol began to feel angry and upset, and 
then she remembered. (Joseph 2008b, pp 1-2) 
 
There can be little doubt that Carol’s actions were the result of what happened to 
her as a four-year-old. Since her uncle’s behaviour was not followed by flight, it does 
not seem appropriate to view her later actions as a Pavlovian response.  It might be 
claimed that her response to her boyfriend’s action was emotional, and not conscious. I 
will discuss right-hemisphere emotional responses in chapter 4 (section 4.3.3). Based on 
that analysis, getting dressed was B-conscious behaviour, which implies B-conscious 
reasoning and B-conscious access to the memory of her abuse. 
 
As a four year old, Carol lacked the language to be able to store what happened 
as a semantic memory, with the result that it could not be recovered C-consciously. 
When her boyfriend’s action stirred the episodic memory it was only accessible  
B-consciously. This explains why she could not explain her actions, even to herself. But 
then it appears that while watching the film – both B-consciously and C-consciously – 
she could form a link between the episodic experience being depicted and the semantic 
representation of that experience, and this provided the key to C-conscious access to her 
episodic memory of what had happened to her as a child. The mechanisms involved in 
this, and the whole issue of “repressed memories”, are outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
The significant issue is that when her boyfriend stroked her hair it triggered a 
memory that was only accessible B-consciously, and her subsequent actions were the 
result of B-conscious reasoning. She was C-conscious at the time, but both the memory 
and the reasoning were not C-consciously accessible. 
 
SUMMARY: In certain circumstances we can respond B-consciously to 
a stimulus because of a memory that we can access B-consciously but 
not C-consciously. We are then unable to introspect the reasons for, or 
explain, our behaviour. 
 
In the next two sections I review two experiments in which I will claim that 
B-conscious perception and reasoning, inaccessible to C-consciousness, provide the best 
explanation for the outcome. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Choosing and confabulating 
In this section I review an experiment in which the participants were asked to choose 
between identical objects and, when required to explain their choice, then confabulated. 
I point out the similarity to the behaviour of a split-brain patient, and suggest that this is 
evidence of B-conscious reasoning that was inaccessible C-consciously. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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Nisbett & Wilson (1977) report an experiment in which subjects were confronted 
with four identical pairs of stockings (laid out in a line) and asked to select the best pair 
(ibid, pp 243-244). Once they had made their choice, they were asked to give their 
reasons. In actual fact, there was a very strong bias to selecting the rightmost pair of 
stockings (a factor of almost four to one compared with the leftmost pair), but position 
was never spontaneously mentioned when the subjects gave their reasons. Indeed, most 
subjects, when subsequently questioned, denied that it played any part in their decision. 
 
Nisbett & Wilson do not provide an explanation for this result, but one can be 
provided based on the existence of both B-consciousness and C-consciousness. There 
were no differences between the pairs of stockings by which to discriminate between 
them, using the data available to C-consciousness. The subjects were therefore unable to 
make a C-consciously reasoned decision as to the best pair, but could have made a  
C-conscious random selection. The fact that they did not report a random choice shows 
that this did not happen. 
 
Instead, we see behaviour that is a close parallel to that reported in 2.1.6 above. 
In that case, a split-brain patient, whose left hemisphere does not have access to the 
choices made by the right hemisphere, confabulates the reasons for a choice of which he 
only becomes C-consciously aware after it has been made. The fact that in this latter 
case the participants confabulated the reasons for their choice shows that they had no  
C-conscious awareness of their reasoning that led to the choice, only of the result of the 
choice.  
 
I suggest that the best explanation for this behaviour is that, unable to make a  
C-conscious reasoned choice, the selection was made B-consciously. We – like them –
cannot access their B-conscious reasoning, but we can infer from the results that position 
played a significant role, so it was not random. 
 
SUMMARY: In an experiment where participants had to choose 
between identical objects, they confabulated their reasons. The best 
explanation is that the choice was made B-consciously (since there was 
no basis for a C-conscious choice), and that unaware of the  
B-conscious reasoning, the Interpreter Module made up reasons. 
 
I will turn now to a more recent study that also suggests that decisions to act may 
be made B-consciously when there is no basis for a C-conscious reasoned decision, and 
only subsequently does the result of that decision reach C-consciousness. 
 
 
 
2.3.5 B-conscious decision making 
Soon et al (2008) report an experiment in which subjects view a computer screen, 
displaying a letter, updated every half second. The subjects are asked to press either of 
two buttons (one to the left with the left forefinger, or one to the right with the right 
forefinger) at their own instigation. After they have pressed a button they are asked to 
indicate which letter was displayed when they consciously made their decision. During 
this whole process their brain activity is being monitored. The experimenters report that Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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the choice of which button the subject’s would press could be determined from brain 
activity well before the time at which the subjects reported their awareness of the 
decision. 
 
The decision to press one of the buttons did not require any reasoning using the 
visual data available on the screen, and there was no basis for a C-conscious choice of 
which button to press. As in the previous case, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the 
decision to press a particular button was made B-consciously, and only subsequently 
recognized C-consciously – perhaps by detecting the bodily preparations for the 
movements required to fulfill the decision. 
 
This scenario would explain how the experimenters were able to identify which 
button would be pressed well before the point at which the subjects reported their 
conscious decision. Although it is undoubtedly true that there will be brain activity that 
is a precursor to conscious decisions, it makes little sense to suppose that that brain 
activity includes the outcome of the decision – unless we are to abandon any idea of our 
making free choices. By recognizing that there are times when decisions are made  
B-consciously and are only subsequently identified C-consciously, we can retain our 
sense of free will and at the same time explain how the decision could be identified by 
brain activity prior to C-conscious awareness of the decision. 
 
SUMMARY: In an experiment participants identified the point in time 
at which they had made a choice, but concurrent brain scans gave 
evidence of the choice significantly earlier. The best explanation is that 
the choice was made B-consciously, and then recognized  
C-consciously. 
 
It might be claimed that focussing on experimental situations or a case of 
childhood trauma is a long way from making the case for two forms of consciousness 
existing side by side in everyday life. But sleep is part of everyday life, and in the next 
two sections I consider how we can distinguish between two forms of consciousness in 
relation to sleep. I begin with the difference between sleep and coma. 
 
 
 
2.3.6 Distinguishing between coma and sleep 
In this section I point out the significant differences between being asleep and being in a 
coma, although these states are often equally described as cases of unconsciousness. I 
will argue that the difference between them can be simply explained by the distinction 
between B-consciousness and C-consciousness. 
 
In the opening chapter I made reference to Rosenthal’s claim that “to be 
conscious a person or other creature must be awake and sentient” (Rosenthal, 1997,  
p 729). This, of course, implies that to be asleep is to be unconscious. Searle makes a 
similar point when he says that “by ‘consciousness’ I simply mean those subjective 
states of sentience or awareness that begin when one wakes up in the morning from a 
dreamless sleep and continue throughout the day until one goes to sleep at night, or falls 
into a coma, or dies, or otherwise becomes, as one would say, ‘unconscious’” (Searle 
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I will return to Searle’s point about “dreamless sleep” in the next section, but for 
the moment I want to focus on his claim that going to sleep, falling into a coma, and 
dying are all ways of ceasing to be conscious.  I will show that in doing so he fails to 
account for significant differences between being asleep and being in a coma: 
differences that are easily explained by the distinction between B-consciousness and  
C-consciousness. 
 
Imagine a hospital ward with two patients: one is in a coma, the other has 
recovered from a coma and been pronounced conscious, but is fast asleep (and not 
dreaming). There is clearly a difference between the two patients. If the fire alarm goes 
off, the patient who is asleep will wake up but the patient in a coma will remain in a 
coma. A person in a coma does not respond in any conscious way to external stimuli, 
whereas a sleeping person will respond to some stimuli, such as an alarm or a baby 
crying.  The former is neither C-conscious nor B-conscious. 
 
Imagine a mother who sleeps through her partner’s snoring, the wind rattling the 
window and the birds greeting the new day in a burst of singing, but wakes up when her 
baby cries – even though in purely physical terms the sound of the baby is quieter than 
the other sounds. The discrimination between the various noises is clearly not based on 
their auditory characteristics, but on their significance for the sleeper. Since she cannot 
on wakening report the various sounds that occurred, it is clear that she was not  
C-conscious. Whilst some might wish to make a case that her response to the baby was 
“subconscious”, it does not meet the criteria of higher order representation and complex 
reasoning required for subconsciousness, set out in chapter 1 (section 1.8.2). It does, 
however, meet the criteria for reasoning, and thus must therefore be classed as  
B-conscious.  
 
Bear in mind that I defined creature consciousness in chapter 1 as a “capacity” to 
respond to the environment and to reason. The capacity can exist when there is no 
response to the environment and no reasoning in progress, just as a house can be 
connected to the power even when every appliance is turned off. So even if there is no 
sensory input and no thought, this is not enough to demonstrate the absence of 
consciousness.  
 
SUMMARY: The best explanation of the difference between being in a 
coma and being asleep is that in the former case you are neither 
B-conscious nor C-conscious, but in the latter you are B-conscious but 
not C-conscious. 
 
But being asleep is not a simple thing: there are distinctions to be made between 
dreamless sleep and dreaming, and between being asleep in bed and sleep walking. 
These distinctions will be the topic of the following section. 
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2.3.7 Consciousness and sleep 
In the previous section I distinguished between being dreamlessly asleep and being in a 
coma. In this section I focus on sleep and the different states that can be part of sleep. I 
begin with the phenomenon of sleep walking. 
 
SCENARIO 2.4 
A man gets out of bed and while still fast asleep gets dressed, goes 
down stairs, walks across the living room and takes down a letter from 
behind the clock. He goes to the front door, puts on his coat, and goes 
out into the street. He checks for traffic before crossing the street and 
walking to the post box. Having posted the letter he returns home, gets 
undressed and goes back to bed. 
 
The actions of the man in this case bear all the hallmarks of reasoned behaviour. 
He is able to make his way around the furniture, to recognise the letter for what it is, 
cross the street safely, and place the letter in the appropriate place – the post box. If it 
were not for the fact that he was not aware of what he was doing, and thus has no 
memory of doing it, we would want to say that these are all instances of reasoned 
behaviour. There was clearly desire (to post the letter) and belief (that the road was safe 
to cross, that the letter would be collected from the post box). This meets all the criteria 
for B-consciousness – but is clearly different from being asleep in bed. 
 
To mark this difference I distinguish between two levels of B-consciousness: a 
restricted level of B-consciousness in normal sleep, and a full form of B-consciousness 
seen in the case of sleep walking, as well as is certain behaviours described in the earlier 
part of this section. A similar distinction between a restricted form of C-consciousness 
and its full form may account for the difference between dreaming and dreamless sleep. 
 
During dreams there is awareness of what we are dreaming, and that can result in 
memories of what we dreamt. It is also known that external sounds can be incorporated 
into our dreams. I have clear memories of some dreams from forty or more years ago, 
even though I have forgotten much of my waking experience from that period. If I can 
introspect my dreams, or at least some of them, and can verbally report their content, 
then the criteria for C-consciousness have been met. 
 
I suggest, therefore, that just as in dreamless sleep there is a limited form of  
B-consciousness, so during dreaming sleep there is a limited form of C-consciousness. 
Generally speaking, it would seem that a switch in the brain ensures that we do not 
physically carry out the actions that we dream. In rare cases however this limited form of 
C-consciousness can combine with the full form of B-consciousness seen in sleep 
walking. An example is a man who, dreaming that he was fighting off and strangling a 
burglar, actually strangled his wife to death: at his trial he was found not guilty of murder 
(Morris 2009). 
 
The differences between sleep and coma, between sleep in bed and sleep walking, 
and between dreamless sleep and dreaming sleep, can all be accounted for by the two 
forms of creature consciousness, each having both a limited and a full form. The table 
overleaf summarises the position. 
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  B-consciousness  C-consciousness 
  Limited  Full  Limited  Full 
In a coma  x  x  x  x 
Dreamless sleep  \/  x  x  x 
Sleepwalking  x  \/  x  x 
Dreaming  \/  x  \/  x 
Dreaming/sleepwalking  x  \/  \/  x 
Normal wakefulness  x  \/  x  \/ 
 
Table 2.1 Consciousness in coma, sleep and wakefulness 
 
 
 
2.4. Some questions and some answers 
In the previous part of the chapter I have claimed that a diverse range of situations can 
be explained by the coexistence of B-consciousness and C-consciousness. However, 
despite the attraction of a common explanation, the presence of two forms of conscious-
ness raises a number of questions, and three of these will be considered in this part. 
 
 
2.4.1 Why am I not aware of both forms of consciousness? 
There are two possible responses to this question. One is to say “But you are aware!” 
The other is to look for reasons for a lack of awareness. I will take each of these 
responses in turn, dealing with the first in this section and the second in the next. 
 
There is, in fact, a long-standing awareness of the duality of the human mind. 
We understand someone who says “I am in two minds whether to do A or B”. We say 
of someone else that “He does not know his own mind”. One of the purposes of 
counselling is to bring to light memories, or attitudes, of which we are not  
[C-]conscious. This sense of division within the human mind was expressed two 
millennia ago by the apostle Paul. 
 
I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but 
what I hate I do. (Romans 7: 15 New International Version) 
 
However, although this duality has long been recognised, it is usually expressed 
by dividing mental activities – perceiving, thinking, choosing, remembering, deciding – 
into those that are conscious and those that are unconscious – or sometimes 
subconscious. But to deny consciousness to those activities when we are not aware of 
them C-consciously is to deny that split-brain patients are conscious when they are 
using only their right hemisphere, and to deny consciousness to animals.  Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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Nobel laureate neuroscientists such as Sperry (1981) and Edelman (2006) have 
no problem in claiming that humans have two distinct forms of consciousness, but 
philosophers either ignore or reject their claims. Even those philosophers such as 
Frankish who accept an essential duality in the human mind label the two divisions as 
‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ (Evans & Frankish 2009). So there is a sense in which 
the two forms of consciousness are recognised, although one is mislabelled.  
 
SUMMARY: There is a long-standing recognition in folk psychology of 
a duality in the human mind, but it is often explained in terms of 
conscious and unconscious thought and behaviour. Philosophers have 
largely ignored the evidence from split-brain patients for consciousness 
in both cerebral hemispheres. 
 
There remains the question of why the C-consciousness located in the left 
hemisphere, the form of consciousness that enables us to introspect our mental states 
and to communicate the content of those states in language, cannot introspect and report 
the operations that take place B-consciously in the right hemisphere. We can understand 
why this does not occur in split-brain patients, but why is it true for the vast majority of 
us, whose corpus callosum is still intact? This is the subject of the following section. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Why cannot C-consciousness access B-consciousness? 
There are two levels at which this question might be answered: the theoretical and the 
practical. The answer at the first level can only be: because that is how mankind has 
evolved. The evidence cited in part 2.1 from split-brain patients reveals that there are 
considerable differences between the two hemispheres. Perhaps the most important is 
that the right hemisphere handles sensory inputs quickly, whereas the left hemisphere 
takes time to analyse and consider. This allows both a rapid response to circumstances 
such as danger, and the careful reflective analysis of circumstances that promotes 
learning and adaptability. A case might be made that this combination of abilities offers 
the best opportunity for the survival of the species.  
 
It has been speculated that communication between the two hemispheres may be 
concerned more with competition than with cooperation. This is because “the 
processing delays inherent in transcallosal communication may limit the extent to which 
the two hemispheres can cooperate” (Gazzaniga et al 2002, p 416). We know that some 
information passes between the hemispheres, since I am C-conscious of the whole 
visual field – even though the left-hand half of the field was processed in the right 
hemisphere. But is seems that once basic sensory data has been shared between the two 
hemispheres, the conscious processing of that data proceeds independently. 
 
This is why the soldier (2.3.2 above) is forced to say “I must have seen . . .” 
whatever it was that caused his behaviour. He did not have C-conscious access to the 
reasoning that had led to the action. In his case his assumption was correct, but in the 
experiment reported by Nisbett and Wilson (2.3.4 above) the inability to access the 
reasoning behind their actions caused the participants to confabulate. 
 Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
52 
SUMMARY: There are two levels of processing in each hemisphere. 
The output from the lower level is shared with the other hemisphere via 
the corpus callosum, but the output from the higher level of processing 
remains within each hemisphere (see figure 2.3 below). 
 
The following diagram provides a highly simplified illustration of the 
relationship between the two hemispheres, and the two levels of processing. It will be 
expanded in chapter 3 to take account of divisions within the visual system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.3 How do split-brain patients lead a normal life? 
As I mentioned above, the initial and surprising evidence from patients whose corpus 
callosum had been severed is that, after a recovery period of between six and twelve 
months (Sperry 1981, p 2), they are able to lead an apparently normal life. The key, I 
suggest, lies in the cooperation between two centres of consciousness. 
 
During the recovery period the C-consciousness in the left hemisphere is faced 
with the fact that it only has control of the right side of the body: the link from the 
Action Command Module to the Action Control System in the right hemisphere (that 
controls the left hand side of the body) had been severed. It is possible that some 
information can pass between the hemispheres via the brain stem and associated areas to 
which both hemispheres remain connected, but this route in not adequate to support the 
amount of correlation needed for tasks such as walking. 
ACM 
Left Hemisphere                                    Right Hemisphere  C-consciousness 
Visual Area V1 
Orange – processes shared between hemispheres                   ACM – Action Command Module 
Blue/Green – processes limited to one hemisphere                 ACS – Action Control System 
Purple – commands from ACM to right hemisphere ACS 
 
Figure 2.3 Inter- and intra-hemispheric processing (simplified) 
ACS  ACS 
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We can assess the possibility of cooperation between two independent centres of 
consciousness – each controlling one half of the body – from the experience of the 
Hensel twins (Haywood, 2009). Abigail and Brittany are conjoined twins, with two 
heads linked to a composite body with separate spines, hearts, lungs and stomachs in the 
upper abdomen, but shared organs below that level. They have two arms and two legs, 
with one of them controlling the left arm and leg, and the other the right arm and leg.  
By cooperation they are able to swim, ride a bike, and join in sports activities. They 
have together passed their driving test. 
 
If two separate minds/brains can cooperate to this extent, then it is not surprising 
that two centres of consciousness in one divided brain can cooperate and enable the 
individual to live a relatively normal life. 
 
SUMMARY: The behaviour of dicephalic conjoined twins provides an 
example of how two separate centres of consciousness, each able to 
control only half of the body, can combine to produce unified 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have set out the evidence for two separate centres of consciousness – 
one in each hemisphere – in humans. I have drawn on detailed studies of individuals 
whose corpus callosum has been severed to show that each hemisphere is conscious, 
and that there are significant differences in cognitive abilities between the two 
hemispheres. Evolutionary evidence shows that mankind inherited a basic form of 
creature consciousness from its animal forebears, and that this was supplemented by the 
development of a more complex form of creature consciousness during human 
evolution. Using criteria set out in chapter 1, I identified the consciousness located in 
the right hemisphere as B-consciousness, and that located in the left hemisphere as  
C-consciousness. 
 
In the third part of the chapter I reviewed a variety of circumstances in which the 
presence of these two centres of consciousness provides the best explanation for 
observed human behaviour. As well as experimental situations, the circumstances 
discussed include driving on automatic pilot and sleepwalking. The difference between 
sleep and coma, and between dreamless sleep and dreaming, can also be explained by 
the two centres of consciousness. 
 
I suggested that there is a tendency to limit creature consciousness in humans to 
what I have termed C-consciousness – which includes the ability to introspect our 
mental states and to report on those states verbally. This results in classing any 
behaviour that cannot be introspected or reported as either unconscious or subconscious. 
The implications of this action is to deny consciousness to animals – since we have no 
evidence that they can introspect their mental states and report their content using 
language – and to split-brain patients using their right hemisphere. 
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I conclude that the evidence for the presence of two forms of creature 
consciousness in humans – B-consciousness in the right hemisphere and  
C-consciousness in the left hemisphere – is at least very strong, if not irrefutable. 
Philosophical theories of consciousness that fail to account for this duality require 
revision.  
 
 
In chapter 4 I will consider the implications of the duality of consciousness for 
our understanding of visual perception, and in chapter 5 I will list some other areas 
where standard philosophical views require amending. Before that, I focus in chapter 3 
on another example of duality in the human mind/brain – the two cortical visual 
pathways. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TWO CORTICAL VISUAL PATHWAYS 
 
In this chapter I review some of the empirical evidence that has amassed in recent years 
about the two cortical visual pathways in humans, and discuss the relationship between 
these pathways and consciousness. I begin with a brief review of how the understanding 
of the role of the two pathways has developed, before outlining some important 
distinctions that are necessary before the empirical evidence can be properly assessed. I 
then describe some of the experiments that have been taken to throw light on the 
differences between the two pathways, and assess some challenges to those conclusions. 
The central issue to be addressed is how these two distinct pathways interact with the 
two forms of creature consciousness which I defined in chapter 1, and for which I 
provided evidence in chapter 2. 
 
 
 
3.1 An introduction to the two pathways 
In this part of the chapter I summarise the steps that led to the identification of two 
distinct visual pathways
1 and the changing understanding of their role. I review an early 
animal experiment, and examine two cases of neurological deficit in humans that 
illustrate the difference between the two pathways. I end this part by drawing some 
preliminary conclusion about the relationship between the pathways and human 
consciousness. 
 
 
3.1.1 The historical background 
Neurological studies on primates some 40 years ago revealed the presence of two 
distinct cortical visual pathways. The pathways are distinguished by both route (see 
figure 3.1 overleaf) and purpose. Both start from the primary visual area (V1) in the 
occipital lobe at the rear of the brain: one pathway terminates in the parietal lobe, and is 
usually known as the “dorsal pathway”; the other terminates in the temporal lobe, and is 
usually known as the “ventral pathway” (Gazzaniga et al 2002, p 160). There are 
interactions between the two pathways, especially in regards to the area that analyses 
movement. 
 
The names “what” for the ventral pathway, and “where” for the dorsal pathway 
were initially coined by Schneider (1969), proposing that the former showed what was 
being seen, and the latter where it was located (cited in Goodale & Milner 1992, p 20).   
 
1. The term ‘pathway’ was used by Goodale and Milner (1992) when they first proposed the 
dichotomy in the human visual system. Since then much of the literature has used the term ‘stream’. I 
will use the former term, but it should be clearly understood that both terms refer to the same feature 
of the human brain. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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When Goodale and Milner proposed that a similar distinction could be identified in 
humans, they claimed that the latter pathway is concerned not so much with where an 
object is located as with the control of actions in relation to that object, and introduced 
the terms “for perception” and “for action” to distinguish the role of the two pathways.  
 
The more commonly used terms now are the “visuoperceptual” and the 
“visuomotor” pathways (see for example Radoeva et al 2005). These terms reflect the 
fact that the ventral pathway enables us to identify what we see, to think about it, and to 
report it linguistically; whereas the dorsal pathway provides the information to control 
our actions in respect of what we see.  This distinction is clearly shown in an 
experiment carried out by Goodale and two colleagues (Aglioti et al 1995).  In a case of 
visual illusion, perceptual judgments were affected by the illusory size of objects, but 
grasping was related to actual size. (I will return to the issue of illusion below.) 
 
 The evidence on which Milner and Goodale relied in the early 1990s was 
largely the neurological findings from primate studies and various dissociations in 
human visual abilities arising from brain damage. However, writing some 20 years later 
they were able to report that: 
 
 
The fact that much has happened since 1994 means that the story has 
become more complex, but we believe that the idea of a fundamental 
distinction between perceptual representation and visuomotor control is 
still essential to understanding the organization of the [human] visual 
system. Indeed, new findings, particular from functional MRI (fMRI), 
have strengthened the evidence base for this two-stream model of 
visual processing. (Milner & Goodale 2006, p 207) 
 
 
SUMMARY: Animal experiments in the 1980s revealed two visual 
pathways. Combining this evidence with cases of neurological deficit 
in humans, Milner and Goodale claimed that there are two visual 
pathways in humans – one for perception and one controlling actions. 
Recent developments in neuroimaging have confirmed their claim. 
V1  MT 
Occipital 
Lobe 
Parietal 
Lobe 
Temporal 
Lobe 
Dorsal Pathway 
Ventral Pathway 
MT = area concerned 
with movement 
Figure 3.1 Two visual pathways in the human brain (highly simplified) 
V1 = primary 
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There continue to be disagreements about whether particular visually-related 
behaviours are associated with one or the other pathway, and some of these will be 
discussed in parts 3.2 and 3.3. Before that, I continue in this part to review some of the 
historical data that led to the identification of the two pathways in humans.  
 
 
 
3.1.2 The pathways distinguished in primates 
A 1973 animal experiment, in which three groups of rhesus monkeys were trained to 
identify the location of food, highlighted the different role of the two pathways 
(Gazzaniga et al 2002, pp 196-197). One group of monkeys had both parietal lobes 
ablated (the termination of the dorsal visual pathway), and another group had both 
temporal lobes ablated (the termination of the ventral pathway). The animals comprising 
a third, control, group were left untouched.  
 
THE TEST 
In the experiment the monkeys had to learn to recognize which of two bowls 
contained food. In one case, the location of the food was indicated by whether or not a 
marker was located beside the bowl containing the food: this “landmark” test was 
designed to use the dorsal visual pathway. In the other case the location of the food was 
indicated by which of two different objects was located beside the bowl containing the 
food: this “discrimination” test was designed for the ventral pathway.  
 
In the landmark test the monkeys were first trained to identify the presence of 
food by the location, next to the dish with the food, of a small cylinder, with the food 
and cylinder randomly moved between the left and right dishes. Once they had learned 
to so do, they were then trained to identify the location of the food in the dish 
not adjacent to the cylinder. Once this was achieved, training reverted to the previous 
case, and so on, until seven cycles of training had been completed. 
 
 
A similar pattern was followed for the discrimination test, except that the 
location of the food was marked by the presence of either a small cylinder or a small 
Table 
Inset food bowl  Inset food bowl 
Location of food marked by presence 
of a marker 
Location of food marked by the 
particular character of a marker 
The Landmark Test  The Discrimination Test 
Figure 3.2 Testing the visual pathways in rhesus monkeys Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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cube next to the dish with the food in. The position of the food and the two markers was 
randomly changed, and once the monkeys had learned to associate food with one of the 
markers, they were then trained to associate it with the other marker: again for seven 
cycles.  
 
Success in each cycle of the test was set at 28 correct choices of the bowl 
containing the food in thirty attempts, and the number of errors prior to success was 
recorded.  
 
THE RESULTS 
Landmark Test  Discrimination Test  Iteration 
Dorsal Path 
Intact 
Ventral Path 
Intact 
Both Paths 
Intact 
Dorsal Path 
Intact 
Ventral Path 
Intact 
Opening  180  140  160  140  >10 
Cycle 1  300  220  200  140  >10 
Cycle 2  140  220  100  110  >10 
Cycle 3  100  210  90  50  >10 
Cycle 4  90  190  40  60  >10 
Cycle 5  80  200  50  30  >10 
Cycle 6  70  180  30  40  >10 
Cycle 7  70  160  20  20  >10 
 
Table 3.1 Number of errors prior to success by Visual Path 
 in Tests on Rhesus Monkeys (figures rounded to nearest 10) 
 
The landmark test was taken by all three groups, and all three made between 140 
and 180 errors before success on the first presentation of the test. All three groups made 
over 200 errors before learning that the food was now in the bowl without a marker. 
From this point on, the group with their parietal lobe ablated (using their ventral path-
way) made only marginal improvements, still making over 150 errors before success on 
the seventh cycle. By contrast, the control group and the group with their temporal lobe 
ablated (using their dorsal pathway) improved their performance significantly at each 
cycle of the test, making significantly fewer errors before success. It should however be 
noted that the control group, making use of information from both pathways, out-
performed the group using only the dorsal pathway. 
 
The control group did not take part in the discrimination test, which showed a 
significant difference between the other two groups. The group with their dorsal 
pathway intact did improve their performance with each cycle of the test, with the 
number of errors reducing from around 140 to less than 20. However, the group with 
their ventral pathway intact succeeded from the very first cycle with less than ten errors, 
and by the fifth cycle needed only two or three errors before achieving success.  
 
THE CONCLUSIONS 
Monkeys with both pathways intact outperformed both other groups in the 
landmark test, suggesting that the combination of information from both pathways is 
more powerful than the information from one pathway, even though it is specialised. 
Unfortunately, the control group did not take the discrimination test, so we cannot 
assess the benefit of utilizing both pathways for object discrimination. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
59 
Monkeys with an intact ventral pathway had no problems with the 
discrimination test, but performed very badly in the landmark test. This is strong 
evidence for the ventral pathway being specialized for object discrimination. 
 
Those with an intact dorsal pathway outperformed those with an intact ventral 
pathway in the landmark test, providing evidence that the dorsal pathway is specialised 
for identifying the location of objects, and not the differences between them. But 
although the former group did significantly less well than the latter in the discrimin-
ation test, they did nevertheless show a marked improvement over the seven cycles.  
 
One possible explanation for this result is that the test can be treated as a 
landmark test. Instead of distinguishing between the cylinder and the cube to determine 
the location of food, perhaps this group of monkeys focused instead on the cylinder – as 
in the first test – and its location (since if the food was in the bowl marked by the cube, 
then it was not in the bowl marked by the cylinder).  
 
Two important points need to be made about the results of this experiment. The 
first is that in the course of human evolution there has occurred the specialization of the 
two cerebral hemispheres. It would not be surprising if this resulted in some changes to 
the visual system inherited from our primate ancestors, and it probably explains a 
change in the role of the two pathways. In humans, the ventral pathway is specialized 
for object discrimination, identification and classification, and the dorsal pathway for 
the control of actions in respect of objects. This difference will be explored in the 
following section. 
 
The other point to note is that the monkeys’ behaviour provides clear evidence 
of perception and reasoning, and therefore of consciousness, using both of the visual 
pathways. As will be seen below (section 3.1.4), the situation is different for humans. In 
the following section I begin to consider the role of the two pathways in humans in 
more detail. 
 
SUMMARY: Tests on rhesus monkeys revealed clear differences 
between the two visual pathways. However, later evolutionary changes 
in humans, resulting in the specialization of the two cerebral 
hemispheres, mean that the role of the pathways will have evolved. 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Two cases of neurological deficit 
Goodale and Milner (1992) drew on two forms of neurological deficit – optic ataxia and 
visual form agnosia – to support their initial claim for two visual pathways in humans. 
The presence of the two pathways is now well-attested by neuroimaging studies, and 
these cases are now more illustrations of the role of the two pathways than proofs of 
their existence. In this section I review the evidence originally cited by Milner and 
Goodale, and two recent challenges to their conclusions. 
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Optic ataxia is a loss of control of eye movement that follows damage to the 
posterior parietal region (associated with the dorsal visual pathway). Such patients have 
no difficultly in recognising objects (which makes use of data from the ventral 
pathway), but are unable to reach accurately for them (Goodale & Milner 1992, p 21). 
Their problem is not only in reaching in the right direction, but also in positioning their 
hand and fingers to the right size and orientation to grasp the object.  
 
The converse situation is demonstrated by patients whose ventral pathway has 
been damaged, and thus suffer from visual form agnosia. One such sufferer, DF, had 
damage to the ventral visual pathway as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning (ibid,  
p 22). She showed significant problems in identifying objects, being unable, for 
example, to distinguish between two blocks of different sizes. One experiment made use 
of a block of wood with a slot in it, that could be rotated at will. When asked to indicate 
the angle at which the slot was positioned with her hand, she could not do so, but when 
a card was placed in her hand she could post it through the slot without any problem.   
 
OBJECTION 
In a subsequent paper Milner and his colleagues (Milner et al 1999) showed that 
a patient with optic ataxia performed better if vision was disabled prior to reaching and 
grasping, because, it was assumed, this forced them to use the stored data from the 
ventral pathway (see 3.2.2 below). This finding was taken to support the earlier claim of 
a distinction between the two pathways, but it has been challenged by Himmelbach et al 
(2009), who compared actions by an optic ataxia sufferer (IG) with the same actions 
performed by healthy subjects, using neuroimaging to reveal activation in the parietal 
lobe, parts of which were damaged in the case of IG. Their conclusion is that “the dorsal 
stream is not only essential for immediate but also for delayed movements” (ibid, p 
1516). 
 
REBUTTAL 
 I believe their conclusion to be flawed because it relies on an unstated – and 
false – premise. In part 3.2, I will make a distinction between those processes that are 
part of the dorsal pathway, and those that are served by the dorsal pathway. The areas of 
the parietal lobe activated in Himmelbach et al’s experiment are areas that play a role in 
planning and controlling movement, and may make use of the visual representation 
formed by the dorsal pathway: they do not, however, form part of that pathway. Just 
because a housing estate is served by a particular road, the fact that traffic is moving 
within the housing estate provides no evidence that traffic is also moving on that road. 
The fact that areas of the parietal lobe were active does not prove that the dorsal 
pathway was active. I will return to this issue in parts 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
OBJECTION 
Goodale & Milner claim that DF uses a visual pathway to post a card through a 
slot that is distinct from the pathway that underlies perception – the dorsal and ventral 
pathways respectively. This claim is challenged by Mole (2009) on philosophical, not 
empirical, grounds. One of the distinguishing features of the two pathways, it is 
claimed, is that we are conscious of the output from the ventral pathway, but not of the 
output from the dorsal pathway.  Some commentators have taken this to mean that 
visually guided actions are controlled by a “zombie within” (Clark 2007, Koch and 
Crick 2001).  Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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Mole (2009) raises objections to this approach and claims that the sort of 
behaviour shown by DF “can be accommodated without accepting anything like the 
zombie-action story” (ibid, p 995). He claims that “movement control and conscious 
experience are the work of one and the same system” (ibid, p 1002 – italics in original), 
and that information about what we see is stored as “an embodied demonstrative” (for 
example, “the slot is angled this way”).  His argument is that DF has a deficiency in her 
visual system that prevents her from passively experiencing form. One example of this 
deficiency is that she can tell that a grey patch is striped, but cannot tell in which 
direction the stripes run (ibid, p 1004-1005). She cannot experience some aspects of 
what she sees, says Mole, until she acts in respect of those aspects. Mole’s view is that 
“when she is acting, but only then, the forms of the things acted upon do figure in her 
conscious experience” (ibid, p 1005).  
 
REBUTTAL 
I reject Mole’s claim on two counts. The first is that he appears to be confusing 
proprioceptive input with visual input. If it is true that DF gains information about 
objects when she acts in relation to them, then that information would appear to arise 
from her awareness of her bodily movements and not from the processing of data from 
the optic nerve.  
 
My second objection is that whilst Mole is ostensibly arguing against there being 
two visual systems, his real target is the claim that there is a zombie within that controls 
actions towards objects of which there is no conscious experience. As will become clear 
in the course of this chapter, there is no need to envisage a zombie within us to explain 
how reaching for objects makes use of visual information that does not reach 
consciousness. There is therefore no need to accept Mole’s convoluted explanation of 
DF’s behaviour, especially since that behaviour can be seen as an illustration of the 
distinction between the pathways and not as proof of the distinction. 
 
SUMMARY: Milner and Goodale used the different behaviour of two 
patients, one with damage to the dorsal pathway and the other with 
damage to the ventral pathway, to support their claim for the distinctive 
role of each pathway. Objections have been raised to their conclusions, 
but these can be rebutted. 
 
DF’s behaviour as described above provides evidence for an important 
conclusion about the relationship between consciousness and vision. I will explore this 
issue in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.4 Consciousness and the two visual pathways 
 
In this section I use DF’s behaviour in respect of the slot to draw some initial 
conclusions about the relationship between consciousness and the visual pathways. 
These conclusions will be supported by further evidence from more recent experiments 
on the effect of illusion on grasping objects. 
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The immediate intent of DF’s attempt to indicate the orientation of the slot by 
the position of her hand was to answer the question put to her (“how is the slot 
angled?”). This action involves the reporting of her perceptual experience, and – as 
discussed above – such actions involve the ventral visual pathway. The fact that DF 
failed to indicate the orientation of the slot is significant because a person with an 
undamaged ventral pathway would succeed. This leads us to conclude that in the 
undamaged brain the output of the ventral pathway reaches C-consciousness. 
 
 We know that an action such as posting a card through the slot involves the 
dorsal pathway, and can judge that her success in posting a card through the slot arises 
from the fact that her dorsal pathway is undamaged. However, her inability to draw on 
that pathway to report the position of the slot, in the absence of data from the ventral 
pathway, confirms that the output of her dorsal pathway is not available to  
C-consciousness. Although it is possible that the brain damage which she sustained 
prevented C-conscious access to her dorsal pathway, the more likely conclusion – which 
will be borne out by further evidence to be discussed below – is that humans in general 
do not have C-conscious access to the output of the dorsal pathway. 
 
If the dorsal pathway in the left hemisphere does not reach C-consciousness, the 
question arises as to where it does terminate.  In a paper to which I will return below, 
Gonzalez et al (2006) conclude that there exists a module in the left hemisphere that is 
specialised for visual control of action (regardless of handedness). This is the module 
which was referred to in section 2.1.3, to which I gave the name Action Command 
Module (ACM). Since the dorsal pathway is specialised for visual control of action, that 
pathway must serve the ACM. If decisions to act are taken C-consciously, as surely they 
must generally be, but the implementation of that decision is controlled by the ACM 
and the output of the dorsal visual pathway, then commands must be passed from  
C-consciousness to the ACM and control then pass from C-consciousness to the ACM, 
and from the ACM to the specialized action control systems (ACS) in each hemisphere. 
 
 I pointed out above that primates have conscious access to both the dorsal and 
the ventral visual pathways, and I will assume for the time being, pending evidence to 
the contrary, that B-consciousness in the right hemisphere of humans is served by both 
pathways. If this is so, there is a question about DF’s successful posting of the card (and 
other actions that depend on the data from the dorsal pathway). Did DF initiate the 
action of posting the card C-consciously, or did she act B-consciously?  
 
We do not know that DF was visually unaware of the presence of the slot, only 
that she was not conscious of the orientation of the slot (compare the example of stripes 
on a grey background mentioned earlier). If DF were aware of the presence of the slot, 
there is no difficultly in assuming that she could make a C-conscious decision to post a 
card through it. However, if she were not aware C-consciously of the presence of the 
slot, it is difficult to see how she could make a C-conscious decision about the slot, 
although it is theoretically possible that DF’s action in posting the card through the slot 
was initiated B-consciously.  
 
The evidence from brain-damaged patients that will be reviewed in the next part 
of the chapter strongly suggests that the former scenario is the correct interpretation of 
DF’s behaviour. That is, that she had C-conscious awareness of the presence of the slot, 
although not of its orientation, and was thus able to make a C-conscious decision to post Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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the card, and that decision passed to the ACM, where the action could draw on the data 
available from the dorsal pathway. 
 
The tentative conclusion that can be drawn from the case of DF is that in the left 
hemisphere only the ventral pathway serves C-consciousness, whilst the dorsal pathway 
serves a specialized Action Control Module. The evidence from animal studies suggests 
that in the right hemisphere both pathways serve B-consciousness.  Figure 3.3 
summarises the position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 The visual pathways and consciousness 
 
SUMMARY: Based on DF’s behaviour I conclude that in the left 
hemisphere the ventral pathway serves C-consciousness, but the dorsal 
pathway terminates in a specialised module for action command and 
does not reach consciousness. In the right hemisphere it appears that 
both pathways may reach B-consciousness. 
 
Further evidence in support of this arrangement will arise in part 3.3, but before 
then I need to consider some of the problems that arise in understanding and 
interpreting the information about the two pathways. 
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3.2 Resolving some problems 
In this part of the chapter I review a number of problems that arise in understanding the 
differences between the two pathways, and in relating particular behaviours to a specific 
pathway. I begin with the differing requirements for the representations formed by each 
pathway.  
 
 
3.2.1 Representations in the two pathways 
Arising from the difference in their function, it is widely assumed that the data provided 
by each pathway will also differ in both content and form (see Clark 2009, p 1461). In 
this section I will outline the reasons for those assumptions, and discuss one specific 
challenge. 
 
For me to identify an object on my desk as a book (which presumably requires a 
comparison between the visual representation of the object in view and a stored 
representation of what a book looks like), precise details of its size and orientation are 
not only not necessary – they are irrelevant to that identification. But if I want to pick the 
book up, then size and orientation are critical. Some idea of how visual data in the two 
pathways might be constructed in different ways to suit the two different purposes can 
perhaps be gained by comparing the two different ways in which visual information can 
be stored on a computer.  
 
Many picture file formats are based on a raster image, in which the area to be 
depicted is divided into a grid, and information is stored about the colour of each element 
of the grid. Whilst the size and orientation of objects within the area will be reflected in 
the information stored in respect of each element in the grid, they are not specifically 
encoded: they must be calculated from the information stored in the file, and the 
accuracy of that calculation will depend upon both the fineness of the grid and the 
availability of clues.  
 
Judgments about the size of the items in the picture below (Figure 3.4) are made 
based on our experience of bathroom furniture, and comparisons between the individual 
items. But a very different judgment emerges if the picture is expanded to provide more 
clues (see Figure 3.5 on the following page). 
 
 Figure 3.4 A bathroom set 
Other picture file formats use a vector image, in which each element in the 
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vertical/draw an arc of an ellipse centred on e,f; length l; from x,y draw . . .”). In this 
format, size and orientation are among the actual data stored. 
 
 Figure 3.5 Doll’s house bathroom set 
These differences between two picture file formats suggest how there could be a  
difference between the representations formed in the ventral pathway and those formed 
in the dorsal pathway. Such a distinction would be consistent with the evidence that we 
assess size and orientation on the basis of the representations formed by the ventral 
pathway and can be misled by illusions, but that size and orientation are accurately 
represented in the dorsal pathway (Aglioti et al 1995). Evidence in support of this 
conclusion will be found in part 3.3.  
 
There is another distinction that is made about the representations in each of the 
pathways. It has been claimed that information in the ventral visual pathway is coded 
allo-centrically, and that information in the dorsal path is coded egocentrically (see, for 
example, Jacob & Jeannerod 2004, p 103; Aglioti et al 1995, p 680). This distinction is 
challenged by Bermúdez (2007), who claims that ‘right’ and ‘left’, for example, relate 
objects to the viewer or to some “prominent landmark” (ibid, p 4), and not to each other. 
He claims therefore that both pathways code visual data egocentrically.  
 
I suggest that Bermúdez is mistaken, and that it is not necessary to assume a 
prominent landmark before objects can be located allocentrically. Many objects in the 
world have a front and a back, which determine their right and left. The right hand page 
of a book, for example, remains the right hand page both for the pupil who is reading 
from it in the usual way, and for the teacher who is reading it upside down. It is the 
relationship between objects, rather than between individual objects and the observer, 
that is stored in the ventral pathway, and that relationship remains constant when I 
move. But for me to be able to grasp an object, it is necessary that its location be stored 
in relation to where I am, and that information will change dynamically as I move. 
 
SUMMARY:  Despite objections raised by Bermúdez, there are good 
grounds for assuming that the representations formed by the two visual 
pathways differ both in the information they encode and the reference 
system (allocentric or egocentric) used to encode it.  
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There are a number of other important issues about the pathways that need to be 
clarified before the large volume of experimental data about them can be assessed, and 
before the relationship between vision and consciousness can be determined. In the 
following three sections I highlight some important distinctions about the form and role 
of the two visual pathways, and the misunderstandings that can arise if they are 
overlooked. I begin with a distinction between two types of visual processing. 
 
 
3.2.2 Distinguishing visual pathways from later processes 
The visual pathways form part of the visual system, that is, those areas of the brain that 
process the input from the optic nerve and together form the visual representations 
needed for perception and action. Thus, for example, the processing of colour in brain 
area V4 is part of the ventral pathway, but face recognition in brain area FFA (fusiform 
face area) is served by the ventral pathway but is not part of that pathway.  The former 
area contributes to the formation of the ventral pathway’s visual representation, whereas 
the latter makes use of that representation. 
 
DISTINCTION 1: There are processes that form part of a visual pathway and processes 
that are served by a visual pathway. 
 
The dorsal pathway terminates in the parietal lobe, and the visual representation 
that it produces is specialised for the control of movement in respect of objects. Within 
the parietal lobe is an area involved in the planning and execution of movements (see 
Connolly et al 2003). But this is an area that is served by the dorsal pathway, but may 
also be served by the ventral pathway (see Distinctions 3 below). Evidence about 
activity in this area cannot be taken to provide evidence about the dorsal pathway itself.  
 
 
3.2.3 The visual pathways and C-consciousness 
Milner & Goodale (2006) make the following claim about the two pathways: 
 
 
[T]hey . . . have different temporal characteristics. The dorsal stream 
may enable us to reach out and grasp objects with exquisite ease, but it 
appears to be trapped in the present. Acting alone, the system can deal 
only with objects that are visible when the action is being programmed. . 
. The ventral stream, in contrast, allows us to escape the present, and 
bring to bear visual information from the past.  
(Milner & Goodale 2006, pp 245-246) 
 
The inaccessibility of the dorsal pathway to [C-]consciousness has led some 
commentators to describe actions that draw on its output as being performed by “a 
zombie within” (Clark 2007, Koch and Crick 2001).  This attitude has not been helped 
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(Goodale 2008). This is highly misleading, and contradicts the emphasis in Milner & 
Goodale (2006, p 221) on the role of perception in initiating action. It is, I think, clear 
that, with the exception of reflexes, the normal process in humans is perception → 
reasoning → decision → action. The action stage can be broken down into at least three 
steps: strategic planning (what object? what action?), tactical planning (how?) and 
performance. The first of these necessarily involves consciousness and thus draws upon 
the ventral pathway.  
 
DISTINCTION 2: The output of the ventral pathway reaches C-consciousness, but the 
output of the dorsal pathway does not
1; the former can be remembered, but the latter 
cannot and is only available so long as vision is enabled 
 
There must then come a point at which that conscious decision and strategic 
planning, based on the allocentric representation formed by the ventral pathway, is 
transmitted to a module that can link that allocentric data to egocentric data provided by 
the dorsal pathway – subject to some exclusions which will be outlined below. I take it 
that the module concerned is the Action Command Module (ACM). In normal 
circumstances the action specified can then draw on the specialized spatial data of the 
dorsal pathway which serves the ACM. To suggest that such actions occur without 
perception, or are the responsibility of a “zombie within”, is highly misleading. 
 
However, the view that actions are decided using the output of the ventral 
pathway and then carried out using the output of the dorsal pathway, whilst true in most 
circumstances, is an oversimplification, and has led to considerable confusion about 
experimental results. 
 
 
3.2.4 Actions that use the ventral pathway 
Actions can be divided into two categories: those that by their nature depend upon the 
ventral pathway, and those that are naturally dependant on the dorsal pathway (so long 
as that pathway is available). The different routes to action can be shown in general 
terms in the diagram overleaf.  
 
DISTINCTION 3: Actions such as reaching and pointing that utilize data from the dorsal 
pathway must be distinguished from similar actions that utilise data from the ventral 
pathway even when data from the dorsal pathway is available. 
 
There are at least three different circumstances in which action is directly 
consciously controlled, so that spatial information during performance of the action 
draws on the ventral pathway, despite the availability of data from the dorsal pathway.  I 
will outline each of these in turn. 
 
 
1. The justification for this distinction was outlined in section 3.1.4. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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 CASE 1: Quasi-linguistic behaviour 
Quasi-linguistic behaviour is behaviour that can be understood as 
making a linguistic statement, such as nodding to mean “yes”. When 
someone acts in a way that relates to an object, such an action may be 
quasi-linguistic, or it may be non-linguistic, or a combination of both. 
If I ask my wife “where are the keys?” she could (a) simply point to 
them, or say “there” and point to them, and in either case the action of 
pointing would be quasi-linguistic; or she could (b) say “here” and pick 
up the keys, in which case her action in picking up the keys would be 
non-linguistic, but her holding out of the keys would be quasi-
linguistic. The critical test in such cases in the immediate intent of the 
action: when she pointed at the keys, her immediate intent was to give 
me information about the keys in response to my request; but when she 
picked up the keys her immediate intent was to pick them up (in order 
then to be able to respond to my question). 
 
When quasi-linguistic acts involve the reporting of one’s perceptual experience 
and perceptual judgments they draw on the output of the ventral pathway. This fact is 
extensively used in experiments designed to differentiate the role of the two pathways. If 
participants are asked “how wide is that object?” and they respond by opening their 
thumb and first finger to indicate the width, then that action is a quasi-linguistic act, and 
will draw on the ventral pathway. However, if they use their thumb and first finger to 
actually grasp the object, then under normal circumstances they are drawing on the 
dorsal pathway – so long as the object to be grasped remains visible (see below). 
 
 CASE 2: Non-existent target 
The second situation in which action must rely on the ventral pathway 
is when the target of the action is a calculated location and not an 
object. If there is no object, there can be no representation of the 
position of that object in the dorsal pathway. If I am asked to move my 
hand to a position that shows where an object will or would be given 
certain assumptions, then I must perform conscious calculations which 
must draw on the ventral pathway.  
 
C-Consciousness 
 
Action 
Command 
Module   
Action 
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System 
 
Ventral Pathway 
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Command pathways 
Figure 3.6 Two routes for action in the left hemisphere of the human brain Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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Melmoth et al (2009) claim that the Poggendorff illusion (see figure 3.7 below) 
affects equally the output of both visual pathways.   
 
 
In an experiment, participants had to indicate where the pointer line would 
intersect with the landing line, (a) by moving a marker or (b) by rapidly pointing to the 
position. They assumed that the former task would use data from the ventral pathway, 
and the latter task would use data from the dorsal pathway.  
 
But since the pointing is to a location that has to be calculated, and not to a 
visually-represented target, this action must draw on the same pathway – the ventral – as 
the perceptual judgments, and thus both cases would be affected by illusion to the same 
extent.  
 
CASE 3: Awkward or unpractised movements 
The final class of action which involves the ventral and not the dorsal 
pathway is composed of those actions that require awkward or 
unrehearsed movements. When a cricketer is in form he makes a 
conscious decision of where to hit the ball, but the detailed planning 
and execution of the stroke require no conscious involvement and draw 
on the dorsal pathway. When he is out of form, however, he must 
consciously think “I must move my left foot to there; I must angle the 
bat just so; I must swing the bat in this direction”, and his actions 
therefore draw on the ventral pathway.  
 
In an experiment reported by Gonzalez et al (2008) participants were asked to 
grasp an object in an illusory setting using thumb and first finger or thumb and ring 
finger. The former action was not affected by the illusion, but the latter was. However, 
after three days of practice using thumb and ring finger of their right hand to grasp the 
object participants were no longer affected by the illusion, although those using their 
left hand continued to be affected.  This provides strong support for the presence of the 
Action Command Module in the left hemisphere, and suggests that when there is no 
schema for an action already stored in memory, then the ACM cannot match the data in 
the dorsal pathway with the data in the schema, and the action must be consciously 
controlled, using the data available from the ventral pathway, until a schema is created. 
Pointer 
Inducing Line 
Landing Line 
The point where the pointer 
line would intersect with the 
landing line appears to be too 
low. 
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In addition to these three categories of action that draw on the ventral pathway, 
there is one other situation in which the ventral pathway comes into play. Milner & 
Goodale (2006, p 246) say of the dorsal pathway that “the system can deal only with 
objects that are visible when the action is being programmed” (what I have termed 
“strategic planning”). I will show later that the evidence indicates that the final six 
words of this claim should be deleted: that is, the dorsal pathway is only available to 
guide grasping whilst vision is enabled, at whichever stage vision is disabled (see 3.3.4 
below). When the dorsal pathway is not available, data must be drawn from the ventral 
pathway. 
 
SUMMARY: There are four circumstances in which the performance of 
an action draws on the spatial data in the ventral pathway and not on 
the data from the dorsal pathway: 
 
1. When the action is quasi-linguistic; 
 
2. When the action relates to a calculated target point where there is  
     no object; 
 
3. When the action involves awkward and/or untrained movements; 
 
4. Where the target object becomes invisible after a decision to act  
     has been made but before the action is completed. 
 
These categories will prove important in the next part of the chapter, when I 
review recent experiments concerning the role of the two pathways.  
 
 
 
3.3 Illusion and the two visual pathways 
There have been many experiments in recent years that rely on the claim that indicating 
the size of an object with the thumb and forefinger (often referred to as “estimating”) 
draws on the ventral pathway, whereas actually grasping the object draws on the dorsal 
pathway, provided that vision is not disabled before planning of the grasping movement 
has been completed.  There are, however, exceptions to this simple dichotomy, as 
explained in the previous section. Care must be taken in setting up and drawing 
conclusions from such experiments, to ensure that behaviour is attributed to the correct 
pathway. 
 
As mentioned in 3.1.1 above, it has been shown that when faced with a size 
illusion, perceptual judgments of size are affected by the illusion, whereas grasping 
movements are mainly affected by actual size (Aglioti et al 1995). In this part of the 
chapter I review a number of other experiments that made use of illusory settings. In 
several of these experiments, reported recently, vision was disabled at various points 
between the planning of the grasping movement and its completion. The results of these 
experiments have been claimed to deny the distinction in the roles of the two pathways, 
but I will argue that – correctly interpreted – they in fact support the distinction. 
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3.3.1 Estimating and grasping – the Müller-Lyer Illusion 
An experiment reported by Radoeva et al (2005) included some brain damaged patients, 
which meant that for these participants the processing of their visual inputs was limited 
to a single hemisphere. There were six patients with either hemianopia or quadratic 
anopia. The former condition involves the inability to process visual information from 
half of the visual field – the left visual field if they have suffered brain damage to the 
right cerebral hemisphere, or the right visual field if the damage is in the left 
hemisphere. The latter problem is a similar loss of visual ability, but awareness is 
limited to either the top or bottom half of the affected visual field. There were four 
patients with damage to their left hemisphere, and two with damage to the right. In 
addition, the experiment included 26 intact-brain participants. 
 
THE TEST 
The participants undertook two blocks of 26 trials, one block involving 
estimating the length of, and the other block involving grasping, one of five black 
wooden bars. Two of the bars were 6cm long and were positioned as the lines of a 
Müller-Lyer illusion (see figure 3.8 below), the other three bars were 4, 6 and 8cm long 
and were positioned on a white background. The gap between thumb and forefinger was 
recorded for each trial, and compared with the size of the relevant bar. The accuracy of 
the grip used on the bars with a non-illusory back-ground was used to adjust the data 
obtained in respect of the two bars in the illusion.  
 
 
 
Participants were required to keep their gaze on a fixation point, and the block to 
be either estimated or grasped was revealed by removing a covering white card. The 
direction of their gaze was monitored, and if it moved away from the fixation point that 
result was excluded from the test. If the block was located to the left of the fixation 
point it would be processed by the right hemisphere and the estimating/grasping action 
would be taken by the left hand; the opposite hemisphere and hand were involved if the 
block was positioned to the right of the fixation point. Control subjects had blocks 
randomly located on both sides of the fixation point, whereas for the brain-damaged 
patients the blocks were always positioned to be viewed by the undamaged hemisphere. 
 
THE RESULTS 
There were significant differences in the results for the three categories of 
participants: the brain-intact, the left hemisphere damaged, and the right hemisphere 
damaged. The results for each visual field are summarized in the table 3.2 overleaf. 
Figure3.8 The Müller-Lyer Illusion 
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Task 
Control  Right Hs Damaged  Left Hs Damaged 
Estimating - RVF  1.1  1.7   
Grasping  -  RVF  0.75  0.1   
Estimating - LVF  1.0    1.6 
Grasping  -  LVF  0.6    1.7 
 
Table 3.2 Error (cm) in estimating and grasping due to Müller-Lyer Illusion
1 
 
THE CONCLUSIONS 
The first point to note is that the patients using only their left hemisphere were 
affected by the illusion when asked to estimate the size of the target object – using the 
ventral pathway – but were not affected by the illusion when grasping – that is, utilising 
the data from the dorsal pathway. This supports the conclusion based on DF’s behaviour 
that we have C-conscious access only to the ventral pathway, and that decisions reached 
C-consciously about objects on the basis of the data from that pathway are com-
municated to the ACM. This module then draws on the data from the dorsal pathway for 
tactical planning and control of the necessary actions directed at those objects.  
 
In complete contrast, those patients utilizing only their right hemisphere made 
the same error on grasping as they did on estimating. From this we can conclude that 
there is not a module in the right hemisphere controlling action in respect of objects 
corresponding to the Action Control Module in the left hemisphere. Furthermore, if the 
data provided by the dorsal pathway is specialized for visuomotor control, and provides 
accurate information about size and orientation, then that data was not used to control 
grasping in this situation.  
 
I suggested earlier that the evidence from primates is that they have conscious 
access to both dorsal and ventral pathway outputs, and that this would imply that in 
humans B-consciousness would also have access to both pathways. It may be that when 
there is a discrepancy between the two sources of information, we B-consciously select 
the output of the ventral system – since this is the output normally used for reasoning. 
There are processes in the right hemisphere that control action by the left hand – what I 
referred to earlier as the Action Control System or ACS – and in brain intact individuals 
the evidence indicates that this system responds to commands from the Action Control 
Module in the left hemisphere. In this case such commands were not available, and so 
information to control grasping had to be provided from B-consciousness – using the 
data from the ventral pathway.  This would explain why for these patients grasping was 
as prone to illusion as estimating.  
 
The brain-intact participants were affected by the illusion in both estimating and 
grasping tasks, although to a significantly greater extent in the former case.  There was 
little difference whether the object was presented in the left visual field or the right 
visual field. This is as would be expected, since although visual inputs are processed 
within the contra-lateral hemisphere to the visual field, the results of that processing are  
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Because the experimenters used a purpose-designed system for measuring maximum grip aperture, 
and not the standard Optotrak device, the errors recorded are significantly higher than those found in 
other similar experiments (Bruno & Franz 2009, p 1429). This does not negate the value of the results 
in terms of the differences between different tasks and different categories of participant. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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shared by both hemispheres. The significant question to answer is why – given the role 
of the ACM – these participants showed an error in grasping, unlike the patients using 
only the left hemisphere. 
 
One explanation that has been proposed is that different illusions may arise at 
different stages in visual processing, and that illusions that arise in the earlier stages 
might therefore affect both visual pathways (Milner & Dyde 2003).  This possibility is 
borne out by differences in the affect of two different illusions, as will be discussed 
below. It fails, to explain, however, why the illusion has a greater affect on the ventral 
pathway than on the dorsal pathway, and there is, perhaps, another possibility in this 
particular case that should not be overlooked. 
 
Since the patients using only their right hemisphere were as bad at grasping as 
they were at estimating, we can infer that even when the target was presented to the left 
visual field of brain-intact participants, and visual processing took place in the right 
hemisphere, the grasping action was controlled by the ACM. However, we can also 
infer that the control exerted by the ACM was dissipated to some extent by some other 
factor. Although it is clear that the participants in the experiment had some visual 
awareness of the movement of their hand and arm whilst grasping, we cannot account 
for the effect on grasping by C-conscious interference with the movements initiated by 
the ACM, since if this were the case the same effect should have been seen in the 
patients using only their left hemisphere. It is possible, however, that in brain-intact 
patients actions initiated by the ACM were affected by B-conscious awareness of the 
illusion and resulting interference.  
 
There were several cases reported in chapter 2 where actions were initiated 
B-consciously, with the individuals concerned being C-consciously unaware of the 
reasoning behind those actions. I have already made the case that we B-consciously 
choose the data from the ventral pathway when it conflicts with data from the dorsal 
pathway. This raises the possibility that the participants tried B-consciously to correct 
the actions that had been initiated C-consciously, since the visual feedback showed that 
the grasping motion did not conform to the ventral pathway data. 
 
SUMMARY: In one experiment based on the Müller-Lyer illusion, all 
participants were affected by the illusion when estimating the size of 
the target object. However, when it came to grasping the object, those 
participants using their left hemisphere were unaffected by the illusion, 
whereas those using their right hemisphere were affected equally 
whether grasping or estimating. Brain intact participants were less 
affected in grasping than in estimating: the extent to which their 
grasping was affected may be due to B-conscious attempts to adjust the 
grip originated C-consciously. 
 
I will review another paper dealing with the Müller-Lyer illusion in section 
3.3.3, but before that I turn to another experiment based on illusion: in this case two 
different illusions. 
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3.3.2 The Ebbinghaus and Ponzo Illusions 
The second experiment based on illusion that I will review (Gonzalez et al 2006) made 
use of the Ebbinghaus
2 and Ponzo illusions illustrated in figures 3.9 and 3.10 below).  
 
  
 
THE TEST 
In the main experiment, 20 participants (11 right-handed and 9 left-handed) were 
tested with the Ponzo illusion, and 26 (evenly divided between right- and left-handers) 
were tested with the Ebbinghaus illusion.  The illusions were constructed on a black 
table top with either a 40mm long bar (Ponzo) or a 25mm diameter disc (Ebbinghaus).  
Two other layouts were constructed as controls, with two different size targets and a 
non-illusory background. The Ponzo illusion was paired with a control in which the 
lines were only horizontal and vertical with no perspective, and with two bars, one 
40mm and one 50mm. The Ebbinghaus illusion was paired with a control in which one 
25mm disc and one 31mm disc were each surrounded by an annulus of 22mm discs. In 
a second experiment, those recruited for the Ebbinghaus illusion trial were observed 
either completing a jigsaw or assembling a Lego
® model, and their use of either hand to 
pick up pieces was recorded. 
 
In the main experiment, grip was recorded using an Optotrak device to measure 
distance between thumb and forefinger, which was then compared with the actual size 
of the item being grasped. The participants were fitted with special goggles that became  
Because the black lines create a 
sense of perspective, the two 
red bars appear to be different 
sizes, although in fact the same 
Figure 3.10: The Ponzo Illusion 
Because of the comparison with the surrounding 
circles, the red circle on the left looks smaller than 
the one on the right, although they are both the 
same size. 
Figure 3.9: The Ebbinghaus Illusion 
 
2. Also known as the Titchener Circles illusion. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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opaque one second after they were given the command of either “big” or “small”, to 
indicate which of the target objects was to be grasped. Both groups had a trial block of 
24 tests, followed by an experimental block of 24 tests. Each block comprised 16 tests 
using the illusory background, and 8 using the non-illusory background. 
 
THE RESULTS 
The results of the main experiment are summarized in the following table: 
 
Right Handed participants using  Left Handed participants using  Illusion 
Right Hand  Left Hand  Right Hand  Left Hand 
Ponzo  0.7  1.6  1.4  3.6 
Ebbinghaus  0.5  2.0  0.8  1.8 
 
Table 3.3 Error (cm) in grasping due to illusion by hand and handedness  
 
The broad picture is that all participants were affected by the illusion to some 
extent, even though the task to be performed was designed to draw on the dorsal 
pathway. This result may at first glance seem to be in line with the results from the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, indicating either that the illusions arise sufficiently early in the 
visual processing chain to affect both pathways, or that grasping is affected by  
B-conscious awareness of the illusion fighting the accurate dorsal pathway data 
available to the ACM.  However, in this experiment the participants wore glasses that 
became opaque one second after the order to grasp, and the effect of this on their 
grasping movements must be taken into account. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since the output of the dorsal visual pathway does not reach C-consciousness 
(see section 3.1.4 and figure 3.3), it is questionable whether it can be committed to 
memory, but it is certain that it cannot be C-consciously retrieved from memory. There 
is clear empirical evidence (see Clark 2001, p 500 for a summary) that we can respond 
to sudden positional changes in a target when pointing, even though not aware of them, 
but fail to adjust for them when asked afterwards (ie, using memory) to indicate the 
position. As Clark puts it: “Memory-driven responses thus seem to be tied to the 
contents of conscious visual experience, while online object-engaging performance is 
driven by a distinct and more sensitive resource” (ibid).  
 
If the dorsal pathway is only active during vision, then as soon as vision is 
disabled the ACM would have to rely on the memory of the target formed by the ventral 
pathway, which is affected by illusion. This would mean that in this experiment 
although grasping was initiated using data from the dorsal pathway, it was completed 
after vision was disabled using the stored data from the ventral pathway. In the next 
section I will discuss an experiment that supports this explanation for these results. 
 
Before that, I must consider two other implications of these results. It will be 
seen from the table that overall right-handers showed significantly less affect of the 
illusion, regardless of which hand was used, and that the left hand, regardless of 
handedness, was more affected than the right hand.  In the second experiment, where 
participants built a jigsaw or a Lego
® model, it was noted that they favoured their right 
hand in picking up pieces, regardless of whether they were right or left handed.  It is 
these factors that led to the postulation of an Action Control Module (ACM) in the left Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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hemisphere, as discussed above. The implication would be that in right-handers the use 
of this specialised module is more dominant than it is in left-handers.  
 
There were other significant differences that deserve further investigation, 
although the issues are outside the scope of this thesis. Left-handers were affected by 
the Ponzo illusion to a far greater extent than they were by the Ebbinghaus illusion. 
Right-handers using their left hand were more affected by the Ebbinghaus illusion, but 
using their right hand were more affected by the Ponzo illusion. In the case of the 
Ebbinghaus illusion left-handers using their left hand were slightly less affected by the 
illusion than right-handers using their left hand, but left-handers using their right hand 
were more affected than right-handers using their right hand. 
 
SUMMARY: In another experiment based on two illusions, both left-
handed and right-handed participants were affected, whether using 
their right or their left hand. There were marked differences between all 
four groups and between both illusions. Since vision was disabled one 
second after the command to begin, it is possible that part of the reason 
why participants were affected by illusion is that control of grasping 
passed from the dorsal pathway data to the ventral pathway data from 
that point. 
  
I turn now to three recent papers that challenge the claim that grasping uses data 
from the ventral pathway after vision has been disabled. I begin with a paper that 
analyses 18 previously published studies on the effect of the Müller-Lyer illusion. 
 
 
3.3.3 When is grasping affected by the Müller-Lyer illusion? 
This is the question that Bruno & Franz (2009) set out to answer by re-analysing the 
results of 18 studies based on estimating the size of, or grasping, the bars within a 
Müller-Lyer illusion. They carried out a detailed analysis in which they took care to 
adjust the published results to obtain a standard measure of difference between the 
maximum grip aperture (MGA) when estimating the size of an object and when 
grasping the object. They identified three factors that were largely responsible for 
differences in the effect of the illusion:  
 
1.  whether and when vision was disabled; 
2.  the angle of the lines forming the arrow heads, and  
3.  the number of trials by each participant.  
 
Focussing on the first of these, vision can be disabled at various stages within 
the grasping process. The four most commonly used arrangements during experiments 
are: 
 
·  Closed Loop, when there is vision throughout the whole process;  
·  Open Loop Move, when vision is prevented once the grasping movement has started;  Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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·  Open Loop Signal, when vision is prevented when the signal to grasp is given; and 
·  Open Loop Delay, when vision is prevented for a number of seconds before the 
signal to grasp is given. 
 
THE RESULTS 
The results from each of these grasping tests can be compared with the results of 
perceptual tasks (such as estimating size using forefinger and thumb). Because the 
results of Open Loop Delay and Open Loop Signal were very similar, Bruno & Franz 
combine these in the results that they report, as shown in the following table: 
 
Type of test/conditions for test  Mean error (mm) 
Grasping – Closed Loop  4.4 
Grasping – Open Loop Move  9.4 
Grasping – Open Loop Signal/Delay  12.6 
Perceptual  10.7 
 
Table 3.4 Mean Error due to Müller-Lyer illusion over multiple tests 
CONCLUSIONS 
They conclude that in the closed loop situation, there is a “clear evidence for a 
difference between the perceptual measures and the action measures” (ibid, p 1431). 
They also found “a substantial similarity between the perceptual measures and the 
action measures when the action was delayed” (ibid). Both of these findings are 
consistent with grasping in the closed loop condition being under the control of the 
dorsal pathway, and grasping in the open loop condition being based on the ventral 
pathway when vision is removed before action starts. The mean error in the former case 
was 4.4mm, and in the latter case 12.6mm. When vision was disabled after movement 
had started, the mean error was 9.4mm, and it is surely no coincidence that the latter 
measure falls near the halfway point between the two extremes. 
 
Although Bruno & Franz point out that their results, relating to grasping, differ 
from those of another study of the Müller-Lyer illusion using pointing, this fact in and 
of itself does not provide good grounds for ignoring the conclusions in the previous 
paragraph, especially since there are questions about when a pointing task makes use of 
the ventral, rather than the dorsal, pathway (see section 3.2.3 above).  
 
Their overall conclusion is that “the perceptual and motor effects of the illusion 
differ only because of online feedback-driven corrections, and do not appear to support 
independent spatial representations for vision-for-action and vision-for-perception” 
(ibid, p 1421). It is not entirely clear what they mean by this claim, but I take it that they 
are saying that visual feedback during the process of grasping allows participants to 
adjust their grip, but such feedback is not available when simply indicating the size of 
the target without grasping it.  
 
But if, as they claim, there are not two independent spatial representations, how 
do they account for the error in the first place?  Why should a visual system that gets it 
wrong initially then be able to correct that error? Or is their claim that it is 
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The clear evidence is that when both actions take place in closed loop conditions 
(with no loss of vision), the error in grasping is significantly less than the error in 
perception, and the authors fail to explain how this is possible if there is one common 
spatial representation. The difference is easily explained if grasping draws, at least 
primarily, on the dorsal pathway, and perception on the ventral pathway.  
 
The variation in error on the grasping task when vision is disabled at different 
points in the process is consistent with the view that spatial data is taken from the dorsal 
pathway so long as vision is enabled, and reverts to stored data from the ventral 
pathway as soon as vision is disabled. I will return to this point in the following section. 
 
One final point is appropriate. The fact that there is a small error whilst grasping 
in the closed loop condition may be indicative of the possibility expressed earlier that 
during grasping the C-consciously initiated grasp, drawing on dorsal pathway data, is 
affected by B-conscious feedback drawn from the ventral pathway. I will return to this 
point at the end of the chapter, but now I turn to two recent papers that propose a 
different explanation for the effect of disabling vision during grasping. 
 
SUMMARY: An analysis of 18 experiments using the Müller-Lyer 
illusion shows that, when vision is disabled before the command to 
grasp is given, the error in grasping is similar to the error on a 
perceptual task. The error is less significant if vision is disabled later in 
the grasping process, and is consistent with a change from dorsal to 
ventral pathway data. Claims that this analysis shows a single spatial 
representation of the target do not stand up to scrutiny. 
 
 
3.3.4 Does the dorsal pathway cease, or merely fade, when vision ceases? 
So far in this chapter I have based my conclusions on the understanding that the data 
from the dorsal pathway ceases to be available as soon as vision ceases, and data must 
be drawn from the ventral pathway (Milner & Goodale 2006, p 247). This may be 
related to the fact that dorsal pathway does not reach C-consciousness. Two recent 
papers have challenged this view, and claim that the data from the dorsal pathway fades 
away over a brief period, and this fading of data accounts for the increase in error that is 
seen in grasping tests in illusory settings. 
 
THE TEST 
Hesse & Franz (2009) used the same stages for disabling vision as explained in 
the previous section: Closed Loop, Open Loop Move, Open Loop Signal and Open 
Loop Delay. Participants in the experiment had to pick up either bars or discs of three 
different sizes, and measurements were made of their Maximum Grip Aperture (MGA), 
the time from start of movement to MGA, and total movement time (MT). As would be 
expected, the earlier that vision was disabled, the greater the MGA and the longer the 
MT. Before I discuss their conclusions, I must draw attention to some false assumptions 
that they make. 
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ASSUMPTIONS 
The first assumption they make is that the dorsal pathway remains active “even 
after a delay of 9 seconds between target presentation and movement initiation” (ibid, p 
1537). They base this conclusion on the paper by Connolly et al (2003), which I 
discussed in section 3.2.2 above, where I stressed the difference between areas that are 
part of the dorsal pathway, and areas that are served by the dorsal pathway. The area 
examined by Connolly and his colleagues is involved in planning and controlling 
movement; although this area may draw on the dorsal pathway in many situations, 
activity in the area cannot be taken as proof that the dorsal pathway itself is active. 
 
The second assumption that they make is that the timing of disabling vision 
controls whether data from the ventral pathway is used in grasping, and that if vision is 
disabled in the Open Loop Move condition – when planning of the movement has been 
completed – then control remains with the dorsal pathway. This assumption is supported 
by Milner & Goodale’s original claim in 1995 (reprinted in their 2006, p 246) that the 
dorsal system dealing “only with objects that are visible when the action is being 
programmed” (emphasis added). However this assumption is open to challenge, and 
will be challenged using the results of this study. 
 
The third assumption is that since a smooth curve can be plotted between the 
four different trial conditions (Closed Loop and three versions of Open Loop) then they 
all draw on the same pathway for their spatial data. This may by a reasonable 
assumption, but it falls far short of proving that the same pathway is used in all four 
situations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
They conclude that “grasping after a delay is guided by classic memory 
mechanisms and that this is reflected in increasing maximum grip aperture in grasping” 
(Hesse & Franz 2009, p 1532). The first part of this conclusion – the use of classic 
memory mechanisms – is based on the first assumption which is at best highly suspect, 
if not completely unfounded. The second part – regarding increasing MGA – can 
equally well be explained by a change from dorsal to ventral pathway, as I will explain 
by reference to another study. 
 
 
The study conducted by Franz, Hesse & Kollath (2009) is broadly similar to that 
reported by Hesse & Franz. The main differences are (a) that they used an illusory 
background for their tests, and (b) that they included two additional points at which 
vision was disabled. These additional points were when the hand was (i) two thirds of 
the way from starting point to the position of the object, and (ii) one third of the way. 
This provides six reference points for comparison rather than just the four. 
 
THE TEST 
There were three separate experiments, based on the Müller-Lyer illusion, with 
the target bar having either inward pointing or outward pointing arrow heads. In each 
experiment there were two tasks: grasping the bar, or indicating the width of the bar 
(either by selecting a bar from a range of options, or by adjusting the length of a single 
adjustable bar). Participants wore special goggles that could be made opaque by the 
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·  In the first experiment, participants saw the bar for one second; then either the 
signal to act either came immediately and vision was uninterrupted (Closed Loop), 
or vision was immediately prevented and the signal to act came after a five second 
delay (Open Loop Delay).  
 
·  In the second experiment the Closed Loop option was replaced by an Open Loop 
Move option, where vision was disabled as soon as the participants began to move 
their hand.   
 
 
·  In the third experiment further options were added, with vision being disabled one-
third of the way from starting point to grasp (Open Loop Move 1/3) and two-thirds 
of the way (Open Loop Move 2/3), and the Closed Loop option was restored. 
 
THE RESULTS 
The table 3.5 below summarises the illusory affect on perception and grasping 
over all three experiments. This affect was calculated as the difference in MGA when 
responding to the two different Müller-Lyer bars. It will be noted that the error increases 
steadily as the length of time before vision is disabled is decreased, and this led to the 
conclusion that the increase “is not due to memory demands but to the availability of 
visual feedback during movement execution” (ibid, p 1518). 
  
Type of test/conditions for test  Mean error  
(mm - rounded) 
Perceptual – Closed Loop  4.0 
Grasping  –  Closed Loop  0.5 
Grasping  –  Open Loop Move 2/3  1.0 
Grasping  –  Open Loop Move 1/3  1.5 
Grasping  –  Open Loop Move  2.0 
Grasping  –  Open Loop Signal  2.5 
Grasping  –  Open Loop Delay  3.5 
Perceptual – Open Loop Delay  4.0 
 
Table 3.5 Mean Error due to Müller-Lyer illusion over three experiments 
CONCLUSIONS 
The authors claim that these results show that “there is no evidence of a shift 
from dorsal to ventral control”, and that so long as vision is enabled there are online 
corrections to the grasping movement. The fact of online corrections demonstrates, in 
their view, that a single representation of object size in involved, and that there is no 
evidence of a shift from dorsal to ventral control. 
 
As in the previous case, their claim is that a single system begins to grasp with 
an inaccurate estimation of the size of the object, and steadily corrects that estimate so 
long as vision is enabled. As pointed out earlier, this raises the question of why the 
system got it wrong in the first place and needs to make corrections. 
 
However, the results are also consistent with the view that MGA is controlled by 
accurate data from the dorsal pathway whilst vision is enabled, but is then adjusted 
towards the illusory size of the object to be grasped calculated from data in the ventral Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
81 
pathway. The longer that the latter data is used, the more closely the result matches the 
illusory size revealed by perceptual tasks. On this interpretation of the results the move 
from dorsal control to ventral control is clearly demonstrated. 
 
I take it therefore that the authors of these two papers have failed to make their 
case that the standard two pathway view is wrong, and that the data that they report can, 
in fact, be taken to support that view. There is thus no reason to abandon the 
conclusions that I have drawn from the illusion experiments, and in the final part of this 
chapter I will draw those conclusions together into a coherent picture. 
 
SUMMARY: Claims that experimental data disprove the existence of 
two separate visual representations that are used to control actions in 
respect of a target object are open to serious challenges. In particular 
they fail to explain why a single representation is responsible for both 
an initial error and the process of correcting that error. 
 
 
3.4 Vision and consciousness: the general picture 
In this final part of the chapter, I summarise the picture that has been revealed about the 
relationship between vision and consciousness in each hemisphere. 
 
·  There are two cortical visual pathways in each hemisphere: the ventral and the 
dorsal. (3.1.1) 
 
·  The ventral pathway is specialised for perception: it enables us to be aware of 
what is within our visual field, to identify and classify the objects in that field, 
and to reason about those objects. The information is coded allocentrically and 
can be committed to memory and retrieved as necessary. There is no need to 
recompute the information about objects simply because we move: their 
identification and relationship with other objects remains constant. (3.1.1; 3.2.1) 
 
·  The dorsal pathway is specialised for the control of bodily actions in respect of 
objects within our visual field. The information about objects is coded 
egocentrically and is recomputed every time we move; it is not remembered and 
is not available when vision is disabled. (3.1.1; 3.2.2) 
 
·  There are a number of circumstances in which movements in respect of objects 
are controlled by data from the ventral system, even when the dorsal pathway is 
active. These are (1) quasi-linguistic actions about an object; (2) movements 
directed to locations where it is consciously calculated that an object will, or 
would, be; and (3) movements that involve novel actions for which no schema 
exists. (3.2.2) 
 
·  The ventral pathway in the left hemisphere serves C-consciousness, and in the 
right hemisphere serves B-consciousness. (3.1.4) Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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·  The dorsal pathway in the left hemisphere does not serve C-consciousness, but 
serves the specialised Action Command Module (ACM) that is responsible for 
tactical planning of movements. (3.1.4) 
 
·  Decisions to act are taken C-consciously using data from the ventral pathway 
and the information passed to the ACM where it can be matched to the data 
available from the dorsal pathway. (3.1.4; 3.2.2) 
 
·  The dorsal pathway in the right hemisphere serves both B-consciousness and the 
Action Control System. (3.1.4) 
 
·  When the information in the two pathways is inconsistent – as in the case of 
illusory settings – B-consciousness makes use of the data from the ventral 
pathway. (3.1.4) 
 
·  When there is no restriction of vision, it is possible that a grasping movement 
initiated C-consciously and drawing on the dorsal pathway may be affected by 
B-conscious attempts to correct the grasp based on data from the ventral 
pathway. (3.3.3) 
 
·  If vision is disabled before a movement is begun, that movement draws on the 
remembered data from the ventral pathway. (3.1.1; 3.3) 
 
·  If vision is disabled during movement, data from the dorsal pathway ceases to be 
available and is replaced by remembered data from the ventral pathway. (3.3.3; 
3.3.4) 
 
Much of the data in this chapter has been drawn from neurological and 
psychological studies, and very little has been drawn from the philosophical literature. 
The reason for this lack is that philosophy has, by and large, failed to deal with the 
existence of two distinct visual pathways. One notable exception is Clark (for example, 
his 2001, 2007 & 2009). Nevertheless, the issues identified in this chapter, for example 
a possible conflict between C-conscious and B-conscious control of grasping, have 
important implications for the philosophy of mind. 
 
In the next chapter I will consider the implications for philosophical views about 
vision and visual perception of (i) two centres of consciousness – located in different 
hemispheres and with differing characteristics – and (ii) two visual pathways with 
differing roles. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSCIOUSNESS, VISION AND PERCEPTION 
 
In the previous two chapters I have outlined the evidence for two essential dichotomies 
in the human mind, one involving creature consciousness and the other involving 
vision. I have shown that each hemisphere of the brain supports consciousness, and that 
these two centres of consciousness are distinct forms of consciousness. The right 
hemisphere has a basic form of consciousness, which I have termed B-consciousness, 
that is inherited from and shared with animals, and is capable of simple reasoning and 
the initiation of behaviour, but lacks language. The left hemisphere has a more complex 
form of consciousness, which I have termed C-consciousness, that has developed in 
humans alongside the development of language, and is capable of complex reasoning, 
introspection, and the linguistic reporting of mental states and their contents. 
 
The human visual system is complex with both subcortical and cortical visual 
pathways, with the latter accounting for more than 90% of the axons forming the optic 
nerve (Gazaniga et al 2002, p 153). I have outlined the evidence for two distinct cortical 
visual pathways – the ventral and the dorsal – in each cerebral hemisphere. The ventral 
pathway is specialised for the identification and classification of objects and properties 
of objects in the visual field, whereas the dorsal pathway is specialised for the control of 
actions directed at those objects.   
 
C-consciousness is served by the ventral pathway in the left hemisphere, but the 
dorsal pathway serves the Action Command Module in that hemisphere and does not 
reach C-consciousness. The evidence suggests that in the right hemisphere both 
pathways serve B-consciousness, but when the information provided by both pathways 
is inconsistent it seems that preference is given to the ventral pathway. 
 
C-conscious decisions to act in respect of objects in the visual field are made on 
the basis of information from the ventral pathway and are passed to the Action 
Command Module. This module connects the spatial data available from the ventral 
pathway with that available from the dorsal pathway and, with certain exceptions, 
utilises the latter data to plan the necessary movements and pass commands to the 
Action Control System(s) in the relevant hemisphere(s) (for the exceptions see section 
3.2.4). Data from the dorsal pathway becomes unavailable if vision is disabled at any 
stage in this process, and from that point on both the planning and the control of 
movement draw on stored data from the ventral pathway. The diagram overleaf 
provides a simplified plan of vision and action in humans. 
 
Existing theories about perception, and the existing vocabulary used to describe 
visual perception, fail to take account of the complexities revealed by this diagram. A 
theory of human visual perception must incorporate the presence of two visual 
pathways and the processing of visual input by two different forms of consciousness.  
 
A complete theory of visual perception is beyond the scope of this thesis, but in 
this chapter I address two sets of questions whose answers must form part of such a 
theory. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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·  To what visual processes should the term “see” relate? Is seeing limited to the 
ventral pathway? Do we see both C-consciously and B-consciously, or only the 
former? 
 
·  If we limit “seeing” to the ventral pathway, what about perception? Given the 
significant differences in cognitive processing in the two hemispheres, is it 
appropriate to talk about “perception” in both cases? 
 
I begin with the problem of defining the terms ‘sight’ and ‘seeing’.  
 
 
 
4.1 The problem of sight 
In this part of the chapter I address the issue of how we are to understand and use terms 
related to the most significant of the five senses: sight. Some of the questions to be 
addressed are: 
 
·  Is the phenomenon of sight limited to visual processing in the ventral pathway, 
or can we be said to see what is processed through the dorsal pathway? 
 
·  If an object is shown in the left visual field of a split-brain patient, and the visual 
input is processed in the right hemisphere, do they “see” that object? Is the 
visual process in this case the same as that when an object if shown in the right 
visual field of a split-brain patient and is processed in the left hemisphere? 
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·  Does the person driving on automatic pilot “see” the red traffic light that causes 
them to halt? Does the sleep-walker “see” the letter which they pick up to take to 
the post? 
 
·  If we apply the term “see” to visual processing via the ventral pathway in both 
hemispheres, do we need separate terms to mark the distinction between  
C-conscious seeing that we can introspect and report verbally, and  
B-conscious seeing of which we are C-consciously unaware? 
 
I begin with visual processing in the different visual pathways, and the 
phenomenon that has been termed ‘blindsight’. 
 
 
4.1.1 Visual processing in the dorsal pathway 
In the 1980’s the case of DB reported by Weiskrantz (1986, 1987) raised new questions 
about visual processing in the human brain. DB had an operation to remove an angioma 
from part of the occipital lobe in his right hemisphere, and the area involved formed 
part of the Primary Visual Cortex, or area V1. As a result, DB had a scotoma – an area 
within his left visual field where no visual information reached consciousness, and 
where he was therefore blind. 
 
A scotoma is distinct from the blind spot which we all have in each eye.  The 
blind spot is formed by the area where the optic nerve leaves the back of the eye, so that 
there are no rods and cones to respond to light. We are not generally aware of our blind 
spot, since the visual system normally compensates for it, but it can be revealed in 
experiments.  
 
In DB’s case his blind spots were identified experimentally, and he then 
underwent a series of tests on each of his blind spots and on several locations within the 
scotoma (Weiskrantz 1987, pp 81ff).  Each site was targeted in a series of pseudo-
random tests and DB was given the forced choice of whether or not a light had been 
detected at that point. (He was not told the results until the whole series of tests was 
finished.) 
 
When the target area was either of his blind spots, his responses were at chance 
level (43% correct). But when the target areas were within the scotoma, his forced 
choices, or guesses as he thought of them, were more than 90% accurate. Despite the 
damage to one specific area of visual processing it was clear that some visual 
information was influencing his “guesses”. In most cases DB reported no awareness of 
any sort during the tests, but for one specific location he reported that he felt 
“something coming in” (ibid, p 82). 
 
Based on the information about the two visual pathways in the previous chapter, 
we can surmise that the damage caused by the operation was to the ventral visual 
pathway. This would account for his inability to report experiencing anything during the 
tests (the one exception may point to one area where some residual processing was still 
possible).  If the dorsal pathway was spared, then visual information via that pathway 
would reach B-consciousness. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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In chapter 2 (sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5) I described experiments in which it 
appears that participants made B-conscious decisions to act in situations where  
C-consciousness lacked data on which to make a decision. In chapter 3 I pointed out the 
possibility, based on animal studies and human behaviour, that B-consciousness is 
served by both visual pathways. If DB’s dorsal pathways were intact, and data from the 
experiment reached B-consciousness, then DB could B-consciously decide whether or 
not he had seen a light.  It is possible that the Interpreter Module (see sections 2.1.6 and 
2.3.4) was able to access the result of the B-conscious decision, although not, of course, 
the reasoning behind it.  
 
In this situation DB would have no C-conscious visual input from the area of the 
scotoma, but would be C-conscious of the output from the Interpreter Module (see part 
4.2 below for further details). This would explain how DB could accurately report what 
had occurred but understand his choices as guesses. Weiskrantz adopted the term 
“blindsight” to describe this phenomenon of responding to visual input without  
[C-]conscious awareness of the input. 
 
SUMMARY: A case study of a patient with a scotoma, revealed the 
ability to accurately “guess” the presence of a stimulus in the absence 
of consciousness of the stimulus. I have proposed that this 
phenomenon, termed ‘blindsight’, can be explained by B-conscious 
awareness of visual input via the dorsal pathway, and that  
B-conscious decisions about visual input are detected by the Interpreter 
Module and interpreted as guesses. 
   
This raises the question of whether ‘sight’ should be applied only to C-conscious 
visual input, or also to B-conscious vision. Before I address that question, I return to a 
case (discussed in 2.3.1) where blindsight may provide the explanation for observed 
behaviour. 
 
 
4.1.2 A case of unconscious driving 
In chapter 2 (section 2.3.1) I reported the case of a driver who continued his drive home 
whilst in the throes of a petit mal seizure, and a pedestrian in the same situation who 
continued to walk home whilst threading his way through the crowds. The cases have 
been discussed by Searle (1992, pp 108-109) and Block (1997, p 397), although they 
reach opposite conclusions. Searle describes the driver as totally unconscious, whereas 
Block regards him as phenomenally conscious but lacking access consciousness. 
 
 I drew a distinction between this driver, and a person driving “on automatic 
pilot”. I claimed that in the latter case the driver was responding to visual inputs  
B-consciously (whilst C-consciously engaged with his inner thoughts), but rejected this 
explanation for the petit mal sufferer. We are told that he went through at least one set 
of red lights (Penfield 1975, p 39), and the identification of traffic lights as signals to be 
obeyed requires consciousness. If this driver was not responding to his environment  
C-consciously – because of the seizure – and not responding B-consciously – which we 
deduce because he failed to understand the meaning of red traffic lights – how are we to Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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understand his behaviour? After all, he negotiated traffic and road junctions without 
crashing. 
 
In chapter 3 (3.2.2 & 3.4; see also figure 3.6) I referred to the three stages 
involved in action once a decision to act has been made: strategic planning, tactical 
planning and action control. The first of these involves consciousness and the data from 
the ventral visual pathway, but generally speaking (I listed the exceptions in 3.2.2) 
tactical planning and action control pass to the Action Command Module and Action 
Control System, and they draw on the dorsal visual pathway and stored schemas.  
 
It is not possible to determine from the information available whether the driver 
in the throes of a petit mal seizure lost both C-consciousness and B-consciousness, or 
only the former. But even if he remained B-conscious, we can judge that he was not 
driving B-consciously. However, since the decision to drive home, the strategic 
planning of his actions, and the selection of the appropriate schema, all took place 
before the seizure began, there is no reason why he should not follow the well-
established route home and avoid other traffic using data from the dorsal visual 
pathway, which would not cease to operate because of a loss of C-consciousness. 
 
SUMMARY: The case of someone continuing to drive home whilst in 
the throes of a petit mal seizure, without crashing but without obeying 
red traffic lights, can be explained by blindsight. If the decision to drive 
home and the implementation of that decision by the Action Command 
Module occurred whilst still C-conscious, the Action Control System 
would continue to have access to visual input via the dorsal pathway; 
this would enable the driver to respond to familiar landmarks and other 
traffic, but not to respond to traffic lights. 
 
This explanation contrasts with the case of the driver on automatic pilot where  
B-conscious control of driving provides the best explanation. However, this still leave 
us with the question of whether it is appropriate to use the term ‘sight’ for  
B-conscious visual inputs. Does the driver on automatic pilot “see” the red traffic lights 
that cause him to stop, and the green lights that prompt him to start moving again? This 
will be the topic for the following section. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 B-conscious sight 
If the driver were asked, once he was again driving C-consciously, why he had stopped 
at the traffic lights, he might well reply “I must have seen that they were red”. This is 
similar to the response of the soldier who, when asked why he had halted and brought 
his gun to bear on a rooftop, replied, “I must have seen something” (see 2.3.2). 
 
The evidence from split-brain patients outlined in chapter 2 (part 2.1) is 
unequivocal: in whichever part of the visual field an object is displayed – so whichever 
hemisphere carries out the visual processing – the patient sees the object. By that I mean 
that the patient becomes aware of the presence of the object within the visual field and 
is able to reason about the object. Although a split-brain patient cannot use language to Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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report the presence of and to name an object in their left visual field, with the visual 
input processed in the right hemisphere, this provides no reason for denying that they 
see the object. 
 
The experiments reported in 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 also provide clear evidence that the 
participants saw what was before them B-consciously as well as C-consciously. It 
makes no sense to deny sight either (i) to split-brain patients using their right 
hemisphere, or (ii) to those with intact brains who respond B-consciously to visual input 
that they cannot introspect or report C-consciously. However, the use of the terms 
‘sight’ and ‘see’ for visual processing via the ventral pathway serving B-consciousness 
as well as the pathway serving C-consciousness raises both conceptual and semantic 
problems. 
 
SUMMARY: There is clear evidence that split-brain patients see with 
their right hemisphere, that is B-consciously. There are also times when 
brain-intact persons can be judged to see B-consciously. 
 
 
4.1.4 Distinguishing between B- and C-conscious sight 
The recognition that we see B-consciously as well as C-consciously creates a problem 
with our use of the term ‘see’. When someone says “I see . . .” they are referring to an 
experience that they can introspect and report. There are, however, instances when 
someone would be unable to say “I see”, but their behaviour provides evidence of sight. 
In such cases they may concede “I must have seen”. “See” clearly means something 
different in these two situations. 
 
SCENARIO 4.1
1 
A student has been recruited for an experiment. She sits in front of a 
computer screen and is told to watch for a symbol that will appear. She 
watches closely, but is not aware of seeing anything. After a few 
minutes, she reaches across and picks a bottle of water from a selection 
of five different varieties available. “Did you see anything?” asks the 
researcher. “No,” replies the student. “Is that the usual bottled water 
that you drink?” “No. Actually I usually drink Brand B.” The 
researcher then reveals that an image of the brand that she chose had 
been displayed on the screen for 300 milliseconds. 
 
It was seen in chapter 2 that visual inputs take longer to reach consciousness in 
the left hemisphere than the right because of the subconscious hypothesis forming and 
theorising that takes place in the former. The fact that the picture of a bottle of water did 
not reach C-consciousness does not mean, of course, that it did not reach  
B-consciousness. Neither the student’s decision to select a particular bottle of water,  
nor the subsequent action of picking it up, meet the criteria for subconscious 
behaviour. There is no need to assume higher order representations or complex thinking  
  
1. This simplified scenario reflects experimental data. See, for example, Baldwin et al (1990). Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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to explain her decision (see Definition 2 in 1.5.3). The logical explanation is that she 
saw the picture B-consciously, and made a B-conscious decision. 
 
This experiment underlines the fact that the term “see” is used in every day 
experience to denote C-conscious visual experiences. However, to limit it to this 
meaning is to deny the term ‘sight’ for B-conscious visual experiences, and thus to split-
brain patients using their right hemisphere and to animals (among others). Whilst it is 
not practical to change the use of the term ‘see’ in normal language use, I suggest that in 
philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience it is important to distinguish between  
C-conscious sight and B-conscious sight. 
 
The obvious difference between visual processing in the separate hemispheres is 
that we can introspect and verbally report what we C-consciously see, but we cannot 
introspect or report what we B-consciously see.  There is, however, another significant 
difference. In chapter 2 I reviewed the evidence from split brain patients that shows 
significant differences in how the hemispheres operate. The left hemisphere lacks some 
of the visual discrimination capacity of the right hemisphere, but instead focuses on 
theorising about sensory inputs – forming and testing hypotheses – and has a capacity 
for complex reasoning that the right hemisphere lacks. 
 
Although both hemispheres receive the same visual input via their ventral 
pathway, it seems highly unlikely that they process that input in the same way. If we 
retain the concept of ‘perception’ for visual (and other sensory) processing in the left 
hemisphere, then we require a different concept (and a different term) for visual (and 
other sensory processing) in the right hemisphere.  This is the issue to be addressed in 
the rest of this chapter. 
 
SUMMARY: It makes no sense to limit sight to C-conscious visual 
processing, since this would deny that animals see and that split-brain 
patients see using their right hemisphere.  
 
 CLAIM 4: Humans see both B-consciously and C-consciously. 
 
But if we see both B-consciously and C-consciously, how do we differentiate the 
top-down visual processes in the two hemispheres? The answer to this question will 
occupy the rest of this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Perception 
In traditional philosophical terms the verb “to see” is a “perceptual” verb, that is, seeing 
is a form of perceiving. In part 4.3 I will explain why it is inappropriate to use the term 
‘perception’ of visual processing in the right hemisphere. But if perception is to be 
limited to the left hemisphere and C-consciousness, although sight is common to both 
C-consciousness and B-consciousness, then it is necessary to separate “seeing” from 
“perceiving”. In this section I focus on top-down visual processing in the left 
hemisphere, and distinguish between visual experiences and perceptual experiences –  
between seeing something and perceiving it. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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CLAIM 5: In humans, [C-conscious] seeing and perceiving are two 
distinct processes. 
 
I will justify this claim with a number of different scenarios and the insights that 
they provide, starting with a well-documented neurological condition. 
 
 
4.2.1 A failure of perception 
SCENARIO 4.2 
The patient, P, is sitting in his doctor’s office where they are discussing 
the effects of an earlier brain operation. P appears to be an alert and 
sensible individual and passes various neurological and psychological 
tests without any problem. Then the door opens and his wife enters. 
“Who is that?’ asks the doctor. “I don’t know,” replies P. “She looks 
exactly like my wife, but she is not my wife; she is an impostor.”   
 
The patient in this scenario is suffering from the Capgras Syndrome (Joseph 
1996, p 99). If asked whether he sees his wife in the room, the sufferer would answer 
“No”. In this case he is not denying a C-conscious visual experience, but rather a  
C-conscious perception. We can judge that his denial is not due to any defect in his 
visual system, since he claims that the person he sees is identical in appearance to his 
wife. His rejection of her as his wife is clearly made on non-visual grounds. 
 
P’s visual system produces, via the ventral pathway, a representation of the 
person before him that matches in every important respect the stored representation of 
his wife’s visual appearance. He has a similar representation of his wife’s voice, and if 
his wife had telephoned the doctor’s office instead of coming in, the patient would have 
had no hesitation in accepting that it was his wife on the phone. So although his claim 
that it is not his wife clearly relates to visual processing, it cannot be based solely on 
what he sees. 
 
SUMMARY: In the case of Capgras Syndrome, there is a clear 
difference between the sufferer seeing his wife and perceiving his wife. 
 
In section 4.2.4 I will discuss the role of the Interpreter Module in integrating 
visual and other sources of data to create perception. The claim that I am making is that 
the unusual affect of Capgras Syndrome is not the result of some unique process, but the 
incorrect result of a process that we all experience all the time. I will discuss that process 
in detail shortly. Before that, I explore other evidence for the distinction that I am 
making. 
 
 
4.2.2 Perception and conception 
Perceptual states involve some form of conceptual content. One cannot perceive 
something for which one does not possess a concept. As Lowe puts it in his Introduction 
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in question under concepts of some sort if one is to have . . . a perceptual experience” 
(Lowe 2000, p 105).  A young child may have the same visual input when confronted 
with an object as their parent, but whereas the parent perceives the vacuum cleaner, the 
child cannot perceive it, since she lacks the concept of vacuum cleaner. 
 
However, to describe the parent’s visual experience as “perceiving a vacuum 
cleaner” is misleading.  The visual experience may result in the perception of a vacuum 
cleaner, but the experience is distinct from, and much richer than, the perception. To 
quote Lowe once more: 
 
[D]o perceptual experiences typically have non-conceptual content in 
addition to conceptual content? One reason for thinking that this might 
be the case is that the perceived scene is often of such richness and 
complexity that it is hard to suppose that anyone could in fact bring all 
of its ingredients under concepts, even if he or she possesses the 
requisite concepts to do so. (Lowe 2000, p 134 – italics in original) 
 
 
Carruthers make a similar distinction, although in different terms. He describes 
concepts as being “wholly ‘chunked’ or ‘digital’ in nature”, whereas percepts in contrast 
“while being imbued with concepts (often or always), contain representations more 
finely grained than any concept; these representations are analog” (Carruthers 2000, p 
133 – italics in original).  
 
Although both Lowe and Carruthers view the richness of the non-conceptual 
content of visual experience as one aspect of perception, I am making the case that this 
rich non-conceptual experience is “seeing”, and that perception only occurs when 
concepts are applied to what is seen and assumptions are made. The important point 
about this latter stage is that it does not depend solely on what is seen, other factors are 
brought to bear – as in the case of the Capgras sufferer. 
 
SUMMARY: There is a difference between the rich detailed non-
conceptual visual input that we see, and the more limited conceptual 
information that is extracted from it so that we perceive. 
 
In the following section I will look much more closely at the process of 
perception, and the role that non-visual data play in perceiving what we see. I will do so 
by comparing several scenarios that involve, or appear to involve, an apple. 
 
4.2.3 A problem with apples 
In this section I compare several different scenarios in which it is to be assumed that the 
non-conceptual visual content is the same, but where perception and reality differ. The 
purpose is to demonstrate that there is a real distinction between what we see and what 
we perceive. I begin with a claim published on the University of Glasgow’s Philosophy 
Department website in 2010 as part of an invitation to submit papers for a conference on 
perception. 
 Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
92 
SCENARIO 4.3 
[I]magine looking at an apple. The colour of the front face of the apple 
is something that is phenomenally given to you in a typical visual 
experience of an apple. This is a property that the facing surface of the 
apple seems to have and to which we seem to have direct access in 
visual perception. . . Some people think that when looking at an apple 
it is part of the way that the apple appears that it is a whole round 
object even though there is clearly a sense in which we don’t see the 
whole round object – we don’t see the back side of the apple. Such 
people would think that the back side of the apple is phenomenally 
given in experience, but it isn’t given in the same way that the colour 
of the front surface of the apple is given. 
(downloaded from philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk on 12/03/10) 
 
The visual experience described here includes the colour of the visible area of the 
apple’s outer surface, the shading of colour on that surface that provides evidence of 
depth, and the shape of the visible area. Those features can be compared with a stored 
representation of the visual appearance of an apple, and an assumption can then be made 
that it is an apple. The concept of apple contains far more than colour and shape: it 
includes among other things the complete three dimensional body of the apple, the 
texture of the apple’s skin and the taste of apple.  
 
It is the association of what is visible with the concept of apple that provides the 
evidence for the back side of the apple: it is not “given” in the visual experience. It 
would be possible for someone to have cut an apple in half and placed it in such a way 
that your visual experience of the facing side was identical to the visual experience when 
viewing a complete apple. But in this case the assumption of completeness would be 
unfounded. There is no visual detail that distinguishes the complete apple from the half 
apple. 
 
SCENARIO 4.4 
You go into a hotel, and on a table in the reception area you see a sign 
bearing the legend “AFMA →”, and below it an apple; or rather, you 
see the colour, shading and shape of the visible area of the apple’s 
surface that is facing you. These are identical to the visual appearance 
in the previous scenario. Being rather thirsty after your long journey, 
and assuming that the apple is available for guests, you pick it up and 
take a bite. You get a shock when you discover that the apple is made 
out of wax. It is only later that you discover that AFMA stands for the 
Artificial Fruit Manufacturers’ Association. 
 
What you perceived, based on the visual evidence before you, was an apple – a 
real apple with its juicy thirst-quenching properties. The assumption that you made was 
no more unrealistic than the assumption referred to in the previous scenario that the 
apple was whole. But now imagine one of the conference attendees looking at the apple, 
and assume that his visual experience of the colour, shading and shape of the visible 
surface was identical to yours. Given the different knowledge that he possessed would he 
have perceived a real apple – or an artificial one? Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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SCENARIO 4.5 
You have been visiting an art exhibition in a stately home. Worn out 
and thirsty from your exertions, you sit down for a rest. On the wall 
opposite you see a semi-circular occasional table, and sitting on the 
table is an apple. You have the same visual awareness of colour, 
shading and shape of the apple’s face as in the previous scenarios. You 
think longingly of the taste of apple. When you get up, you cross the 
room to take a closer look, and discover that you have been looking at 
a trompe l’oeil  painting.  
  
This experience shows that even the awareness of depth that seemed an integral 
part of the visual experience in the previous two scenarios is, in fact, an assumption. A 
clever artist can shade colour in such a way that there is an appearance of depth, even on 
a flat surface. The curator of the exhibition could sit in the same place as you, have the 
same visual input, but not perceive a real apple. 
 
What these three scenarios demonstrate is that despite the richness of the non-
conceptual visual representation formed by the ventral visual pathway, the visual 
information on which we base perception is very limited. The conceptual content of our 
perception far outstrips what it visually given. It is our knowledge – or in some cases 
our lack of knowledge – that combines with the visual data to produce visual 
perception. 
 
SUMMARY: What we perceive visually is assumed on the basis of very 
limited visual data. 
 
The remarkable thing is that on the majority of occasions the assumptions that 
we make based on limited visual data result in veridical perception. In the following 
section I look more closely at the process that brings this about. 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Visual perception and the Interpreter Module 
In chapter 2 (section 2.1.6) I describe an experiment on a split-brain patient that led to 
the identification of the Interpreter Module in the left hemisphere.  This module seeks to 
make sense of sensory and other inputs by forming hypotheses. In this particular case, 
the module had access to the C-conscious reasoning and the resulting selection of 
pictures by the right hand, and to the action of selecting pictures by the left hand, but 
did not have access to the B-conscious reasoning behind the left hand’s action. The 
reason advanced by the patient for his choices was therefore a fiction: an attempt to 
construct a logical explanation in the absence of some of the facts. 
 
This same process was seen at work in an experiment described in section 2.3.4. 
The participants were asked to select one of five identical objects, but after they had 
made their choice they confabulated their reasons. I claimed that the confabulation arose 
because lacking a basis for a C-conscious choice between the objects, the participants 
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the action of choosing, and not to the B-conscious reasoning in the right hemisphere that 
determined the choice, it was forced to make up reasons. 
 
I suggest that the same process can be seen in the case of the Capgras sufferer. 
Faced with visual data from one source – the ventral pathway and the Face Recognition 
Module – but lacking data from another source – possibly the emotional response 
associated with seeing his wife – the Interpreter Module forms a theory. The person 
looks like his wife but is not his wife: therefore she is an impostor. 
 
The evidence indicates that the Interpreter Module combines (a) the visual 
matching of what can be seen of an object with a stored representation; (b) other visual 
clues (Visual Analysis – see 4.2.6 below); and (c) other sources of information. From 
these a theory is constructed to provide the best match to all the available data, and this 
theory reaches C-consciousness alongside the purely visual (analogue) data. This 
arrangement is set out in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The route from visual input to C-consciousness 
 
 
I have shown Attention with a double-headed arrow as I do not know whether a 
signal is sent to C-consciousness that data is available in Working Memory, or whether 
C-consciousness polls Working Memory to find out whether data is available. Which of 
these is the case must await empirical evidence, but the issue is not relevant to the wider 
picture, which is of two parallel inputs reaching C-consciousness together: the non-
conceptual analogue rich detailed visual data, and the interpretation of that data – seeing 
and perceiving. 
 
SUMMARY: Visual data reaches C-consciousness in two parallel 
forms: rich detailed non-conceptual content and perceptual content 
which is output by the Interpreter Module. 
 
One of the results of this dichotomy may be seen in the phenomenon of change 
blindness, which is the topic of the following section. 
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4.2.5 Change blindness 
There is now an extensive literature on change blindness, and many examples can be 
found on the internet (see for example http://viscog.beckman.illinois.edu).  The 
following scenario is typical. 
 
SCENARIO 4.6 
You are watching a short film clip. In the first scene you see a young 
man seated at a cluttered desk. He pushes back his chair, gets up and 
goes to leave the room. In the second scene you see a young man leave 
a room and enter a corridor, where he lifts a telephone and makes a 
call. The chances are very high that you failed to realise that there were 
two different young men dressed in different clothes. 
(http://viscog.beckman.illinois.edu/flashmovie/23.php 
 
The detailed rich analogue data produced by the ventral pathway of the visual 
system changes constantly as the scene before our eyes changes, but that data is not 
committed to memory. Instead, it appears that it is the output of the Interpreter Module 
that is memorised. As one researcher has put it: 
 
It appears that there is a kind of attentional “bottleneck” which limits 
information transfer into memory: only a fraction of the information 
available in a scene is transferred into visual storage for later report or 
comparison. . . .  the code in which the information is stored in visual 
short term memory is not a visual code, but a code in which only the 
category or identity of the elements is available.  (O’Regan 2010, p 5) 
 
Which elements of the visual scene will be picked out by the Interpreter Module 
will vary from individual to individual and from circumstance to circumstance. But 
setting aside those rare individuals blessed (or cursed) with what is called “a 
photographic memory”, it is only those elements that have reached C-consciousness via 
the Interpreter Module that are stored in C-conscious accessible memory.  
 
SUMMARY: We C-consciously remember what we perceive, not what 
we see. 
 
This brings me to one final example of the distinction between seeing and 
perceiving – the issue of illusion. 
 
 
4.2.6 Visual analysis and visual  illusion 
In the previous chapter I reviewed a number of experiments which revealed that in cases 
of visual illusion the data available from the dorsal visual pathway provides generally 
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on the ventral pathway demonstrated inaccurate size and orientation information. I noted 
that the extent of the inaccuracy varied from illusion to illusion, and that this had led to 
speculation that different illusions arise at different places within the visual process 
(Milner & Dyde 2003). In this section I suggest an alternative explanation. 
 
In section 4.2.4 and Figure 4.2 I made reference to a process that I termed Visual 
Analysis. I have treated this as a process distinct from the Interpreter Module because the 
process can also be found in the right hemisphere (see 4.3.5 below). What we perceive 
differs from what we see in several important respects. What we see is the affect of light 
reflected from objects onto the retina, and each object will fill a different proportion of 
our visual field, and form a different shape, depending upon its position.  Visual Analysis 
is the process of adjusting our visual input to allow for the effects of distance and 
perspective. 
 
Thus, for example, we perceive two lamp posts as being the same size, even 
though the one further from us takes up a smaller portion of our visual field. We perceive 
that a clock face is circular, even though the image formed in our visual field is elliptical. 
We perceive that a person with two legs is walking past our window, even though only 
their head, arms and trunk are present in our visual field. 
 
In most circumstances the adjustments that separate perception from seeing are 
well founded and serve to provide us with accurate information about the world around 
us. Indeed, we would not last for very long if such adjustments were not made. But there 
are special circumstances in which the adjustments are not justified, and lead to wrong 
conclusions.   
 
When we look at the Müller-Lyer illusion, the rich detailed analogue 
representation of what is in front of us includes two lines of equal length; but the digital 
representation formed by the Interpreter Module draws on the output from the Visual 
Analysis Module, which assumes that one line is nearer than the other, and therefore that 
the one that is further away must be longer. If you look at the illusion and simply 
compare the end points of the two lines, without using any artificial aids such as a ruler, 
you can see that the end points align and that they are therefore the same length. 
 
SUMMARY: Visual illusions may arise because a specialised module 
that interprets raw visual input and adjusts for distance and perspective 
is misled and makes unjustified adjustments. 
 
The perceptual errors that arise in the case of illusions are illustrative of a wider 
problem in visual perception: we perceive what we expect to perceive. This is the topic 
of the following section. 
 
 
4.2.7 Perception and expectation 
There is clear evidence that what we perceive is strongly influenced by what we expect 
to perceive. The literature divides perception into bottom up and top down processing. In 
this thesis I am making the case that as regards vision the former should be referred to as Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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sight, and only the latter as perception. It is this stage in the visual process that is 
“affected by our concepts, beliefs and expectations” (Swoyer 2003, p 1). 
 
The reason that we are misled by the Müller-Lyer illusion is that our experience 
of living in a community where much of our environment is “carpentered” – that is, 
constructed using straight edges and angles – creates expectations about how to interpret 
such constructions. Zulus, whose houses are circular and whose environment contains far 
fewer straight edged objects, are less prone to the illusion (ibid, p 5). 
 
One influential writer on the philosophy of science has made the point in the 
following terms: 
 
[S]omething like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a 
man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his 
previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see . . .  
In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of 
competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds . . . [and] 
see different things when they look from the same point in the same 
direction.  (Kuhn 1970, pp 113 & 150) 
 
Note that in this quotation Kuhn follows the traditional practice of using ‘see’ in 
the sense of ‘perceive’. It is this traditional practice that I am claiming needs to change. 
 
SUMMARY: What we perceive is determined in part by what we expect 
to perceive, and not just by the visual data. 
   
In the following section I summarise the issues that need to be considered in 
developing a theory of perception that can account for the difference (a) between  
B-consciousness and C-consciousness, and (b) between visual processing in the ventral 
and the dorsal pathways. 
 
 
 
4.2.8 Seeing and perception: a summary 
In this part of the chapter I have examined various lines of argument that all point to one 
conclusion: that there is a clear difference between C-conscious seeing and perceiving. 
What we see is a rich and detailed analogue representation of the visual scene, a 
representation that changes as the visual scene changes. What we perceive is a very 
limited digital representation of what the Interpreter Module selects as relevant, and it is 
what we perceive that is stored in memory. 
 
The distinction that I am making is the same as, or very similar to, the distinction 
that Bermúdez (2005, pp 221ff) makes between perception and cognition. He uses the 
term ‘perception’, however, for what I have termed ‘sight’, and ‘cognition’ for what I 
have termed ‘perception’.  
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There are occasions when we fail to perceive what we clearly see. The Capgras 
sufferer fails to perceive his wife, although he sees her. In these situations the visual 
input clashes in some way with other sensory input, or the lack of it.  We fail to perceive 
that the person in a video clip shown going out of a room is not the person shown 
coming out, although we see both persons quite clearly. This is because what we 
remember is the summary of the scene created by the Interpreter Module, not the rich 
detail from the analogue representation of the visual scene. We also perceive what we do 
not see; sometimes because of the deliberate act of a magician or a conman, sometimes 
because a brain process misinterprets what is seen in an illusion.  
 
Perception is not determined solely by what we see. Our beliefs and expectations 
play a major role. We see a woman in the market, but fail to perceive our sister-in-law, 
because we do not expect to see her since we believe she is in America. We expect 
teenagers wearing hoodies to be bad, so when we see one running out of a shop we 
perceive a shop-lifter – not a well-behaved pupil who is late for an appointment. 
 
SUMMARY: Seeing is not perceiving: what we perceive depends not 
only on what we see but also on (a) other available information, (b) 
analysis of the visual data, and (c) our beliefs and expectations. 
 
We need to be clear that in terms of C-consciousness, and the processing of visual 
data in the left hemisphere, there is an essential difference between seeing and 
perceiving. It is wrong to use “to see” as a perceptual verb in philosophical literature, 
even if it retains that sense in every day language. But what about B-consciousness and 
the right hemisphere, is there a similar dichotomy? The answer to that question will be 
found in the following part of the chapter. 
 
 
 
4.3 Visual processing in the right hemisphere 
In part 4.1, I showed that it makes no sense to deny that humans see B-consciously. But I 
also pointed out that there are clear differences between visual processing in the two 
hemispheres which need to be taken into account in a theory of human visual processing. 
In part 4.2, I focussed on C-conscious visual processing and the distinction between 
seeing C-consciously and perceiving. In this part of the chapter I discuss a similar 
distinction in the case of B-conscious visual processing, although with a degree of 
speculation, since there is less empirical evidence available. I begin with a 
terminological problem. 
 
 
 
4.3.1 The terminology of B-conscious vision 
In part 4.1, I argued that we should use the term ‘sight’ of both C-conscious and  
B-conscious bottom-up visual processing via the ventral pathway, because the 
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term for B-conscious ventral pathway bottom-up processing would obscure those 
similarities, and would imply that ‘sight’ was a purely human phenomenon (since  
C-consciousness is limited to humans). 
 
However, when we come to the later top-down stages in visual processing, the 
differences between the hemispheres become significant. It would be possible to talk of 
C-conscious perception and B-conscious perception, but this would tend to obscure the 
essential differences between the two hemispheres (see chapter 2, part 2.1). In part 4.2, I 
drew attention to the difference between C-conscious sight and perception, and stressed 
the role of the Interpreter Module in integrating visual input with other data sources to 
create visual perception. There is no equivalent module in the right hemisphere, which 
lacks the complex reasoning skills of the left hemisphere (see sections 2.1.7 and 2.1.8). 
 
There is nevertheless, as will become clear through the rest of this chapter, a 
distinction within the visual processing of the right hemisphere that bears some similarity 
with the distinction between seeing and perception in the left hemisphere. Whilst it 
would be possible to adopt an existing term to denote the B-conscious equivalent to 
perception, there might well be confusion between the new specialised sense of such a 
term and existing well-established senses. I propose, therefore, to take the concept of 
“quasi perception” and form the noun ‘quaception’ and the verb ‘quaceive’ to serve as 
the B-conscious parallels to ‘perception’ and ‘perceive’. 
 
SUMMARY: The terms ‘quaception’ and ‘quaceive’ are to be 
understood as the B-conscious equivalents to C-conscious ‘perception’ 
and ‘perceive’. 
 
In the following section I explain why the concept of perception is not 
appropriate for B-conscious visual processing, drawing on data from split-brain patients 
reported in chapter 2, and on the nature of perception as discussed in part 4.2 above. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Why quaception is not perception 
We know that a split-brain patient sees objects presented to their left visual field using 
their right hemisphere because of their actions using the left hand (which is controlled by 
the right hemisphere). One of those actions includes selecting a card with the name of the 
object written on it, from a selection of cards (see section 2.1.3). I have already set out 
the reasons why this action is not evidence of language ability in the right hemisphere 
(section 2.1.4), but it is also not evidence of perception. 
 
As discussed above (4.2.2), perception involves conception: we cannot perceive 
something of which we lack the concept. But concept formation is part of the 
hypothesising and theory testing abilities that are unique to the left hemisphere. The 
ability of a split-brain patient using their right hemisphere to recognise the existence of 
a link (formed before the commissurotomy) between the stored visual image of an 
object and the stored visual image of a pattern of marks on a card, involves purely 
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Furthermore, other tests involving the right hemisphere of split-brain patients 
clearly demonstrate that written words do not trigger concept recognition. Shown the 
two words “pan” and “water” in their left visual field, a split-brain patient is unable to 
select, with their left hand, a picture of a pan filled with water (section 2.1.4). Shown 
the two words “pin” and “finger”, the patient cannot select the term “bleed” from a list 
of options (ibid).  
 
Given this clear evidence that recognition of a written word by the right 
hemisphere does not involve conception, we have no reason to suppose that  
B-consciously seeing an object involves conception. And if there is not conception, then 
there is no perception. 
 
SUMMARY: The right hemisphere lacks the ability to conceptualise 
what it sees, and in the absence of concepts it cannot be said to 
perceive. 
 
 
 
I have previously shown that the right hemisphere is capable of reasoning: 
simply not the complex reasoning of the left hemisphere. But what plays the role in  
B-conscious reasoning that concepts play in C-conscious reasoning? To attempt an 
answer to that question I must pull together a number of threads relating to emotion. 
 
 
 
4.3.3 The role of emotion in the right hemisphere 
The right hemisphere is dominant “for emotional and social-emotional intelligence”, 
says Joseph (1996, p 95).  The typical responses associated with emotions – including 
facial expressions, changes to heart rate, release of adrenaline, changes to skin 
conductivity – are controlled by the limbic system. This system, which includes the 
amygdala and the thalamus, formed the forebrain in reptiles, before the evolution of the 
neocortex in birds and mammals. It seems likely therefore that our emotional responses 
(or at least the more ancient ones) are inherited from our reptilian ancestors. 
 
It is, I suggest, possible to account for reptilian behaviour in terms of their 
response to a very limited number of factors sensed within their environment. These 
factors would include food, friend or foe; and the same object could be sensed 
differently on different occasions. What is not sensed as food when the reptile is replete 
may well be sensed as food when it is starving. A male relative may be sensed as friend 
in one situation, but as foe when they are both competing for the same female. 
 
At some stage during the evolution from reptile to mammal to man, sapience 
was added to sentience (see chapter 1, section 1.5.1). With the arrival of creature 
consciousness, the range of factors sensed will have grown, but I suggest that the 
underlying arrangement has remained the same. Within the right hemisphere, objects 
are not perceived in their own right, but are quaceived according to the opportunity that 
they afford.  We can gain some idea of how B-consciousness fits into this scenario from 
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Sensory information reaches the thalamus via a subcortical pathway, and a 
signal is passed to the amygdala. This is not a sophisticated analysis of what triggered 
the sensation “but a crude signal . . . indicating whether this stimulus roughly resembles 
the conditioned stimulus” (Gazzaniga et al 2002, p 557). Although this passage refers to 
a “conditioned stimulus” the evidence of common emotional reactions across cultures 
and species (Darwin 1872/1965) suggests that the stimulus can sometimes be innate. 
 
This subcortical triggering of the amygdala is the process that I outlined above 
for reptiles. But the sensory data also passes to the neocortex for a “slower . . . more 
thorough and complete” analysis (Gazzaniga et al 2002, p 557), which I take to be what 
I have termed B-conscious quaception. It is only when both routes agree that in humans 
the amygdala initiates the appropriate emotional response. 
 
The role played in this scenario by the amygdala corresponds to the concept of 
“affect program” proposed by Griffiths (1990). He describes the concept as follows: 
 
An affect-program is a neural circuit, probably in the hypothalamus 
and associated regions [the limbic system]. When triggered, it initiates 
the complex series of reactions which make up an emotional response. 
These are generally thought to include facial expression, vocalisation 
and expressive vocal changes, skeletal muscular reactions, such as 
orienting or flinching, and changes in autonomic nervous system 
activity, leading to alterations in heart rate, skin temperature, and so 
on. (Griffiths 1990, p 180) 
 
It also fits in with the outline of emotion proposed by Price (2005, p 14). She 
lists eight stages, of which the first four are:  
 
1.  An eliciting event or situation [I use the term “trigger”] 
2.  The “perception” of the trigger [this combines sight and quaception]. 
3.  The processing of the “perception” [this is Griffiths’ affect program]. 
4.  Bodily changes, both internal and external. 
As well as the bodily changes initiated by the limbic system, there can be other 
actions initiated B-consciously. One example of this was described in Scenario 2.2 in 
section 2.3.2. A soldier on patrol becomes B-consciously aware of a potential danger 
(that is, he quaceives a potential danger) and brings his gun to bear. This is clearly a 
very different response from the increased heart rate and adrenaline rush that he may 
also have experienced.  
 
SUMMARY: Quaception is the process of placing what is seen  
B-consciously within a limited range of categories, and (a) leads to 
emotional reactions initiated in the amygdala and (b) may result in B-
conscious actions. 
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CLAIM 6: Top-down visual processing in the right hemisphere is 
linked to emotion. 
 
I will return to the topic of the emotions and the latter four stages in Price’s 
analysis in the final chapter of the thesis. At this point I return to the issue of visual 
processing in the right hemisphere. 
 
 
4.3.4 The role of quaception 
In the previous section I have suggested that quaception developed out of the more 
ancient process by which animals such as reptiles responded to their environment before 
the development of creature consciousness. In this section I consider what we can deduce 
of the role of quaception in modern man. 
 
The first point to note is that quaception is a later stage in visual processing than 
seeing. In this sense it parallels perception in the left hemisphere, but there are marked 
differences. Split-brain patients are far better with the right hemisphere at recognising 
whether an object is one that they have seen previously (see 2.1.6), and this was put 
down to the way in which the left hemisphere theorises about the objects presented to it.  
But it can also be taken to show that the right hemisphere does not conceptualise what it 
sees. 
 
Furthermore, the right hemisphere lacks language and does not therefore create 
the link between object or property seen and a linguistic label, although it can recognise 
such a link that has been previously formed (see 4.3.2 above). This implies that  
B-conscious thinking must manipulate visual images – since the right hemisphere lacks 
semantic images or concepts by which to individuate images. This means that the right 
hemisphere must commit visual images to memory, unlike the left hemisphere (see 
4.2.5). This may account for the widely held view that visual art is a predominantly right 
hemisphere phenomenon, and that artists have a better visual memory than non-artists. 
 
Since it is at least possible that the output of both the ventral and the dorsal visual 
pathways reach B-consciousness, the question arises as to which of these is committed to 
memory. In sections 3.3.1 and 4.3.5 I argue that if we do have B-conscious access to the 
dorsal pathway, we nevertheless choose to use the output of the ventral pathway when 
there is a discrepancy because of illusion. This suggests that it is the output of the ventral 
pathway that is stored as a visual image in the right hemisphere. 
 
SUMMARY: Since quaception does not involve conceptualisation, 
visual memory in the right hemisphere cannot comprise the curtailed 
image that is created in the left hemisphere through perception. 
 
There are, it seems, significant differences between the two hemispheres in the 
later top-down stages of visual processing, despite the fact that they both see the same 
visual image. But there is one feature that B-consciousness shares with  
C-consciousness – the phenomenon of visual illusion. 
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4.3.5 B-conscious visual illusion 
In discussing the role of perception in the left hemisphere I made reference to a module 
which I named the Visual Analysis Module (VAM – see 4.2.4, 4.2.6 and Figure 4.2). The 
fact that illusions affect B-consciousness as well as C-consciousness indicates that a 
similar module must be located in the right hemisphere. 
 
In the experiment which I reviewed in section 3.3.1, those patients who had brain 
damage to their left hemisphere, and thus were using only their right hemisphere, were 
equally affected by the Müller-Lyer illusion in both estimating and grasping (see Table 
3.2). This could be taken as support for the view proposed by Milner & Dyde (2003) that 
illusions arise in the early stages of visual processing.  The alternative view, and the one 
that I am adopting in this thesis, is that the VAM accounts for illusion.  
 
In discussing perception and the left hemisphere I drew a distinction between the 
rich detailed analogue representation of the visual scene and the digital output of the 
Interpreter Module. In the former, two identical objects take up a different proportion of 
the visual field because one is further away than the other; in the latter, they are 
perceived as the same size because the Visual Analysis Module adjusts for perspective. I 
assume that the same arrangement applies in the right hemisphere, except that in this 
case there is no Interpreter Module, and the output of the VAM goes directly to  
B-consciousness. 
 
This output explains why B-consciousness is as prone to illusion as  
C-consciousness. Under normal circumstances the VAM makes necessary and accurate 
adjustments to the visual input, and behaviour based on that output is successful. This 
may be why, when there is a conflict between the output of the ventral pathway via the 
VAM and the output of the dorsal pathway, we B-consciously choose the former  
(see 3.3.1). 
 
SUMMARY: B-consciousness has the same susceptibility to visual 
illusion as C-consciousness, and this may arise from the presence of a 
Visual Analysis Module in the right hemisphere and well as in the left 
hemisphere. 
 
 
 
4.3.6. Overview 
I end this part of the chapter with a summary of what is involved in visual processing in 
the right hemisphere. I began by introducing the term ‘quaception’ (and the verb 
‘quaceive’) to describe the process in the right hemisphere that corresponds to perception 
in the left hemisphere. The right hemisphere lacks concepts, and therefore lacks 
perception. 
 
I suggested that quaception developed from the very simple responses to the 
environment that controlled reptilian behaviour before birds and mammals evolved. 
These responses could be seen as marking an early stage in the development of the 
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humans an input to the amygdala via an older non-conscious visual pathway is 
accompanied by an input via the ventral pathway and B-consciousness. When both 
inputs agree, the amygdala initiates changes in the Autonomic Nervous System. 
 
The ventral visual pathway may reach B-consciousness via a module that I have 
termed the Visual Analysis Module (VAM), which is also found in the left hemisphere. 
This module adjusts the raw visual data provided by the ventral pathway for perspective 
and distance; it is therefore open to illusion. When the output of the VAM is inconsistent 
with the output of the dorsal pathway, we B-consciously choose the former. The result is 
that illusion affects B-conscious grasping as well as perceptual tasks performed 
B-consciously. 
. 
The diagram below summarises the visual processes that take place in the right 
hemisphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Visual Processing in the Right Hemisphere 
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4.4 Consciousness and vision: a summary 
In this chapter I have considered how visual processing should be understood in the light 
of the dichotomies of two forms of consciousness, two visual pathways, and differing 
processes in the two cerebral hemispheres. I have claimed that traditional views in the 
philosophy of mind about perception fail to take these dichotomies into account. Any 
philosophical theories concerning human vision need to draw a clear distinction between 
sight – the bottom-up visual processing common to both hemispheres – and perception 
and quaception – the top-down visual processes in the left and right hemisphere 
respectively. Sight involves the rich detailed non-conceptual representations formed via 
the ventral pathway: perception involves a less detailed conceptualised representation of 
what is seen. 
 
Perception and quaception differ in three important respects. Perception involves 
the conceptualisation of what is seen and the integration of that conceptualisation with 
other sources of information through the role of the Interpreter Module. That integration 
involves (a) the analysis of the visual data (by the Visual Analysis Module) to adjust for 
issues such as distance and perspective; (b) other sensory inputs – or sometimes the lack 
of such inputs; and (c) pre-existing beliefs and expectations. What is committed to 
memory in the left hemisphere is the perceptual representation and not the detailed non-
conceptual representation. 
 
Quaception involves the B-conscious placing of what is seen within a limited 
range of categories that has expanded through the course of human evolution, and that is 
linked to a range of bodily changes that are initiated in the amygdala. Other appropriate 
actions can also be inititated B-consciously. The fact that B-consciousness is prone to 
illusion shows that its visual input comes through a Visual Analysis Module (VAM) 
similar to that in the left hemisphere. Lacking B-conscious introspection, we cannot tell 
whether B-consciousness also receives the rich detailed non-conceptual analogue 
representation in parallel with the output from the VAM, but it does appear that  
B-consciously stored visual memories are richer and more detailed than  
C-consciously stored visual memories. 
 
With this chapter I have completed the task of explaining and defending the six 
claims – three concerning human consciousness and three concerning human vision – 
that I set out in chapter 1. In the final chapter I will briefly consider the implications of 
these claims for other topics within the philosophy of mind. Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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CHAPTER 5 
PROBLEMS, POSSIBILITIES AND PARALLELS 
 
In the previous four chapters I have sought to explain and defend six specific claims, that 
arise out of the more general claim that philosophers of mind have, to a large extent, 
failed to take adequate account of the rapidly growing body of empirical evidence 
regarding human consciousness and vision. The claims are: 
 
1.  Humans have two separate centres of creature consciousness, one in each cerebral 
hemisphere. 
 
2.  The form of creature consciousness located in the right hemisphere – which I 
have termed B-consciousness – is the capacity to sense the environment and to 
respond with simple reasoning using the content of first order intentional states. 
 
3.  The form of creature consciousness located in the left hemisphere – which I have 
termed C-consciousness – is the capacity to sense the environment, to respond 
with complex reasoning using both first order and higher order intentional states, 
and to introspect and verbally report those states. 
 
4.  Humans see both B-consciously and C-consciously. 
 
5.  Seeing and perceiving are distinct stages in the processing of visual inputs, 
bottom-up and top-down respectively, and perceiving is limited to the left 
hemisphere. 
 
6.  Top-down visual processing in the right hemisphere is linked to emotion. 
In this final chapter of the thesis I consider the implications of these claims for 
other topics within the philosophy of mind. My discussion of those topics is necessarily 
brief, and I focus on those aspects where the implications are immediately obvious. I 
begin with two issues where it may be thought that traditional views are challenged. 
These are the concept of the Unity of Consciousness, and the issue of personhood. 
 
I then go on to two issues where the claims I have made may resolve 
disagreements or uncertainties. Views about emotions fall into two broad camps: the 
presence of two centres of consciousness with different abilities may explain the 
differences and provide a unifying approach. The problem of explaining self deception 
has led some philosophers to deny its existence: two centres of consciousness provide a 
simple explanation of how deception can arise, and how contradictory beliefs can 
coexist. 
 
In the opening chapter I made brief reference to what has been termed “the Dual 
System (or Two Minds) Theory” (Evans & Frankish 2009). In this chapter I consider 
some parallels between that theory and the claims made in this thesis, and draw 
attention to some significant differences. I end the chapter, and the thesis, with a brief 
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5.1 Two problems to be faced 
In this part of the chapter I consider two topics where traditional views in the 
philosophy of mind appear to conflict with the presence of two distinct centres of 
consciousness. I will discuss the issue of personhood after I have considered the Unity 
of Consciousness. But before I tackle either subject, I raise a general point about the 
reliability of our introspective experience. 
 
 
5.1.1 A problem with introspection 
In this section I set out one of the implications that arise out of the presence of two 
visual pathways with very different roles. It forces us to reconsider what appears to be 
an obvious feature of our conscious experience, and to wonder whether other obvious 
features need to be questioned. 
 
I look at the desk at which I am working on this thesis, and I see a rich and 
detailed scene. One of the objects on my desk I identify as a stapler, and that 
identification takes no account of the precise size and position of the stapler. I would 
have made the same identification if it were positioned elsewhere on the desk, or 
elsewhere in the room. But the rich and detailed non-conceptual content of my visual 
experience means that I can judge its size and position, and it seems obvious that it is 
that conscious judgment of size and position that enables me to stretch out my hand and 
pick up the stapler. 
 
This is what Clark (2001) calls the “Assumption of Experience-Based Control”. 
He describes this assumption in the following terms: 
 
Conscious visual experience presents the world to the subject in a 
richly textured way, a way that presents fine detail (detail that may, 
perhaps, exceed out conceptual or propositional grasp) and that is, in 
virtue of this richness, especially apt for, and typically utilized in, the 
control and guidance of fine-tuned, real-world activity.   
(Clark 2001, p 496) 
 
Clark goes on to point out that the empirical evidence, much of which I have set 
out in chapters 3 and 4 above, disproves this assumption. He proposes that it be 
replaced with the “Hypothesis of Experience-Based Selection”. This means, says Clark, 
that “conscious visual experience presents the world to a subject in a form appropriate 
for the reason-and-memory-based selection of actions” (ibid, p 512). This is the issue 
that I highlighted in chapter 3 (see section 3.2.3, distinction 2 and figure 3.6), where I 
showed that the decision to act, and the strategic planning stage of actions use data 
from the ventral pathway, before tactical planning and the control of action passes to 
the Action Command Module. 
 Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
108 
As I have set out in section 3.2.4 (distinction 3), there are a limited number of 
circumstances in which my actions are controlled by what I perceive, using visual data 
from the ventral pathway. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence is overwhelming for 
control in most cases drawing on visual data from the dorsal pathway of which I am not 
C-consciousness. 
 
The point that I wish to make is that if the assumption of experience-based 
control, which seems to fit with our C-conscious introspection of our mental states, is 
so clearly wrong – then what other obvious assumptions underlying philosophical 
views on the human mind are also wrong? In the next two sections I consider two 
issues where I suggest that our assumptions – based on introspection – are unfounded. 
 
SUMMARY: The assumption, based on introspection, that our 
conscious visual experience of our environment controls our actions is 
disproved by empirical evidence. What other assumptions based on 
introspection are wrong? 
 
 
 
5.1.2 The Unity of Consciousness 
In this section I consider the implications for the Unity of Consciousness of the presence 
of two forms of consciousness within the human mind/brain. My concern is not with the 
various theories that have been proposed to explain the unity, but with the assumption 
that there is unity. Could it be that in this case also an obvious assumption is unjustified? 
 
At the heart of the concept of the unity of consciousness is what has been termed 
the “unified consciousness of contents” (Brook & Raymont 2006, p 5).  This is the claim 
that there is a single unified consciousness of all my sensory inputs. My consciousness at 
this moment in time includes my visual awareness of my computer screen and all the 
other objects in the room, the sound of my wife moving about in the adjoining room, the 
pressure of the chair against my backside, and the ache in my left ankle. (I do not deny 
that there may be some sensory inputs such a smells of which I am unaware, and which 
do not form part of my unified consciousness.) 
 
Brook and Raymont make the point that if there were not a unified consciousness 
then I would be unable to relate different elements in my perceptual experience. “If the 
consciousness of  . . . two items were not unified, an important, indeed probably the most 
important, way of comparing them as they appear to me would not be available” (ibid). 
Bayne & Chalmers make the same point in these terms: “Necessarily, any set of 
conscious states of a subject at a time is unified” (Bayne & Chalmers 2007, p 2). 
 
But – assuming that I am a single subject – consider my experience of driving on 
automatic pilot. I am C-conscious of my thoughts as I wrestle with complex 
philosophical concepts, and at the same time I am B-conscious of red traffic lights and 
B-consciously apply the brakes and bring the car to a halt. (See section 2.3.1 for the 
justification for my driving being [B-]conscious.) My consciousness of my thoughts and Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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my consciousness of the red traffic lights are certainly not unified. I cannot think “I 
reached that conclusion just as the lights turned to red”. 
 
Perhaps the problems can be solved by simply limiting the concept, and renaming 
it “the unity of C-consciousness”. This would deal with the issue of driving on automatic 
pilot, and offers the chance to explain unity by reference to the role of the Interpreter 
Module (see sections 2.1.6 and 4.2.4). But if we adopt this solution, what are we to make 
of the sleep walker (section 2.3.7)? I have claimed that in his case there is no  
C-consciousness, and there cannot therefore be any unified C-consciousness. But he 
shows a least some form of conscious unity when he is able to make his way around the 
furniture, pick up the envelope, make his way down the street, and post the envelope in a 
pillar box.  
 
Perhaps we need to recognise two quite distinct concepts: the unity of  
C-consciousness and the unity of B-consciousness But this raises a further problem – the 
relationship between consciousness and the person – which will be the topic of the 
following section. 
 
SUMMARY: The traditional view of the Unity of Consciousness is 
challenged by the presence of two different forms of consciousness in 
humans. It may be true that each form of consciousness is 
independently united, but if so it raises questions about personhood. 
 
 
 
5.1.3 Personhood 
I turn now to the implications of the claims that I have made for the philosophical 
understanding of personhood. I will not attempt to consider all the issues that underlie 
the concept of person, but will focus on some implications of dual consciousness. 
 
“As Locke put it,” say Brook & Raymont (2006, p 14), “being the same person 
just is having the ‘same consciousness’”. Since Locke, they say, “diachronic unified 
consciousness has been closely linked to personal identity in the philosopher’s sense” 
(ibid). Closely linked to this line of thought is the role of memory, in two different ways 
(see Parfitt 1987, p 205).  If I can remember what I did 20 years ago, then I am the same 
person as I was then. Alternatively, if I can remember what I did last year, and last year I 
could remember what I did the year before, and so on until I reach what I did 20 years 
ago, then that chain of memories shows that I am the same person as I was 20 years ago. 
 
Both of these approaches to personhood are challenged by the existence of two 
forms of consciousness, each with their own access to memories. I cited a case in section 
2.3.3 of a girl who retained a B-conscious memory of childhood abuse, to which at the 
time she had no C-conscious access. If she had no C-conscious memories of that time in 
her life, is she still the same person as she was then? And suppose she has C-conscious 
memories linking now to five years earlier and linking 10 years ago to 15 years ago, but 
only B-conscious memories linking five years ago to ten years ago – does that show that 
she is the same person? Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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Puccetti (1973, p339) describes the standard approach as thinking of “a human 
being as having a single brain, possessing a unitary mind, constituting a unique 
individual person”.  But he goes on to reject this view, based on the experience of split-
brain patients and of other individuals who had one hemisphere surgically removed. He 
comes to the conclusion that all brain-intact humans comprise not just two centres of 
consciousness, but two persons.  
 
This is not a claim that I am making. But I am making the point that our idea of 
what constitutes a person requires major changes to incorporate the presence of two 
centres of consciousness in each human brain. 
 
SUMMARY: The existence of two centres of consciousness in the 
human mind/brain, each with its own memory system, challenges two 
of the traditional approaches to individuating persons. 
 
 
 
5.2 Two possibilities to be explored 
In this part of the chapter I look at two issues in the philosophy of mind where the 
presence of two centres of consciousness may provide an explanation for topics on 
which there continue to be disputes. I begin by returning to the issue of the emotions, 
and continue the line of argument begun in section 4.3.3. I conclude this part of the 
chapter with the topic of self deception. 
 
 
5.2.1 The emotions 
In this section I describe the two broad camps into which philosophical views about the 
emotions can be divided. I continue the sequence of stages within an emotional 
experience outlined by Price (2005), the first four of which I discussed in section 4.3.3. 
I suggest how the presence of two forms of consciousness can reconcile the two camps 
and also fit into Price’s analysis of emotion. 
 
Philosophical views about emotion fall into two broad camps. The following 
table sets out three major differences. 
 
Camp 1  Camp 2 
Emotions are innate and involuntary   Emotions are culturally acquired 
Emotions are often irrational responses to 
stimuli 
Emotions are rational assessments of 
stimuli 
Emotions involve bodily changes   Emotions are the feeling of bodily 
changes 
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Solomon (2005, p 198) says that “emotions are taken to be the hallmark of the 
irrational”. Griffiths (1990, p 185) states that emotions “frequently occur when their 
occurrence is irrational in the light of our beliefs and desires”. There appear to be two 
distinct issues at play. The first is that the bodily changes associated with emotion can 
occur before I have the opportunity to C-consciously analyse the trigger. The second is 
that the changes may conflict with my C-conscious desires and beliefs.   
 
In section 4.3.3, I outline the processes in the right hemisphere associated with 
emotions. In the case of a visual trigger, it is B-consciously seen – before awareness of 
the trigger reaches C-consciousness. The B-conscious sight of the trigger results in 
quaception, and the outcome of that process feeds into the amygdala. The amygdala 
initiates changes to the autonomic nervous system (ANS), and these changes may be 
accompanied by other changes initiated B-consciously. It is the ANS changes 
themselves that are understood by adherents to Camp 1 either as comprising the 
emotions, or as being the expression of emotions (Darwin 1872/1965). 
 
One leading opponent of this view of emotion is James. In The Principles of 
Psychology he states that “the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the 
exciting fact, and . . . our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” 
(James 1890, p 449, cited in Price 2005, p 194). He equates emotion with the fifth stage 
in Price’s analysis of emotions. Her eight stages are as follows (my terminology in 
brackets): 
 
1.  Eliciting event or situation (Trigger) 
2.  Perception of that event (Sight (or other sensory input) and quaception) 
3.  Processing of the information (in the amygdala) 
4.  Bodily changes 
5.  Feeling the bodily changes 
6.  Judging the significance of what is felt 
7.  Desire to respond to the judgement 
8.  Voluntary actions 
I take it that what James is referring to (and Price, in her stage 5), relates to one 
aspect of the process that I have described in section 4.2.4 and figure 4.2. This is the 
process within the left hemisphere by which the Interpreter Module creates a theory 
that makes sense of all available sensory data, as well as stored beliefs and desires. 
Among the sensory data available to the Interpreter Module are the bodily changes 
initiated in the amygdala, as well as behaviour initiated B-consciously. It is the former 
that reach C-consciousness as perceptual input via the Interpreter Module, identified as 
a particular emotion. 
 
Price’s stage 6 may be understood as comprising part of the work done by the 
Interpreter Module; that is the judgment of the significance of what is felt may reach  
C-consciousness already formed by the Interpreter Module. Alternatively, it may be a  
C-conscious judgment based on the input from that Module. In either case, the 
subsequent desire to respond (stage 7) results in behaviour that is initiated  
C-consciously (stage 8). Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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It will, I think, be clear that Price’s stages 1 – 4 relate to activities in the right 
hemisphere associated with B-consciousness, with stage 4 including both ANS changes 
and B-conscious actions. Stages 5 – 8, and the views attributed to Camp 2, relate to left 
hemisphere activities associated with C-consciousness. This suggests that the presence 
of both B-consciousness and C-consciousness may provide the basis for a theory of 
emotion that explains and incorporates both camps.  
 
Such a theory would reconcile such conflicting views as those of Ekman & 
Friesen (1971) and Averill (1980). The former compared the facial expressions 
associated with emotions in different societies, and showed a high degree of 
correlation, indicating that at least some basic emotions are innate. They also report that 
in some circumstances Japanese students consciously replaced the initial expression of 
emotion with a polite smile (cited in Griffiths 1990, p 179).  This clearly puts them into 
Camp1. 
 
Averill takes a quite different view and defines an emotion as “a transitory 
social role . . . that includes an individual’s appraisal of the situation and that is 
interpreted as a passion rather than an action” (Averill 2005, p 254). This puts him into 
Camp 2. 
 
These conflicting views can be understood as referring to right-hemisphere and 
left-hemisphere phenomena respectively, and are therefore not inconsistent. 
 
SUMMARY:  Philosophical view about emotion fall into two broad 
camps with sometimes contradictory views about what constitutes 
emotions and how they are acquired. These contradictions can be 
reconciled if the distinctive roles of the separate hemispheres, including 
B-consciousness and C-consciousness, are recognised. 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Self-deception 
In this section I consider two of the philosophical problems raised by the issue of self-
deception, and show how the duality of human consciousness provides simple and 
convincing explanations. The first problem is intention: how can I intend to deceive 
myself? The second problem is belief. One common way of expressing self-deception is 
that it involves simultaneously believing p and believing ⌐p: how is this possible? 
 
The first problem can be resolved if we recognise that what we should be asking 
is “how can I be deceived by myself?”. If we think of deception in the case of two people 
– A and B – then B can be deceived by A without any intention on A’s part to deceive B. 
We do not have direct access to other people’s thoughts – only to their actions. And 
actions can be misinterpreted.  We are all familiar with American police dramas in which 
a suspect makes an innocent move, perhaps to take his identity card out of his pocket, 
and the policeman is deceived into thinking that the suspect has a gun. The end result is 
the death of the suspect. 
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In previous chapters I have shown that my B-conscious thought processes are not 
accessible to the Interpreter Module and to C-consciousness. The Interpreter Module can 
only observe behaviour that I initiate B-consciously, and make assumptions about the 
thinking that led to that behaviour. When those assumptions are wrong, then I am 
deceived C-consciously about my B-conscious motives, without any B-conscious 
intention to deceive. 
 
Others may see the same B-conscious behaviour and make correct assumptions 
about the motives behind it, but then hear my C-conscious explanations for that 
behaviour. When they judge that those explanations are unjustified, they will conclude 
that I am deceiving myself. 
 
A very similar situation arises when I C-consciously express a belief that I hold, 
but others can see that my behaviour gives evidence of the opposite belief. If I come to a 
B-conscious belief that p, the only way that I can become C-consciously aware of that  
B-conscious belief is by recognising its effect upon my B-conscious behaviour. If this 
does not happen, then there is no internal conflict if I come to form the C-conscious 
belief that ⌐p. And since B-consciousness has no access to C-conscious thinking, there is 
no conflict in my continuing to hold the B-conscious belief that p. It is only when my 
actions give evidence of a B-conscious belief which I deny C-consciously, that the 
conflict becomes apparent and I am said to be self-deceived. 
 
I should perhaps point out that in the majority of cases we are both B-conscious 
and C-conscious during perceptual experiences. It is therefore to be expected that any 
beliefs that arise B-consciously from an experience should also arise C-consciously, and 
it will be the exception rather than the rule for B-conscious beliefs and C-conscious 
beliefs to be in conflict. 
 
SUMMARY: Two central problems in the philosophy of self-deception 
are explaining how I can intend to deceive myself, and how I can hold 
the belief that p simultaneously with the belief that ⌐p. The first of 
these can be explained by C-conscious assumptions about B-conscious 
behaviour resulting in deception, without any intention to deceive. 
Secondly, beliefs can be formed B-consciously and C-consciously, and 
neither form of consciousness has access to the beliefs of the other 
form. Both problems are therefore resolved by the duality of human 
consciousness. 
 
 
 
5.3 Claims about two minds 
In chapter 1 (section 1.8.4), I made reference to the fact that there are certain parallels 
between (a) the claims that I am making about human consciousness and (b) what has 
been termed “The Dual System (or Two Minds) Theory”. In this section I outline those 
parallels, before pointing out some significant differences. I end the section by stressing 
the danger of focussing on terminology, rather than on the facts described by that 
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5.3.1 The parallels 
Evans (2009, p 34) summarises current views about two systems of human cognition by 
listing their characteristics
1. System 1 is described as “evolutionarily old”, “shared with 
animals” and “independent of language”. All of these terms can also be applied to  
B-consciousness. System 2 is described as “evolutionarily recent”, “distinctively human” 
and “associated with language”. All of these terms apply equally to C-consciousness.  
However, he goes on to suggest that talk of two systems should be abandoned in favour 
of two minds. 
 
There are a number of reasons . . . why it may be a good idea to get 
away from the Systems 1 and 2 terminology. It would be more useful 
to describe this grand unifying form of dual-process theory as the ‘two 
minds hypothesis’ . . . Here I define ‘mind’ as a high-level cognitive 
system capable of representing the external world and acting upon it in 
order to serve the goals of the organism. The two minds hypothesis is 
that the human brain contains not one but two parallel systems for 
doing this. Animals, according to this view, have but one system 
corresponding to the ‘old mind’ in human beings. Humans have a 
second ‘new’ mind, which coexists in uneasy coalition with the first, 
sometimes coming into direct conflict with it. This is a strong, even 
startling hypothesis, which makes it very interesting (if probably 
wrong!). (Evans 2009, p 35) 
 
In this passage Evans appears to be describing the claims that I make in this 
thesis, except that he uses the term ‘mind’ where I have chosen to use the term 
‘consciousness’ (an issue to which I will return below). Apart from disagreeing with his 
final comment – that this hypothesis is probably wrong – why have I distinguished my 
claims from the two minds hypothesis? There are three reasons, which I will explain in 
the following sections. 
 
SUMMARY: There are several very clear parallels between the two 
Systems described by Evans and the two forms of consciousness 
described in this thesis. Evans’ description of the Two Minds Hypothesis 
strengthens the comparison, although he concludes that the hypothesis is 
probably wrong. 
 
 
5.3.2 Different concepts of consciousness 
The first major point to note is that Evans (ibid, p 34) describes the evolutionarily older 
System 1 as “unconscious, preconscious”, and only System 2 as “conscious”.  This 
contrasts with my claims of two centres of consciousness. If System 1 is shared with  
 
 
 
 
1. I have based my analysis on there being two misprints in Table 2.1 on page 34 of (Evans 2009), with 
the entries on rows 4 and 6 being inadvertently reversed. This has been confirmed in a personal 
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animals and is unconscious (or preconscious) then there are only two possible 
conclusions: 
 
(1)  Animals are not conscious. 
 
(2)  Animals are conscious, but when System 2 developed in humans, the 
consciousness inherited from our animal ancestors was lost, even though we 
retained all the abilities associated with that consciousness. 
 
I will take the second possibility first. In chapter 1, I described the behaviours 
that we use to identify the presence of consciousness: sensing the environment, 
reasoning, learning and choosing. It is because animals display these abilities that we 
judge them to be [B-]conscious; what animals do not display are the [C-]conscious 
abilities to introspect, to use language to report their mental states, and to engage in 
abstract reasoning.  
 
It makes no sense to find evidence of the same abilities in split-brain patients 
using their right hemisphere that are found in animals, but to declare that they are 
unconscious simply because they do not display the uniquely human abilities associated 
with C-consciousness. I therefore reject this possibility. 
 
Turning now to the first possibility, there may be those who wish to define a 
concept of consciousness that has the effect of limiting consciousness to humans, and 
denying it to animals. Proponents of the Two System Theory do not deny that animals 
respond to their environment, nor that they are capable of reasoning (ibid); they simply 
deny that they do so consciously. This requires a much narrower conception of 
consciousness than I have adopted in this thesis, and limits consciousness to what I have 
termed ‘C-consciousness’. 
 
The problem with this view is not in denying consciousness to animals, although 
many philosophers of mind view at least some animals as conscious. For example, Searle 
(2002, pp 61-62) explains why he judges his dog to be conscious. The problem arises 
when confronted with evidence from split-brain patients (see chapter 2). The behaviour 
of a split-brain patient using their left hemisphere meets the criteria for System 2’s 
concept of consciousness, but the same patient’s behaviour when using their right 
hemisphere fails to meet the criteria, and would therefore have to be classified as 
unconscious or preconscious. 
 
It might be thought that the only difference between my claim for two centres of 
conscious and the Two Systems Theory is in the definition of the term ‘consciousness’. 
The consciousness associated with System 2 is consistent with my concept of  
C-consciousness. If this narrower concept of consciousness were adopted, then any 
behaviour that could not be viewed as C-conscious would, by definition, be unconscious 
(or possibly preconscious).  
 
I take this view to be untenable, not only because of the problem of explaining 
the behaviour of split-brain patients, but also because of the explanatory power of two 
centres of consciousness for a wide variety of human behaviour (see part 2.3 of chapter 
2, and sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 above). 
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SUMMARY: The Two Systems Theory views the evolutionarily older 
System 1 as unconscious or preconscious, and only System 2 as 
conscious. I have identified two forms of consciousness, with the older 
B-consciousness corresponding to System 1, and the more recent  
C-consciousness corresponding to System 2. Although it is possible to 
frame a narrower concept of consciousness, equivalent to my  
C-consciousness, I reject the claim that behaviour that I characterise as 
B-conscious can be understood as unconscious. 
 
 
5.3.3 Hemispheric specialisation 
In this section I point out a significant omission from the literature about the Two 
Systems Theory or the Two Mind Hypothesis. There is no mention of empirical evidence 
from split-brain patients, nor of the specialisation of the cerebral hemispheres revealed 
by that evidence. 
 
In chapter 2 I summarised some of the differences that have been identified 
between mental processes in each of the cerebral hemispheres through tests on split-brain 
patients.  Many of these differences overlap with differences identified between the 
proposed two systems in the human brain, such as speed of processing, type of 
reasoning, and association with language. Yet not one of the articles comprising (Evans 
& Frankish 2009) makes any mention of the extensive data on split-brain patients, some 
of which have been available for around half a century. 
 
It may be this failure to take such data into account that leads Evans to the view 
that the Two Minds Hypothesis is probably false (Evans 2009, p 35). It may also explain 
the confusion that permeates (Evans & Frankish 2009) about whether there are two 
systems or three systems (Evans 2009, Stanovich 2009, Samuels 2009).  Some of the 
distinctions that are made – between ways of thinking, for example – do not map onto 
the basic distinction between an evolutionarily older and an evolutionarily younger 
system, but are clearly differences within the latter system. 
 
One essential difference therefore between my claims about two centres of 
consciousness, and the various forms of the Dual System Theory, is that the former is 
grounded in empirical evidence about the structure and organisation of the brain, 
especially as revealed in tests on split-brain patients, whilst the latter focuses mainly on 
evidence from psychology. (One exception is Carruthers (2009), who draws on the 
distinction between the two cortical visual pathways, although he makes no reference to 
the differing roles of the two hemispheres.) 
 
SUMMARY: The proponents of the Two Systems Theory and the Two 
Minds Hypothesis make no mention of the empirical evidence about 
the different roles of the two hemispheres as revealed through tests on 
split-brain patients.  Some of the distinctions that they make can be 
understood as differences within a system, rather than between 
systems. 
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In the next section I will consider one other difference between the claims made 
in this thesis and the Two Systems Theory – the use of the term ‘mind’. 
 
 
 
5.3.4 A problem with mind 
In this section I highlight the differences in the use of the term ‘mind’ in this thesis and 
in (Evans & Frankish 2009). I explain why I have largely avoided use of the term, and 
have focused instead on creature consciousness. 
 
In chapter 1 (part 1.3), I rejected the Cartesian concept of mind as a substance, 
and outlined two possible senses of the term – using the analogy of school and education. 
If mind is understood in the latter sense, then it makes no sense to discuss how many 
minds we have. But if used in the former sense, then we require criteria in order to be 
able to individuate minds. Before I pursue this point, an expansion of the school analogy 
may be helpful. 
 
St David’s is a long-established boys’ school for pupils aged 11-18, 
housed in an Elizabethan mansion. A few years ago it was reorganised 
into a Lower School, for pupils aged 11-14 and an Upper School for 
pupils aged 14-18. The long-serving Head Master of St David’s was 
appointed Head Master of the Lower School, and a new Head Master 
was appointed to the Upper School. One wing of the building is used 
mainly by the Lower School and one wing mainly by the Upper 
School; the central part of the building provides common services 
including science and sports facilities. Because contact with parents 
tends to focus on GCSE and ‘A’ level exams and on university 
entrance, parents see much more of the Head Master of the Upper 
School, and many assume that he is Head Master of St David’s. There 
has been a long-running dispute as to whether St David’s is one school 
or two, with the teacher unions arguing that two Head Masters means 
two schools, whereas the governors argue that St David’s continues to 
be a single school. 
 
In Two Minds (Evans & Frankish 2009) opens with a paper in which the authors 
“explore the idea that there is a fundamental duality in the human mind” (Frankish & 
Evans 2009,  p 1). However, in the next paper Evans talks about humans having both an 
“old mind” and a “new mind” (Evans 2009, p 35). In so doing, he defines ‘mind’ as “a 
high-level cognitive system capable of representing the external world and acting upon it 
in order to serve the goals of the organism” (ibid). 
 
The parallels with the school analogy are clear, and it might be possible to make a 
case for using ‘mind’ both of the totality of the mental processes within one human 
brain, and also of two distinct sets of processes, each comprising “a high-level cognitive 
system”. But in the very next paper, Stanovich (2009) complicates the picture. He first 
makes the point that what is commonly called “System 1” should really be viewed as a 
set of systems, and then identifies two levels of processing within System 2: the 
reflective and the algorithmic. Finally, making reference to Dennett’s (1996) book Kinds Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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of minds, he suggests that humans have three minds: the reflective mind, the algorithmic 
mind, (both associated with System 2) and the autonomous mind (which is a renaming of 
System 1). 
 
It was in the light of such inconsistencies in usage of the term ‘mind’ that I chose 
to focus on creature consciousness. It may be that the presence of two centres of 
consciousness means two minds, in the same way that having two head masters means 
two schools. But it is also possible that one mind could be divided into two sections, 
each controlled by a centre of consciousness. My concern was that disagreement about 
the meaning of terms would divert attention from the underlying features to which the 
terms are applied.  
 
SUMMARY: My claim is that there is a duality in human con-
sciousness and human cognition, arising from essential differences 
between mental processes in the two cerebral hemispheres, not that 
there are two minds (although I have no principled objection to that 
terminology). The collections of views described as the Dual Systems 
Theory cannot agree whether they are discriminating between 
processes, or systems, or minds; nor whether there are two, three or 
more of them – whatever they are. This is the third essential difference 
between that Theory and what I am claiming. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The underlying theme of this thesis has been that philosophers of mind have failed to pay 
adequate attention to empirical evidence about the structure and organisation of the 
human brain. That evidence, some of which has been available for fifty years, reveals 
two essential dualities at the heart of the human brain: two centres of consciousness – 
one in each cerebral hemisphere – and two cortical visual pathways – one serving the 
identification of objects in our visual field, and the other controlling our bodily actions in 
respect of those objects. 
 
I have claimed (a) that the form of consciousness in the right hemisphere, which I 
have termed B-consciousness, is inherited from our animal ancestors, and comprises the 
capacity to sense the environment and respond with simple reasoning using the content 
of first order intentional states; and (b) that the form of consciousness in the left 
hemisphere, which I have termed C-consciousness, is uniquely human, developed 
alongside language, and comprises the capacity to sense the environment, to respond 
with complex reasoning using both first order and higher order intentional states, and to 
introspect and verbally report those states. I have also claimed that the co-existence of  
B-consciousness and C-consciousness provides the best explanation for (a) the 
widespread phenomenon of driving on automatic pilot; (b) the experience of having 
responded to a threat even before we become aware of it; (c) the way that our behaviour 
can be influenced by beliefs, desires, or memories that we are not aware of; (d) the 
confabulation that we sometimes fall back on to explain our behaviour; and (e) how 
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Although there is clear evidence from neuro-imaging of two cortical visual 
pathways, there continues to be disagreements about the detailed implications. I have 
made claims about the relationship of the two visual pathways to the two centres of 
consciousness, with C-consciousness being served only by the ventral pathway, whereas 
B-consciousness is served by both pathways. I have refuted some attempts to challenge 
the evidence for separate visual pathways for perception and action, pointing out the 
difference between the visual pathways themselves and the processes served by those 
pathways. I have also shown that some actions do indeed make use of visual data from 
the ventral pathway and not the dorsal. These actions are: 
 
(a)  Actions that a quasi-linguistic in nature and convey information about an object 
rather than acting on the object; 
 
(b)  Actions that are directed at a point in space that has to be C-consciously 
calculated; 
 
(c)  Actions that involve movements for which no schema is currently available, and 
which therefore depend upon conscious control of movements; and 
 
(d)  That proportion of any other object-directed action in respect of which vision is 
disabled at some point between initiation and completion. 
 
The existence of these two dualities at the heart of the human mind/brain 
challenge many central ideas in the philosophy of mind. Is there any validity in the 
concept of the unity of consciousness? What are the implications of two centres of 
consciousness – each with its own beliefs, desires, memories, and cognitive processes – 
for our understanding of the mind, and of persons? If the visual system that controls my 
movements when I pick up my coffee cup is not the same as the visual system which 
enables me to identify that it is a coffee cup, and which makes me visually aware of what 
I am doing when I pick up the cup, then what other “obvious” introspectable experiences 
are not what they seem? I have made the case for separating seeing from perceiving, 
denying the standard view that ‘seeing’ is a perceptual term. I have also claimed that 
perception is limited to C-consciousness, and that we require a different way of 
understanding the B-conscious process that results from seeing. 
 
My focus has been on creature consciousness, and I have questioned whether it is 
appropriate to apply the term ‘conscious’ to mental states. This puts me at odds with 
much of the literature of the past fifty years in which consciousness has been viewed as 
primarily applying to mental states. It also differentiates my claim for two centres of 
consciousness from that of Block (2005), since he talks in terms of the difference 
between “access consciousness” and “phenomenal consciousness”, both of which are 
essentially mental state forms of consciousness (Block 1997). 
 
If it is accepted that the terms “access consciousness” and “phenomenal 
consciousness” can be applied to creature consciousness, then both B-consciousness and 
C-consciousness are forms of access consciousness, since they both enable us to reason 
and to control action (Block 1997, p 382). I have, however, denied that there is any sense 
in which our B-conscious sensory inputs can be described in terms of “what it is like” for 
us to process them (see chapter 1, section 1.7.1). Only C-consciousness could therefore 
be viewed as a form of phenomenal consciousness, but in conceding this possibility I am Consciousness and Vision in Man: Where philosophy has gone wrong 
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not committing to the concepts of phenomenal properties or qualia, since I doubt their 
existence. 
 
I conclude this summary of my claims by returning to my central point: that 
philosophers have to a large extent either been ignorant of, or have chosen to ignore, 
some empirical evidence that challenges traditional views about human consciousness 
and human vision. The scope of science has been expanding exponentially for several 
centuries, one result of which is the development of narrower and narrower 
specialisations. It becomes increasingly difficult for the philosopher of mind to keep pace 
with developments in other aspects of philosophy, let alone developments in all the other 
fields with an interest in the human brain and the human mind. 
 
Despite these problems, philosophy must continue to be informed by empirical 
findings, from whichever branch of science they come. To fail to do so is to risk 
philosophy being sidelined, and being dismissed as no longer relevant, or even dead – as 
claimed by Hawking & Mlodinow in their recent book (cited in Wojcik 2010, p 1).   
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APPENDIX 
 
GLOSSARY OF NEUROLOGICAL TERMS 
 
 
Amygdala  A part of the limbic system. It is the source of commands to the 
body that control emotional responses. 
 
Autonomic Nervous  The system that controls such things as heart rate, breathing,  
System  digestion, and various glands (including the tear glands). 
 
Brainstem  The oldest part of the brain that controls automatic processes 
such as breathing and heartbeat. 
 
Cerebellum  The “little brain” that links into the brainstem below the cortex. 
 
Cerebral  Relating to the cerebrum. 
 
Cerebrum  The main part of the human brain, comprising the two cerebral 
hemispheres. 
 
Commissurotomy  An operation to sever the corpus callosum, usually to prevent 
or reduce epileptic seizures. 
 
Corpus callosum  The bundle of nerve cells that link the two cerebral hemispheres. 
 
Cortex  Usually refers to the neocortex, the most recently evolved outer 
part of the brain. It is divided into two hemispheres, each of 
which comprises four lobes. 
 
Cortical  Relating to the cortex. 
 
Forebrain  Another term for the limbic system, that part of the brain that 
evolved to control behaviour in reptiles.  
 
Frontal Lobe  The area of the cortex at the front of the brain. It is the site of 
many higher functions, and has been described as “the executive 
brain” (Goldberg 2001). 
 
Fusiform Face Area  An area within the temporal lobe of the right hemisphere, 
known as the fusiform gyrus, that is specialised for face 
recognition. 
 
Fusiform gyrus  A part of the temporal lobe, from the Latin ‘fusus’ meaning 
spindle, because of its shape. 
 
Hippocampus  Part of the limbic system. 
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Limbic system  Those areas of the brain, including the amygdala, the 
hippocampus and the thalamus, that formed the forebrain in 
reptiles, and in humans controls the autonomic nervous 
system. 
 
Lobe  One of four areas within each cerebral hemisphere. The lobes 
are separated by deep fissures. 
 
Neocortex  The most recently evolved part of the cortex, often simply 
called the cortex. 
 
Occipital Lobe  The area of the cortex at the rear of the brain. Visual processing 
begins in area V1 in this lobe. 
 
Parietal Lobe  The area of the cortex between the occipital and temporal 
lobes. The dorsal visual pathway terminates in this lobe. 
 
Subcortical  Involving an older part of the brain, below the neocortex. 
 
Temporal Lobe  The area of the cortex behind the temples, ie between the 
frontal and parietal lobes. The ventral visual pathway 
terminates in this lobe. 
 
Thalamus  Part of the limbic system. 
 
 
NOTE: Except where otherwise attributed, the information in this appendix is drawn 
from Gazzaniga et al (2002) and Joseph (1996). 
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